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Abstract
This thesis presents three empirical studies, each motivated by separate major po-
litical economy events that took place in the recent past, namely the 2014 Scottish
independence referendum, 2016 EU referendum and the 2016 US presidential elec-
tion.
This initial empirical chapter considers the causes of ﬁscal decentralization with a
focus on the role of ethnic diversity. Using two new measures of decentralization
that capture decision making autonomy and accounting for the depth of divisions
between ethno-linguistic groups using the structure of language trees, I ﬁnd that
ethnic diversity has a positive eﬀect on decentralization. It is the amount of frac-
tionalization towards the leaves of the trees, where groups are more numerous and
less distinct, that drives decentralization.
The subsequent chapter explores the causal eﬀect of exposure to the government's
mailshot on the 2016 EU referendum. I ﬁnd that individuals who were exposed to
the leaﬂet were less likely to vote to leave the EU in the referendum. I show that the
eﬀect is driven by certain groups who only read the leaﬂet as a source of information
and Conservative supporters who were exposed to other sources of information.
The evidence is consistent with the idea that voters vary in their susceptibility to
persuasion bias, which allows for heterogeneous eﬀects across demographic groups.
The ﬁnal empirical chapter investigates the role of partisan alignment in the allo-
cation of federal transfers using data from the US states. This chapter ﬁnds that
the president shows a bias towards his co-partisans with federal transfers. The size
of this manipulation is larger when accounting for electoral incentives. The results
are in accordance with the theory that the president aims to increase his party's
re-election probability by vertical performance spill-overs from lower tiers of gover-
nance.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation and aims
This thesis is motivated by three seismic political economy events that occurred in
recent history. Namely, the 2014 Scottish independence referendum, 2016 EU refer-
endum and the 2016 US presidential election. All of which were of huge international
interest and importance. The ramiﬁcations of each event, whether successful or not,
stretch far beyond the domestic markets they immediately impact and spill onto the
international landscape.
The ﬁrst of these events, the Scottish independence referendum, took place on the
18th September 2014. This referendum gave Scottish voters the opportunity to
express whether they would like to remain a part of the United Kingdom with
further devolved ﬁscal powers or leave the union altogether. The referendum was
the panacea of the Scottish independence movement -cultured and endorsed by the
Scottish National Party, the governing party in Scotland- as it gave the people a
binding say on independence. Naturally, the fact that a referendum was even taking
place spilled over to other independence movements and furthered support for their
own separatist aspirations. The organisers of the 1st October 2017 illegal referendum
on Catalan independence likely took conﬁdence from the past Scottish attempt. The
economic implications of independence were a key factor in the outcome. Not only
would an independent Scotland struggle to join the EU, for example Spain said they
veto any attempt in order to prevent further secessionist momentum in the Basque
and Catalan regions, but independence would also require an entirely new currency
1
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as Scotland would be unable to continue to use the British pound sterling. Using
this situation as a point of motivation, it is interesting to explore how countries have
arrived at their current level of devolved ﬁscal powers. In the ﬁnal referendum count
the `No' side prevailed with 55.3% of the vote to 44.7% and Scotland remained part
of the United Kingdom. Support for a second such vote on Scottish independence
has been building since Scotland, on the whole, voted to remain in the UK's EU
referendum.
With this as a clear point of motivation, the ﬁrst aim of this thesis is to explore how
countries have arrived at their current level of decentralized ﬁscal powers. There
is a small portion of literature that assess this this question (Oates, 1972, Panizza,
1999, Letelier, 2005, Treisman, 2006, Bodman and Hodge, 2010, Sambanis and Mi-
lanovic, 2014). However, the previous work is plagued by insuﬃcient measures of
the degree of decentralization and lacks a clear focus on any one particular driver of
decentralization. In this chapter, I introduce a new set of measures by Hooghe et al.
(2016) which are a marked improvement on the current ones. Moreover, I employ
an instrumental variable estimator to ensure a proper identiﬁcation of the eﬀect of
interest, which is the amount of ethnic diversity  an area where there are currently
mixed results in the current literature.
The next event of study, and chronologically, is the aforementioned 2016 EU referen-
dum. An in-out referendum on EU membership was a promised by David Cameron,
then leader of the Conservative party, in the Conservative manifesto for the 2015
general election. This saw the Conservative party elected to government by a nar-
row majority of parliamentary seats. However, the origins of the EU referendum
go back to John Major's premiership, which created a rift within the Conservative
party on the issue of EU membership. The unchecked rise of UKIP after the 2010
and 2015 general elections, a party whose seemingly sole objective was to leave the
EU, was a further motivating factor. So, to appease party in-ﬁghting and combat
the growth of UKIP, Cameron called a referendum for the 23rd June 2016. He began
to negotiate with the EU over special status for the UK within the EU, however, the
2
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consignments were considered to be trivial. The campaign itself was characterised
by a misuse of information and statistics, particularly the leave campaign for the
argument that the UK sends ¿350 million to the EU per week, whereas the actual
ﬁgure is much smaller. The remain side was accused of scaremongering, dubbed
Project Fear by prominent leave campaigners, in response to the remain cam-
paign's apparent focus on economic pain after leaving the EU. The leave side won
the referendum with a vote share of 51.9% to 48.1% for remain. The driving force
behind this is argued by some to be because of the `left-behind' voters. Individuals
whose personal situation since the global ﬁnancial crisis has not improved and have
seen their real wages stagnate used their vote to rail against the current order. It
also is argued that another element behind the outcome was the populist overtones
in campaigning. Anti-immigration, anti-intellectual, nationalistic and isolationist
rhetoric appealed to a large proportion of the electorate who had been left behind
after the ﬁnancial crisis. Understanding the determinants of the leave vote is clearly
a critical area of research.
The second aim of this thesis is to consider what factors acted as aggravating or
mitigating factors to an individual's propensity to vote to the leave the EU. The
rapidly expanding current literature on Brexit has focused on mere correlations
between individual or regional-level characteristics and the leave vote (Langella and
Manning, 2016, Goodwin and Heath, 2016a,b, Antonucci et al., 2017, Los et al.,
2017, Colantone and Stanig, 2017, Becker et al., 2017). This chapter contributes
the ﬁrst evidence from a quasi-natural experiment on why a person may, or may
not, be more likely to vote leave. More speciﬁcally, I explore the impact of the
UK government's pro-remain leaﬂet on voting behaviour for the populist outcome
Brexit. Populism had seemingly won out in the UK, and Italy on a constitutional
referendum, although it fared worse in the French, German, Dutch and Austrian
elections. The United States, however, is a very diﬀerent case.
The 2016 presidential election in the US was contested between Democratic nominee,
Hillary Clinton, and Donald Trump, the Republican candidate. The election on
3
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the 8th November 2016 saw Donald Trump elected president winning the electoral
college by 304 to 227 votes. Despite losing the popular vote by 2.1 percentage
points, 46.1% to 48.2%, Trump took oﬃce in January 2017. The outcome was
heralded by many as one of the greatest upsets in political history. The campaign
pitted one of the most qualiﬁed people to ever run for president, a person seen
as a typical politician that would signal business as usual if elected, in the mould
of Clinton. Against a reality television star and real estate tycoon who oﬀered
something the polar opposite. Trump's campaign was modern day populism typiﬁed,
which often found him marred in controversy. Everything you need to know about
the style can be boiled down to his catchy campaign slogan `Make America Great
Again'. Since being elected, Trump has changed the status-quo. The economic
implications are vast given the size of the US economy. Withdrawing from free
trade deals like NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) signalled a more
protectionist US trade policy, whilst simultaneously taking on foreign low wage
manufacturing sectors, such as China and Mexico, that Trump believed to be taking
US jobs. The US stock markets grew their market capitalisation on the speculation of
corporate tax cuts, relaxing fossil fuel regulations and huge domestic infrastructure
spending, the latter of which is unlikely to happen. These are just two examples of
the economic consequences of the election, but both have global repercussions and
spill-overs.
Even the Trump case in isolation makes it crucial to understand how the president
can consolidate his, and his party's, power. The literature has established that
central leaders redistribute funds disproportionately to their co-partisans across the
world (see, e.g., Veiga and Pinho (2007) for Portugal, Fouirnaies and Mutlu-Eren
(2015) for the UK or Rumi (2014) for Argentina), and that electoral cycles exist
at the both the federal and state-level in the US (Tufte, 1978, Alesina et al., 1997,
Levitt, 1997). However, they have yet to be combined to explore the electoral in-
centives that underpin why, in this context, a president may favour his co-partisans
at the lower tiers of government. This is the third and ﬁnal aim of this thesis.
4
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1.1.1 Overview of chapter 2
This chapter analyses the causes of ﬁscal decentralization. The ﬁrst objective is
to identify the speciﬁc role ethnic diversity plays and contribute to the relatively
new strand of diversity and economic development literature. The second is to
contribute a new set of decentralization measures that better capture the decision
making autonomy each sub-national government has.
The analysis uses evidence from a cross-section of 78 countries, which features small
island nations like Haiti and large wealthy countries such as the US. A new dataset
of decentralization measures are used to better capture the true degree of ﬁscal de-
centralization. In addition, this chapter employs data on long-run ethnic diversity
that accounts for the depth of cleavages between ethno-linguistic groups. A method-
ical contribution is also made by using an instrumental variable approach. This is
adopted to account for endogeneity concerns, in particular reverse causality. The
methodology involves instrumenting diversity with the origin of anatomically mod-
ern human life in a given country  a plausibly exogenous driver of ethnic diversity.
The ﬁndings show that increasing levels of diversity leads to a higher degree of of de-
centralization. More speciﬁcally, I ﬁnd that it is the ﬁner, more superﬁcial cleavages
between the ethno-linguistic groups that is driving the degree of decentralization.
Using events of civil unrest, this chapter also argues that more sub-national auton-
omy is provided for reasons of political inclusivity to integrate the diverse popu-
lation into a locality, which is in accordance with Alesina and Ferrara (2005) and
economic eﬃciency. The policy implications of this chapter are simple yet impor-
tant. As the world continues on its path becoming a more open and globalised place,
authority will continue to become more decentralized in order to avoid tensions de-
veloping. The extent to which decentralization can be seen as positive outcome
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relies on its ability to increase ethnic integration and create economic growth.
1.1.2 Overview of chapter 3
Chapter 3 investigates the UK government's pro-remain leaﬂet as a potential de-
terminant of vote preference in the 2016 EU referendum. This chapter is the ﬁrst
evidence from a quasi-natural experiment in a novel setting of the EU referendum.
It directly contributes to the literature on what, or who, drove the Brexit vote.
Using data from the British Election Study (BES), this chapter implements a match-
ing and diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence methodology to identify the causal eﬀect of exposure
to the government's EU leaﬂet. I use a sample of 6,123 individuals who were sur-
veyed in the weeks leading up to the referendum and are located across the UK.
After careful considerations regarding the identiﬁcation strategy, the argument is
further supported using two sub-samples of individuals: those who were exposed
to low levels of other referendum information and those who used multiple sources
of information. Furthermore, this chapter allows for a heterogeneous treatment ef-
fect across various demographic groups, which is in accordance with the idea that
groups of individuals who are more liable to persuasion bias should be aﬀected to a
greater extent. This chapter also examines the mechanism of impact by exploiting
additional survey questions. More speciﬁcally, it tests whether the leaﬂet aﬀected
turnout or acted as a persuasive tool for turning leave votes into remain votes.
The ﬁndings of this chapter show that exposure to the leaﬂet did in fact reduce
an individuals probability of voting leave by 3 percentage points. By splitting the
sample between individuals with levels of high and low levels of exposure to other
referendum information, I show that demographics who are more liable to persua-
sion bias, with low levels of other information exposure, are driving this eﬀect. For
instance, females and the risk averse are even more likely to vote remain after expo-
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sure. In terms of partisanship, this research ﬁnds that individuals with high levels
of other information exposure, who are Conservative partisans, are again even more
likely to vote remain. The chapter presents the persuasive mechanism by examining
how an individual's opinion of a particular contentious issue if a leave vote won
changes after exposure. In terms of policy implications, this chapter oﬀers insights
into a more eﬀective political campaign based on undiluted, clear information and
a more targeted campaign based on persuasion.
1.1.3 Overview of chapter 4
Chapter 4 focuses on the role of partisan alignment, between the US president and
state governors, in the allocation of federal grants to US states over the period 1950
 2008. This is an exploration of how an elected president may seek to consolidate
power and maintain oﬃce at the presidential level for his party.
A ﬁxed eﬀects methodology is applied here and the eﬀect is identiﬁed using the
quasi-randomness of alignment in the US. This chapter constructs an argument to
show that the alignment bias towards co-partisans is driven by electoral incentives.
Here, I use the exogenous variation of the national electoral calendar to identify the
alignment eﬀect in election years. Additional evidence to support the electorally
driven argument is shown by exploiting the existence of swing states based on the
margin of victory in past presidential elections. I also show which political party is
driving the eﬀect and provide an explanation as to why this may be. This chapter
also investigates the role of the governors personal characteristics that the president
may duly consider when allocating funds. In particular, gender, age, term limits
and prior political careers.
The ﬁndings show that the growth rate of grants increases when the president and
governor are of the same party, that is, when they are politically aligned. Moreover,
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I ﬁnd that in election and pre-election years the amount of grants increases signiﬁ-
cantly more. This electorally driven argument is supported by exploring the role of
swing states. These are states that are critical to winning the electoral college on
the way to the presidency, I ﬁnd that these are disproportionately targeted when a
co-partisan of the president is governor. This chapter also ﬁnds that governors with
prior political experience in congress receive more transfers on a bi-partisan basis,
which reﬂects their superior lobbying skills. The results are in accordance with the
idea that the president wishes to beneﬁt from positive vertical spill-over eﬀects of
governance. The policy implications here are based on a more merit orientated sys-
tem of federal money allocation in order to avoid partisan bias.
1.2 Organisation of this thesis
The following three chapters employ modern econometric techniques to identify
the eﬀect of interest. The type of data varies from chapter-to-chapter; starting
with cross-country in chapter 2, then using individual-level data in chapter 3 and
culminating with the use of regional-level data in chapter 4. The remainder of this
thesis is organised as follows.
Chapter 2 begins by introducing the research in terms of the previous literature
and highlighting the various pieces of literature that have explored determinants of
decentralization. The proceeding section then discusses the relevant data. Here, I
outline the construction and beneﬁts of the new set of decentralization measures. In
the next subsection I set out the OLS and instrumental variable empirical strategies.
Following this I present the results from a replication of a seminal paper, the baseline
model and the main results, which includes a discussion of instrument strength and
relevance. I also present some supporting anecdotal evidence here. Then I conduct a
number of robustness checks, which are standard in the literature. The ﬁnal section
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in this chapter concludes.
I begin chapter 3 by giving some information on the EU referendum and the govern-
ment's leaﬂet. The idea here is to not provide a deep survey of the current literature
on Brexit, but to give a background on how the leaﬂet acted as a possible deter-
minant of vote preference. The next section characterises the individual-level data
and sets out the main explanatory variable. Some further motivation is provided by
the descriptive statistics and a brief look at the polling data around the time the
leaﬂet was sent out to households. Following this, I set out the empirical strategy
to identify the leaﬂet's eﬀect on voting behaviour. The following section presents
the results. First, to illustrate the quality of the data, I show that the data is an
accurate predictor of who voted for Brexit.1 Second, I perform the matching exercise
for the full sample of individuals. I then split the sample between individuals who
were exposed to other sources of referendum information to a low and high degree
of exposure. I focus on the low exposed group ﬁrst and re-estimate the matching
approach by demographic group. In doing so, this allows for a heterogeneous treat-
ment eﬀect. I conduct a number of placebo tests here and support my ﬁndings with
an alternative diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence methodology. Then the matching exercise by
demographic is repeated for the sub-sample of individuals who were exposed to mul-
tiple sources of information. The last part of the results section performs a number
of robustness checks. The next section examines the persuasive mechanism behind
the leaﬂet and supports the ﬁndings with a set of placebo tests. The ﬁnal section in
chapter 3 concludes and oﬀers some avenues of future research.
In chapter 4 I start by giving an overview of the related literature on partisan align-
ment, electoral cycles and then set out this chapter's contribution. I then discuss the
theoretical reasons why a politician would favour a co-partisan. This entails going
through the arguments of `credit claiming', the underlying electoral incentives and
1 That is, the results reﬂect the associations of who voted for Brexit that are common in the media
and other scholarly work.
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the personal traits of the governor  as I expect that governors with certain traits
are likely to attract more favouritism. The next section in this chapter then sets out
the institutional framework in the US. In particular, I make clear how the president
and governors interact with one-another. Some quotes that further motivate the
research are presented that showcase a direct relationship between the two tiers of
political oﬃce. The following section sets out the dataset used and characterises the
variables of interest. I present the spatial distribution of the alignment variable and
show how alignment can take place in a quasi-random manner. The next section sets
out the main results. I ﬁrst focus on partisan alignment exclusively. Secondly, I pur-
sue the electoral motives by exploring alignment's interaction the electoral calendar
and then with swing states. Thirdly, I examine the role of experience in determining
the amount of transfers to the governors. In the next section I split the alignment
into two: Democratic and Republican alignment. This is to assess which party is
driving the eﬀect. This is followed by a section of falsiﬁcation tests to strengthen
my overall suppositions. The ﬁnal element to this chapter is to conclude, provide
some limitations and ideas for further research.
This thesis concludes in chapter 5. Here, I summarise the implications of this thesis
for social scientists, economists and the wider society. I begin by presenting each
chapter's main ﬁndings and provide an economic interpretation of the main eﬀect
of interest. Then I discuss the policy implications, limitations and possible future
research. For the second chapter, I highlight the potential roadmap of decentral-
ization in an increasingly globalised world. With respect to the third chapter, I
propose more eﬀective strategies for future political campaigns based on a targeted
scheme of persuasion rather than a canvassed approach. And in the fourth chapter
this thesis suggests some policy reforms in order to retreat from ineﬀectual partisan
politics.
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Chapter 2 Explaining ﬁscal decentralization and the
role of ethnic diversity
The ﬁrst empirical chapter is motivated by the ﬁrst of three major political economy
events, namely the 2014 Scottish independence referendum. The Scottish referen-
dum took place to determine whether Scotland would break away from the United
Kingdom and operate as an independent nation. The Scottish electorate voted to re-
main a member of the UK and further ﬁscal powers were devolved from Westminster
to the Scottish parliament. Using this referendum as the backdrop for this empirical
chapter, I ask what are the speciﬁc drivers of decentralization across countries and
focus particularly on the role of ethnic diversity.
2.1 Introduction
Decentralization has been linked to various economic outcomes. For instance, a
higher degree of ﬁscal decentralization is associated with less corruption (Fisman
and Gatti, 2002), a smaller informal sector (Teobaldelli, 2010) and a more eﬃcient
provision of public goods (Faguet, 2004, Escaleras and Register, 2010). Conversely,
more decentralization has been shown to reduce the eﬀectiveness of aid (Lessmann
and Markwardt, 2016) and to lower the rate of inﬂation (Neyapti, 2004, Baskaran,
2012). Across countries, we observe very diﬀerent levels of decentralization and
there is portion of literature that seeks to address how this variation has come
about, which this paper contributes to. Moreover, given the variety of outcomes
decentralization is associated with, it is critical to understand how countries have
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become relatively more decentralized than others.
The overarching objective of this paper is to explore the determinants of ﬁscal de-
centralization with a speciﬁc focus on the role of ethno-linguistic fractionalization.
The relationship between the two is not new to the literature, although the empir-
ical evidence is mixed (see e.g., Treisman (2006) for a negative eﬀect or Panizza
(1999) and Dreher et al. (2018) for a positive eﬀect). Not only has fractionalization
been shown to have an aﬀect on decentralization, but it has also been shown to
aﬀect a wide variety of economic and political outcomes, which is addressed in a
wide body of literature. First abridged by Easterly and Levine (1997), who show
the negative consequences of fractionalization on development, which has since been
conﬁrmed by Alesina et al. (2003), Desmet et al. (2012), Ashraf and Galor (2013b)
and Papyrakis and Mo (2014). Additionally, many papers demonstrate how internal
fractionalization increases the risk of the onset of violent civil conﬂict (Fearon and
Laitin, 2003, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005, Desmet et al., 2012).
Whilst addressing the main goal of this paper, I make 2 contributions. The ﬁrst
of which is in relation to the measurement of decentralization. On the whole, the
literature has used sub-national revenue or expenditure shares as proxies for the
degree of ﬁscal decentralization but has persitently noted a desire for a better mea-
sure (Fisman and Gatti, 2002, Rodden, 2004, Enikolopov and Zhuraskaya, 2007,
Teobaldelli, 2010). The revenue and expenditure share measures are of course sub-
ject to severe criticism for many reasons, the two main reasons being that they
severely overestimate the extent of ﬁscal decentralization and capture little decision
making autonomy (Stegarescu, 2005). The measures introduced in this paper, from
the Regional Authority Index (RAI) produced by Hooghe et al. (2016), are a dis-
tinct improvement. These measures capture the degree of actual decision-making
authority, on ﬁscal issues, that sub-national governments constitutionally hold.1
1 These measures are also an improvement on the measures of policy decentralization as they measure
actual decision making-authority on ﬁscal issues. It is noteworthy to mention however that ﬁscal
and political decentralization are highly correlated (see, e.g., Treisman (1997) or Rodden (2004)
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The second contribution lies in the treatment of fractionalization as an endogenous
variable, which is currently not the case in the decentralization literature. The pre-
vious work treats fractionalization as exogenous, however, this assumption is being
challenged in recent work that examines the eﬀect of fractionalization on growth
(Ahlerup and Olsson, 2012, Casey and Owen, 2014). As most migration occurs
into those countries with higher levels of economic and institutional development,
both related to decentralization, it implies that OLS coeﬃcients will be downwardly
biased (Freeman, 2006). Reverse causality is likely another source of endogeneity
as diverse groups would sort themselves into more decentralized nations. In light
of these concerns, I build primarily on the previous work by Ahlerup and Olsson
(2012) on the historical determinants of fractionalization, which identiﬁes a suitable
instrument for examining the role ethno-linguistic heterogeneity.2 Speciﬁcally, I use
the origin of anatomically modern human life in each country as an instrument for
ethno-linguistic diversity. This follows from the premise that a longer settlement
duration breeds more ethnic heterogeneity.
This paper ﬁnds that there is a positive relationship between the level of ethno-
linguistic fractionalization and the degree of decentralization for reasons of economic
eﬃciency and political inclusivity. More speciﬁcally, it is the amount of fractional-
ization at the lower levels of aggregation where there are more groups, which are
less distinctly deﬁned, that drive the decentralizing of ﬁscal authority. Whereas,
the perennial groups, where cleavages are at their deepest, bear no impact for on
the degree of decentralization. Importantly, when treating fractionalization as an
endogenous variable in the appropriate manner, the relationship persists.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. The proceeding section, 2.2, presents
and discusses the theoretical determinants of decentralization that have been used
for a discussion on the diﬀerent concepts of decentralization).
2 There are other seminal works on the origins of ethno-linguistic diversity (see, e.g., Michalopoulos
(2012) and Ashraf and Galor (2013a)).
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in the previous literature. Section 2.3 describes the data, presents the empirical
strategy and some anecdotal evidence. Section 2.4 presents the main results of
the empirical analysis. The following section, 2.5, presents a number of robustness
checks on the results and section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Theoretical determinants
2.2.1 Ethno-linguistic heterogeneity
The primary focus of this paper is the role of ethno-linguistic diversity, which has
a strong theoretical grounding with respect to decentralization  ﬁrst introduced
into the decentralization theorem by Oates (1972). There are at least two such
reasons exist that warrant ethno-linguistic diversity's inclusion into a model that
explains the degree of decentralization. The ﬁrst focuses on economic eﬃciency.
As diﬀerent ethnic groups show heterogeneity in their preferences for public good
provision it is expected that more fractionalized countries will therefore tend to be
relatively more decentralized to provide diﬀerent public goods regionally (Oates,
1972, Treisman, 2006). This relies on the idea that local governments are better
placed to get constituents to reveal such preference heterogeneity (Tanzi, 2000).
The example used in the literature to illustrate this channel is the decentralization
of education policy. If the setting of this policy is decentralized to the sub-national
level, then diﬀerent ethnic groups can set the syllabi and ﬁnancing in-line with their
preferences.
The second reason is for political inclusivity. Decentralization can be used as a policy
to integrate minorities into society. In particular if the central government decides
to decentralize authority over issues of contention it will help to restrain communal
violence, ethnic tensions or even civil war organized along ethnic lines (Treisman,
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2006, Sambanis and Milanovic, 2014). By doing so, decentralizing authority will
involve minorities into the policy making process to create and set decentralized
policies. This falls in accordance with Alesina and Ferrara (2005), who argue that
the implications of an ever increasingly fractionalized country fall partly on the local
authorities to implement policies that increase racial integration. Prior empirical
work has, however, only taken a two-dimensional approach to diversity (Oates, 1972,
Panizza, 1999, Garrett and Rodden, 2003, Treisman, 2006, Dreher et al., 2018). This
paper allows for a historical dimension in the analysis.
2.2.2 Other determinants of decentralization
The ﬁrst key determinant is the level of income. Much of the empirical literature
has found a positive relationship between income and decentralization (Oates, 1972,
Panizza, 1999, Garrett and Rodden, 2003, Letelier, 2005, Bodman and Hodge, 2010,
Sambanis and Milanovic, 2014). This follows that decentralization is perceived to
be a superior good and demand therefore increases with the level of income (Tanzi,
2000). As individuals become richer, more educated and have more free time, they
may also have more motivation to participate in making local policy decisions, so
more autonomy is demanded.
Larger countries should also be relatively more decentralized (Garrett and Rodden,
2003, Bodman and Hodge, 2010, Dreher et al., 2018). As the country size increases,
the cost of governing from the center increases. The dis-economy of scale of gover-
nance increases with country size when governing from the center only. In a large
decentralized nation, for instance, there will exist decreasing per capita cost of pub-
lic goods and economies of scale in taxation beyond a certain level. With a larger
country surface area, the diﬃculty of satisfying a diverse population is particularly
costly and can result in secession or civil conﬂict (Oates, 1972, Alesina and Spolaore,
1997). Implicit in this, is the idea that there are clear eﬃciency gains to make from
decentralizing authority in larger nations.
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A less straight forward determinant is the amount of natural resources. Sambanis
and Milanovic (2014) show that, on a regional-level, areas with a greater share of
natural resources in regional GDP should demand more autonomy to control the
natural resources in their jurisdiction. However, on a country-level, it is possible
that countries with a greater endowment of natural resources will tend to be more
centralized as central policy makers will seek to gain from the externalities of con-
sumption and production, whereas the costs are born locally (Dreher et al., 2018).
The quality of democracy has been shown to go hand-in-hand with decentralization
(Alesina and Spolaore, 1997, Garrett and Rodden, 2003, Treisman, 2006). Central
governments may wish to create strong sub-national governments to involve the
citizens in policy making rather than exploiting their agenda-setting power. Stronger
lower tier governments also act as a check on the central government from being
abusive. Furthermore, the fall of autocratic regimes and creation of better political
institutions was quickly followed a dispersion of power and drive toward the provision
of local rights. Examples here include the fall of Franco in Spain and the Communist
party in the Soviet Union.
The system of governance may also aﬀect the degree of decentralization. Presidential
regimes are often associated with smaller governments relative to parliamentary
ones (Persson and Tabellini, 2003). Thus, parliamentary regimes may be more
decentralized in order to eﬀectively allocate the budget across the diﬀerent layers of
government.
There are a number of other drivers of decentralization. First, as discussed by Gorod-
nichenko and Roland (2015), historical disease prevalence should have a centralizing
eﬀect on the government due to the negative externalities from disease transmission.
Thus, a country with a more repeated history of disease should be more centralized.
Globalization has potential impacts on the ﬁscal system. On one hand, Alesina and
Spolaore (1997) and Bolton and Roland (1997) argue that decentralization is likely
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to occur on the way to secession because of globalization. Whereas, Garrett and
Rodden (2003) show empirically that globalization has a centralizing eﬀect. One
reason why one may expect to ﬁnd a centralizing eﬀect in more globalized countries
is because these countries may need to concentrate export and import taxes at
the central government level. Taxing global trade at the local level is not feasible
(Letelier, 2005, Bodman and Hodge, 2010).
Population heterogeneity in terms of the demographic structure may also drive de-
centralization. The share of the elderly in a country goes beyond what ethnic diver-
sity captures. That is, it captures public good and service preference heterogeneity
between age groups. Consistent with this logic, the population living in more vari-
able land areas may also have diﬀerent preferences.
More tiers of governance may seem obviously correlated with more decentralization.
However, with more tiers of governance real decision making authority may actu-
ally be diluted. This is especially interesting to examine with the decentralization
measures used in this paper.
Lastly, inequality may also have an eﬀect. As Sambanis and Milanovic (2014) argues
high inequality will hinder collective action in pursuit of regional autonomy. It
would ultimately undermine social cohesion and therefore have a centralizing eﬀect.
Moreover, ﬁscal redistribution in a highly unequal country may be more diﬃcult in
highly decentralized systems.
2.3 Data and methods
2.3.1 Data and variables
In order to characterise the baseline model, I begin by following the previous liter-
ature, in particular the paper by Panizza (1999), to which this one is most closely
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related. The author addresses the determinants of decentralization and ﬁnds no
signiﬁcant eﬀect for fractionalization. Despite treating fractionalization as an exoge-
nous variable, the speciﬁcation used is a natural starting point for my speciﬁcations.
I use two diﬀerent measures of decentralization as dependent variables. These are
taken from the RAI derived by Hooghe et al. (2016). This dataset contains infor-
mation on 80 countries over the period 1950  2010.3 The sample contains a set
of countries that have a varied set of characteristics. There is a mix of developed
and developing nations with diﬀerent systems of governance, democratic rights and
levels of income. The full list of countries contained in the sample is found in Table
2.1 and the spatial distribution in Figures 2.1 and 2.2. This paper focuses on two
particular aspects of decentralization, that is, the degree of ﬁscal and borrowing au-
tonomy. The former, denoted FISC, represents the extent to which a sub-national
government can independently tax its population and is scored between 0 and 4. 0
means that the central government sets the base rate of all regional taxes, and 4
means that the regional government sets the base rate of at least one major tax.
The latter, denoted BORRO, represents the extent to which a sub-national gov-
ernment can borrow autonomously and is scored between 0 and 3. 0 indicates that
borrowing is prohibited and 3 means that a sub-national government may borrow
without any centrally imposed restrictions. Both variables are naturally ordered so
that lower values represent a lower degree of decentralization.45 These measures
are a signiﬁcant improvement on the commonly used expenditure or revenue shares
as they capture actual decision making autonomy, are not aﬀected by business cy-
cle ﬂuctuations as changes in the RAI measures require constitutional change and
therefore they should be accurate measures of the extent of decentralization.
The measure of ethnic heterogeneity, Fractionalization, is the probability that two
3 Two countries are dropped due to the availability of independent variable data availability.
4 Both measures, can take values higher than their maximum due to population weighting. See
Hooghe et al. (2016) for a complete discussion on the construction of these measures.
5 For a full breakdown of each value of the decentralization measures see Table 2.2.
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randomly selected individuals will be from a diﬀerent ethno-linguistic group. The
favoured measures are the Desmet et al. (2012) measures, which account for how
perennial or superﬁcial the cleavages across groups are by using country speciﬁc
language trees. The fractionalization measure at the highest level of aggregation
(towards the tree leaves), where cleavages are at their deepest and least numerous
is denoted ELF1. The lowest level of aggregation (towards the tree roots), where
cleavages are at their most superﬁcial and most numerous is captured by ELF15.
The chosen measures in this paper oﬀer a signiﬁcant improvement on approaches in
the previous literature that use the older measures, as I allow for a three-dimensional
approach to diversity. The fractionalization measures are discussed and motivated
in greater detail in the following subsection.
A number of studies have begun to question the exogeneity assumption in fraction-
alization. For example, as most migration occurs into countries with higher levels
of economic and institutional development, this imples that OLS coeﬃcients will
underestimate the impact of fractionalization (Freeman, 2006). Darity et al. (2006)
argue that ethnic identities are not deﬁnite categories and the choice to identify as a
group is in response to costs and beneﬁts. As argued by Alesina and Spolaore (1997)
national boundaries may also be endogenous. This would create reverse causality
between decentralization and fractionalization. Moreover, it is plausible that more
diverse groups will sort themselves into more decentralized countries as there is
likely a better chance of integrating into society. There are potential unobserved
factors that are correlated with the dependent and the main independent variable,
for instance the preferences of the centralized policy maker with respect to their
desired degree of decentralization. Thus, the contribution here lies in the treat-
ment of ethno-linguistic fractionalization as endogenous with respect to the degree
of decentralization. The instrumental variable method in this paper should alleviate
these concerns and represents an improvement over the current approaches in the
established literature. This approach will also provide more consistent estimates in
the presence of measurement error in the independent variable (Angrist and Pischke,
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2014).
Given the endogeneity concerns for fractionalization, identifying a valid instrument
is crucial to correctly identifying the eﬀect. That is, meeting the exclusion restric-
tion (the instrument must be uncorrelated with decentralization), the independence
assumption (unrelated to unobservables in the second-stage) and is suﬃciently cor-
related with fractionalization. Fortunately, there exists a recent literature on the his-
torical determinants of fractionalization which provides such an instrument. Thus,
to instrument for fractionalization, I follow Ahlerup and Olsson (2012) who show
that the origin of anatomically modern human life, Origtime, in a given country
is positively correlated with more ethno-linguistic heterogeneity. Life started in
the Rift valley in Ethopia 160,000 years ago and spread throughout Africa, and
this where one ﬁnds the most diversity. Conversely, nations in Latin America were
colonised by humans much later and have relatively little diversity. This follows from
the evidence that a country being colonised by modern humans for longer creates
more ethno-linguistic diversity. Moreover, in this IV framework, I assume that the
settlement date is not correlated with countries' current unobserved characteristics,
as long as I condition on current income the instrument should be valid. Using the
variation in modern human settlement dates as an instrument for fractionalization
is not new to the literature as it has been successfully employed in the same manner
by Ahlerup (2010) and Casey and Owen (2014) to explain variation in income.6
The remaining control variables are as follows. The ﬁrst three covariates form the
speciﬁcation from Panizza (1999). To capture to the level of income I use the
natural log of real GDP per capita in 2000 US dollars. To capture country size I
use the natural log of country surface area (in square kilometres), and to capture
political institutions I use the level of democracy  measured by the average of the
civil liberties and political rights indices from Freedom House. The following main
6 Other relevant instruments are tested, such as genetic diversity Ashraf and Galor (2013b), migra-
tory distance Ashraf and Galor (2013a) and absolute latitude. ORIGTIME, however, statistically
performs the best.
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control variables are from other related previous literatures, these are: proportion
of the population aged 65 or over, total natural resource rents as a share of GDP
and the historical prevalence of seven disease causing pathogens from Murray and
Schaller (2010).
A set of previously discussed extended controls are also used for robustness pur-
poses. The KOF index of trade globalization is used to proxy for globalization
(Gygli et al., 2018). The share of arable land from Ashraf and Galor (2013b),
the Gini index of market income inequality (Solt, 2016), a dummy inductor for a
parliamentary government (Cruz et al., 2016) and the number of tiers of elected
sub-national government (World Bank, 1999). Further controls include historical
dummies that are typical to this type of literature, namely colonial history and legal
heritage dummies, which will help alleviate the omitted variable bias. Summary
statistics, cross correlation tables and complete variable descriptions with sources
are detailed in Table 2.4, 2.5, 2.6 and listed in the Appendix.
2.3.2 Fractionalization measures
Ethnic fractionalization was ﬁrst introduced into economic models by Easterly and
Levine (1997) who considered the role it has for growth in Africa. As mentioned
above, the chosen fractionalization measure to be used in this chapter comes from
Desmet et al. (2012). There are, however, a variety of other measures that capture
ethnic and ethno-linguistic diﬀerences in the population. Measures constructed prior
to Desmet et al. (2012) are the Fearon (2003) index of ethnic fractionalization and
the Alesina et al. (2003) measure of ethno-linguistic fractionalization. The Fearon
(2003) measure is constructed using data from Library of Congress Country Study,
Encyclopedia Britannica and the CIA World Factbook, it does not take into account
linguistic distance, and the Alesina et al. (2003) measure is constructed from data
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contained in the Encyclopedia Britannica and the CIA World Factbook.7 Whilst
both these measures imply divisions across groups, they have come under criticism
as they convey no information about how deep-set these divisions are (Posner, 2004)
and are very likely out of date (Laitin and Posner, 2001).
The newer Desmet et al. (2012) measure captures how deep the cleavages between
groups are by using data grouped in hierarchical linguistic trees in the Ethnologue
15th edition database. Thus the key advantage of this data is that it allows this
paper to bring a historical dimension to the analysis. A hypothetical linguistic tree
is shown in Figure 2.6 to illustrate how the size of groups matter, and an example
linguistic tree is shown in Figure 2.7 to depict the types of group at each level of
aggregation. At the top of the hierarchy, i.e. the roots of the tree, the cleavages
are a result of prehistoric group formation (Ashraf and Galor, 2013a). As you move
further down the tree, towards the leaves and away from the roots, the groups
become less distinct and more numerous. The cleavages here are created as a legacy
of colonialism or the dynamics of cultural drift from uninterrupted human settlement
in a given location (Ahlerup and Olsson, 2012). The following formula is applied to
the diﬀerent branches of the trees to create the Desmet et al. (2012) measures:
ELF (j) = 1−
N(j)∑
i(j)=1
[si(j)]
2 (2.1)
for i(j) = 1, ..., N(j) groups of size sij, where j = 1, ..., J denotes the level of ag-
gregation. This ranges from 1 to 15, 1 being the most aggregated and 15 the most
disaggregated levels of groups. These disaggregated measures of fractionalization
are the ones this paper will use in the empirical analysis.
7 The algebraic formula to derive each of these indices are found in Table 2.3.
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2.3.3 Anecdotal evidence
For the cross-country analysis in the following sections it requires that nations do
not vary much over time in their values of decentralization. Inevitably this is not
always the case. Therefore, I can assess a particular example where there has been a
change in population diversity followed by a change in the degree of decentralization
with a descriptive lens to ﬁrst motivate the relationship.
To illustrate this, consider the case of the EU and Italy. The EU project has under-
gone repeated enlargements since its inception, ranging from the countries under the
Iron Curtain in the east to those on the Iberian peninsula in the west. The accession
of the Mediterranean and northern European countries throughout the latter part of
the 20th century and the principle of free movement allowed the unrestricted ﬂows
of various ethno-linguistic groups to diﬀerent nations within the EU. For example,
Italy, whose geographical placement is unique in Europe because of its proximity to
Africa and short distance to the Anatolian peninsula, has seen drastic changes in the
recent past. Italy, who joined the EU in 1958, has experienced a persistent increase
in foreign nationals settling within its borders, with a large proportion coming from
eastern Europe, according to the World Bank's migration data. This experience
exempliﬁes an increase in the internal ethno-linguistic diversity of Italy. Over the
same period, there has been a steady increase in the amount of ﬁscal authority
decentralized to Italian sub-national governments. There has been constitutional
reforms to municipal and regional governments, larger cities now elect a mayor and
there are presidents of each region (Grisorio and Prota, 2015). Figure 2.8 shows
the years where the EU was expanded and plots the level of ﬁscal and borrowing
authority over the period 19802010. Turning to the fractionalization data at the
lower levels of aggregation, where intra-european migration would impact, Italy has
a value of 0.5922. Implying that there is 59.33% chance that two randomly selected
individuals will be from the diﬀerent ethno-linguistic groups. For comparison, the
UK's ELF15 value is 0.1395, or a 13.95% chance. Whilst migration is unlikely to
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be the sole cause of such changes, there is some anecdotal evidence that supports a
correlation between diversity and decentralization.
2.3.4 Empirical strategy
The strategy is to ﬁrst present results from a basic cross-country OLS estimation to
show the association between fractionalization and decentralization. I then perform
Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimation to apply a causal interpretation to the
relationship. The second- and ﬁrst-stage regression equations can be formalised,
respectively, as follows:
yi = α0 + β1 ̂Fractionalizationi + β2Xi + i (2.2)
Fractionalizationi = α1 + φ1Origtimei + φ2Xi + νi (2.3)
where yi is one of the measures of decentralization, either ﬁscal or borrowing auton-
omy, in country i. Fractionalizationi is one of the various ethno-linguistic fraction-
alization measures that takes a value between 0 and 1, where 1 represents certainty
that two randomly selected individuals will be from diﬀerent ethno-linguistic groups.
Xi is a set of previously discussed control variables and i and νi are the error terms.
As mentioned above, the instrument Origtimei, is the number of years anatomically
modern humans have been settled in a given country and is scaled to 100,000 years.
The decentralization measures are available in country-year format, however, there
is little variation over time to exploit (see Figure 2.3 and 2.4). So for these and
all other variables that vary over time, they are collapsed into their average value
for the 2005  2010 period.8 Consistent with the main hypothesis and reasoning
previously discussed, I expect β1 and φ1 to be positive and statistically signiﬁcant.
8 As a robustness check, the regressions are repeated using 1999  2004 data and the results are
unchanged.
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A positive and signiﬁcant φ1 coeﬃcient indicates that a longer duration of human
settlement creates more fractionalization. A positive and signiﬁcant β1 will then
mean that more fractionalized countries causes a higher degree of decentralization.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Panizza (1999) replication
As a brief exercise before beginning the main analysis, I replicate the analysis pro-
duced by Panizza (1999). This is useful in this context as it allows the results from
the new data to be compared to the seminal paper in the literature.
The results are presented in Table 2.7. Using FISC and BORRO as a depen-
dent variable in odd and even columns, respectively, the results align with those in
Panizza (1999). Country size and income are both robustly positively associated
with more decentralization. Fractionalization, as a proxy for heterogeneity in pub-
lic good preferences, is again positively associated with more decentralization. The
coeﬃcient for democracy is generally positive but not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
0, which is again parallel to the ﬁndings of Panizza (1999). Overall, one can be
conﬁdent that the new decentralization and fractionalization measures produce a
comparable relationship to that shown in previous seminal work.
2.4.2 Baseline model
Given the number of ethno-lignuistic indices available, I begin by cycling the indices
for one another in separate regressions that includes the baseline set of controls. This
cycling technique is especially useful in this case as it allows the data to guide the
research to the most appropriate measure of diversity and is used by Desmet et al.
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(2012) and Michalopoulos (2012).9 The results of this exercise are presented in Table
2.8.
Before discussing the fractionalization variables of interest, I make a comparison of
the control variables here to those in the previous in order to motivate the validity
of the new data as viable measures of decentralization. Income and country size are
robustly positive and signiﬁcant across all speciﬁcations, which chimes with a large
portion of the empirical literature (Panizza, 1999, Garrett and Rodden, 2003). The
share of the elderly and democracy are positively related to decentralization albeit
insigniﬁcantly so in most columns.10 Natural resource rents appear to have a per-
sistent centralizing eﬀect as in Dreher et al. (2018). The eﬀect of historic pathogen
prevalence is also very small and not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0. All things con-
sidered, one can be conﬁdent that these are valid measures of ﬁscal decentralization.
Turning to the fractionalization measures, the results are notably interesting. At
the higher levels of aggregation, closer to ELF1, the coeﬃcients are statistically
insigniﬁcant. When the level of aggregation is decreased, moving towards ELF15,
capturing a larger number of ethno-linguistic groups, the coeﬃcients become signif-
icant at the 1% level. Qualitatively, ELF15 can be interpreted as a country moving
from a population of complete homogeneity to complete heterogeneity would be 1.5
points more decentralized. Evaluated at the mean FISC score, the average country
with complete population heterogeneity would have sub-national governments that
are able to set the base and rate of minor taxes, holding all else constant. This
indicates that the deep ancestral cleavages between groups bear no impact on the
level of decentralization. It is, however, the more recent superﬁcial cleavages that
eﬀect the degree of decentralization. These are the cleavages created by the legacy
of colonialism and interrupted settlement. The reason why this time dimension ef-
9 Desmet et al. (2012) use the cycling technique to show that ELF15 is associated with lower growth
and public good provision, whereas ELF1 is related to the onset of civil war and redistribution.
10The results here remain the same when using the dichotomous measure of democracy from Boix
et al. (2013).
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fect of fractionalization on decentralization exists may be because it is the sheer
number of ethno-linguistic groups that drive decentralization rather than the deep
diﬀerences between a small number of groups.
Whilst this exercise has produce some intriguing results, they are taken with cau-
tion because of the endogeneity problem and further controls to introduce.11 To
proceed to the next stage of the analysis, this paper focuses on the ELF15 measure
of fractionalization.12
2.4.3 Additional controls
Following from analysis of the previous subsection, I now proceed to explore how
the coeﬃcient for ELF15 is aﬀected in diﬀerent OLS model speciﬁcations. In Table
2.9 columns (1) - (5) the dependent variable is the degree of ﬁscal autonomy and
in (6) - (10) it is the degree of borrowing autonomy. Simple bivariate speciﬁcations
in column (1) and (6), controlling only for income, fractionalization is positive and
signiﬁcant. Columns (3) and (8) introduce the extended set of controls which have
a generally insigniﬁcant eﬀect on decentralization. The variable acting as a proxy
for globalization, Trade, is negative and only signiﬁcant in the borrowing autonomy
regressions. This indicates that more globalized countries, holding all else constant,
are more centralized, which supports the empirical ﬁndings in Garrett and Rodden
(2003).13 In column (4) and (9), I include controls for colonial history and in col-
umn (5) and (10) I introduce legal origin controls. A history of disease, captured
by pathogen prevalence, is negative and signiﬁcant for borrowing autonomy only,
11Another concern may be that as the aggregation of the Desmet et al. (2012) measures fall, the mean
increases. To remedy this, Table 2.8 is re-estimated with standardised measures of fractionalization
and the results remain qualitatively the same.
12The spatial distribution of ELF15 is presented in Figure 2.5.
13The results remain unaﬀected when including each variable progressively or removing Tiers of
Government, see Table 2.10.
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in line with the predictions of Gorodnichenko and Roland (2015). Here, it is un-
likely the decentralized governments could respond in unison to disease transmission
and therefore required a centralization of spending (borrowing) powers to alleviate
and eradicate disease. The fractionalization coeﬃcient remains highly signiﬁcant
throughout the columns. The average eﬀect across all columns for FISC is 1.5 and
for BORRO it is 1. This diﬀerence in magnitude reﬂects the reluctance of cen-
tral governments to decentralize spending powers relative to revenue raising powers.
From these results it appears that a fractionalization does indeed eﬀect the degree
of decentralization, to attach a causal interpretation to this eﬀect I now proceed to
the 2SLS estimates.
2.4.4 Addressing endogeneity concerns: 2SLS
Prior to discussing the main results from the instrumental variable regressions, I
examine some tests of instrument validity and strength to support the estimation
strategy. Speciﬁcally, in the bottom rows of Table 2.11 I report tests of instru-
ment strength and weak identiﬁcation that support the eﬀort to correctly identify
the eﬀect of fractionalization. The ﬁrst thing to note is the positive and statis-
tical signiﬁcance of the instrument, Origtime, in the ﬁrst-stage. As expected the
longer anatomically modern humans have been settled in a country, the more ethno-
linguistically diverse that country is. In column (2), the size of the coeﬃcient implies
that 10,000 years earlier settlement is associated with a 5.46 percentage point in-
crease in the probability that two randomly selected individuals in a population
will come from the diﬀerent ethno-linguistic groups. The full ﬁrst stage results are
reported in Table 2.12 and the correlation is shown graphically in Table 2.9. The F-
statistic is the ﬁrst-stage F-statistic which measures the strength of the instrument.
Values below the rule of thumb ﬁgure of 10, given by Stock and Yogo (2005), indicate
a weak instrument. In all cases but two, I can reject this null hypothesis, thus the
28
2.4. RESULTS
instrument is suﬃciently strong.14 In the presence of a weak instrument, the results
can be biased (Stock and Wright, 2000). To test whether the instrument still has a
signiﬁcant eﬀect in the presence of weak instrument, I report the Anderson-Rubin
Wald Chi2 test. The p-values indicate in all but two speciﬁcations, that should the
instrument be deemed weak, fractionalization does have a signiﬁcant eﬀect. In sum,
these diagnostic tests suggest that Origtime is a suﬃciently good instrument for
identifying the eﬀects of fractionalization.
The instrumental variable speciﬁcations directly mirror those in Table 2.9 for rea-
sons of openness. Across all columns but one, instrumented ELF15 exerts a positive
and highly signiﬁcant impact on the degree of decentralization. For example, the
results in column (2) imply that a country moving from complete population homo-
geneity to complete heterogeneity would be 2 points more decentralized in terms of
taxing power. In column (7) the results predict that a country moving from com-
plete homogeneity to heterogeneity would be 2.4 points more decentralized in terms
of borrowing autonomy. The magnitude of the coeﬃcients are larger than those
produced by OLS estimation, meaning that the OLS estimates were downwardly
biased due to the endogeneity issue. To determine whether the results are aﬀected
by omitted variables, I include the colonial and legal origin controls. The magnitude
of the fractionalization coeﬃcient estimate falls (compared to the baseline speciﬁ-
cation in (2) and (7)) but remains statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level with the
exception of coeﬃcient in column (4).
On the whole, the results of Table 2.11 imply that fractionalization has a positive
causal eﬀect on the degree of decentralization, which may act through the economic
eﬃciency and political inclusivity channels. This is consistent with much of the the-
oretical predictions in the literature, despite the shortcoming of empirical evidence.
14The instrument would be an even stronger predictor of diversity if the sample were to include
African countries to create more variation to exploit, however they are unfortunately not contained
in the RAI. Nonetheless, there is still ample variation in the sample, with old nations, such as
Indonesia and Malaysia that were ﬁrst populated 75,000 years ago, and younger ones like the UK
and Iceland, colonised 8,000 and 1,200 years ago, respectively.
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2.5 Robustness checks
This section conducts a number of checks on the sensitivity of the results. The ﬁrst
thing to consider is whether the same relationship, based on the depth and number
of cleavages, exists between borrowing decentralization and fractionalization. To do
so, I repeat the speciﬁcations in Table 2.8 but change the dependent variable to
BORRO. The results, presented in Table 2.13, remain qualitatively the same.
In a more technical aspect, I assess the robustness of the results when removing
certain groups of countries. The results are depicted in Table 2.14. I ﬁrst focus on
the stability of the dependent variable, given that I am conducting cross-country
analysis, this requires there to be little variation over time. I remove countries that
vary 2 or 1 points in their degree of decentralization over time in columns (1) - (4).
In the proceeding columns, I remove the top and bottom 10% countries by surface
area. The coeﬃcient for fractionalization across all columns remains positive and
signiﬁcant. Second, I exclude countries in the tails of the distribution of their surface
area. Columns (5) and (6) remove the 7 largest countries and columns (7) and (8)
remove the 7 smallest. The coeﬃcient of fractionalization results remain similarly
robust in all 2SLS regressions.
To probe the ﬁndings further, I conduct a number of checks that are common to the
literature. The results are shown in Table 2.15. First, I run a horserace regression
between fractionalization and polarization.15 At the lower levels of aggregation
the two measures are correlated, however the variance inﬂation factor indicates no
serious problems of multicollinearity. The regressions in column (1) and (2) conﬁrm
15Similar to fractionalization in construction, polarization takes the value 1 when there are two
groups of equal size and is also available at diﬀering levels of aggregation.
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my result, as only ELF15 is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
As a second check, I examine whether the results diﬀer between the New World and
Old World. When splitting the sample between the old and new world - deﬁned as
the Americas and Oceania - I ﬁnd that the results are less robust for the New World.
Consistent with the ﬁndings in Desmet et al. (2012) this is perhaps a result of a weak
link between linguistic cleavages and historic divisions in the NewWorld. To account
for the small sample of countries when splitting the sample, I introduce a dummy
variable for the New World and an interaction between that and fractionalization,
the results remain qualitatively the same.
For a third exercise, I introduce a quadratic term to test for any non-linearity in
fractionalization. The premise for this comes from Ashraf and Galor (2013b) who
argue that very low or very high levels of diversity is detrimental to growth. However,
in this instance, there is no evidence of a inverse-U shaped relationship.
In a fourth robustness check, I include a set of country-speciﬁc geographic controls.
These are the log of the mean elevation, the log distance between the nearest river or
coast, the share of tropical land, the log of the standard deviation of mean elevation
(as a measure of land variability) and the log of absolute latitude. The fractional-
ization estimate remains statistically signiﬁcant. As a ﬁfth, I replace the measure
of democracy with the Boix et al. (2013) dichotomous measure of democracy, this
appears insigniﬁcantly as the previous measure did.
As one ﬁnal check, I can use an alternative main explanatory variable.16 Using a dif-
ferent measure of ethno-linguistic diversity than a fractionalization measure is useful
to show that the diversity eﬀect is not driven by something spurious contained in the
construction of the indices. By doing so, it emphasises the importance of accounting
16When using the older Fearon (2003) or Alesina et al. (2003) measures, the results are far weaker,
which is expected as they do not account for the depth of divisions and the Fearon (2003) measures
does not account for linguistic distance.
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for linguistic distance in the fractionalization measures and the implications of lan-
guage diversity for the degree of decentralization. Moreover, it again helps validate
the new RAI data as useful measures of decentralization. I follow Michalopoulos
(2012) and use the number of languages with at least 1,000 speakers in a country.
I log-normalise the variable, replace the fractionalization measure with it and re-
estimate the baseline speciﬁcations. The OLS and 2SLS results for this exercise are
presented in Table 2.16. The coeﬃcient estimate is statistically signiﬁcant across all
columns.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper has provided evidence that ethno-linguistic fractionalization is an impor-
tant factor in the decentralization of ﬁscal and borrowing decision making. More-
over, I have also shown that the new RAI measures of autonomy are adequate and
valid measures of decentralization by comparing the control variables with the sign
and signiﬁcance found in the previous literature using older measures of decentral-
ization. These results add to a long literature on decentralization and diversity
(Oates, 1972, Panizza, 1999, Garrett and Rodden, 2003, Rodden, 2004, Sambanis
and Milanovic, 2014, Dreher et al., 2018). The results also have implications for the
literature strand that examines the role of the depth of cleavages across groups and
their impact on economic outcomes (Laitin and Posner, 2001, Alesina et al., 2003,
Desmet et al., 2009, 2012). Whilst instrumenting for fractionalization is not a new
(Ahlerup, 2010, Casey and Owen, 2014), it is however new to the decentralization
literature which typically treats fractionalization as an exogenous variable.
In summary, the results show that fractonalization where the divisions are ﬁner, more
numerous and less distinct drive the degree of decentralization. No eﬀect is found for
the deep ancestral cleavages that were formed thousands of years ago. The results
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remain robust to a variety of controls and across two measures of decentralization. To
address endogeneity concerns, an instrumental variable methodology is used, which
involves instrumenting fractionalization with the settlement dates of anatomically
modern human life, and the results similarly persist.
There is obviously more work to be done on this matter. Whilst it now seems clear
that fractionalization is positively related to decentralization, a further exploration
into the channels of impact would be especially useful to the literature. More gener-
ally, a reasonable interpretation of the results would indicate as the world continues
to become a more globalized and open place, countries will become more decentral-
ized in response to the permutation and spread of ethno-linguistic groups.
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2.A Chapter 2 variable deﬁnitions
FISC. The extent to which a regional government can independently tax its popu-
lation. Source: Hooghe et al. (2016)
BORRO. The extent to which a regional government can borrow autonomously.
Source: Hooghe et al. (2016)
EF/ELF/ELF(j). Ethno-linguistic fractionalization. The probability that two
randomly selected individuals belong to diﬀerent ethnolinguistic groups. Source:
Fearon (2003); Alesina et al. (2003); Desmet et al. (2012)
GDP per capita. The natural log of real GDP per capita, 2005 US $'s. Source:
World Bank's WDI
Country size. The natural log of surface area in km2. Source: World Bank's WDI
Proportion of 65+. The proportion of persons in a given population over the age
of 65. Source: World Bank's WDI
Democracy. Average of indexes for civil liberties and political rights, where each
index is measured on a one-to-seven scale with one representing the highest degree
of freedom and seven the lowest. Source: Freedom House
Natural resource rents. Total natural resources rents are the sum of oil rents,
natural gas rents, coal rents (hard and soft), mineral rents, and forest rents. Source:
World Bank
Pathogen prevalence. Historical prevalence of 7 infectious disease causing pathogens.
Source: Murray and Schaller (2010)
Arable. The share of arable land. Source: Ashraf and Galor (2013b)
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Trade. Trade globalization in the KOF index. Source: Gygli et al. (2018)
Tiers of government. The number of elected sub-national tiers of government.
Source: World Bank (1999)
Parliament. A dummy variable equal to one if the country operates under a Parlia-
mentary system of governance. Source: Cruz et al. (2016) and author's elaboration
Gini. Gini coeﬃcient of income inequality before taxes and transfer (Gini market).
Source: Solt (2016)
Colonial historyk. A dummy variable equal to 1 if the country has colonial history
of country k. Where k is one of; Britain, France, Russian, Spanish or Portuguese,
other or none. Source: CEPII
Legal originm. A dummy variable equal to 1 if the country has a legal origin of
country m. Where m is one of; British, France, Socialist, German or Scandanavian.
Source: La Porta et al. (1998)
Origtime. Duration of anatomically modern human settlement. Scaled to 100,000
years. Source: Ahlerup and Olsson (2012)
POL15. The probability that there will be two ethno-linguistic groups of equal size
at the 15th level of aggregation. Source: Desmet et al. (2012)
New World. A dummy variable deﬁning countries in the New World, namely
countries in the Americas and Oceania. Source: Author's own elaboration
Ln(mean elevation). The natural log of mean elevation. Source: Gallup et al.
(2010)
Ln(distance coast river). The natural log the distance to the nearest coast or
river. Source: Gallup et al. (2010)
Tropical. The share of tropical land. Source: Gallup et al. (2010)
Ln(std. dev. mean elevation). The natural log of the standard deviation of the
mean elevation. Source: Gallup et al. (2010)
Ln(absolute latitude). The natural log of absolute latitude. Source: Gallup et al.
(2010)
Democracy01. A dummy variable equal to 1 if the country is a democracy, which
is deﬁned as satisfying political contestation and participation criteria. Source: Boix
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et al. (2013)
Ln(Number of languages). The number of languages, with over 1,000 speakers,
in a given country, as deﬁned in the 15th Ethnologue. Source: Michalopoulos (2012)
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2.B Chapter 2 Figures
Figure 2.1: Spatial distribution of FISC
Figure 2.2: Spatial distribution of BORRO
37
2.B. CHAPTER 2 FIGURES
F
ig
u
re
2
.3
:
F
isca
l
a
u
to
n
o
m
y
o
v
er
tim
e
38
2.B. CHAPTER 2 FIGURES
F
ig
u
re
2
.4
:
B
o
rr
o
w
in
g
a
u
to
n
o
m
y
o
v
er
ti
m
e
39
2.B. CHAPTER 2 FIGURES
Figure 2.5: Spatial distribution of ELF15
Figure 2.6: Hypothetical linguistic tree
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Figure 2.7: Pakistan linguistic tree
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Figure 2.8: Time series plots of FISC and EU
expansion dates
Notes: The graph shows the evolution of FISC over time in Italy. Red perforated lines indicate years where the EU has been
expanded.
Figure 2.9: Correlation between ORIGTIME and
ELF15
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2.C Chapter 2 Tables
Table 2.1: Country sample
Albania Finland Nicaragua
Argentina France Norway
Australia Germany Panama
Austria Greece Paraguay
Bahamas Guatemala Peru
Barbados Guyana Philippines
Belgium Haiti Poland
Belize Honduras Portugal
Bolivia Hungary Romania
Bosnia and Herzegovina Iceland Russian Federation
Brazil Indonesia Serbia
Brunei Ireland Singapore
Bulgaria Israel Slovak Republic
Canada Italy Slovenia
Chile Jamaica South Korea
Colombia Japan Spain
Costa Rica Latvia Suriname
Croatia Lithuania Sweden
Cuba Luxembourg Switzerland
Cyprus Macedonia Thailand
Czech Republic Malaysia Trinidad and Tobago
Denmark Malta Turkey
Dominican Republic Mexico United Kingdom
Ecuador Montenegro United States
El Salvador Netherlands Uruguay
Estonia New Zealand Venezuela
Notes: Countries in bold are OECD member states.
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Table 2.2: Decentralization measures
Variable name Score Description
FISC The extent to which a regional government can independently tax its population:
0 Central government sets base and rate of all regional taxes.
1 Regional government sets the rate of minor taxes
2 Regional government sets base and rate of minor taxes
3 Regional government sets the rate of at least one major tax: personal income, corpo-
rate, value added, or sales tax
4 Regional government sets base and rate of at least one major tax.
BORRO The extent to which a regional government can borrow:
0 The regional government does not borrow (e.g. centrally imposed rules prohibit bor-
rowing)
1 The regional government may borrow under prior authorization (ex ante) by the central
government and with one or more of the following centrally imposed restrictions:
a) Golden rule (e.g. no borrowing to cover current account deﬁcits)
b) No foreign borrowing or borrowing from the central bank
c) No borrowing above a ceiling
d) Borrowing is limited to speciﬁc purposes
2 The regional government may borrow without prior authorization (ex post) and under
one or more of a), b), c), d)
3 The regional government may borrow without centrally imposed restrictions.
Table 2.3: Fractionalization measures
Variable name and source Description of construction
Fearon (2003)
EF The size and number of ethnicity groups are identiﬁed using a variety of sources:
CIA World Factbook, Encyclopaedia Britannica and the Library of Congress Coun-
try Study, to which the following formula is applied. Denoting population shares
of the ethnic groups in a country as p1, p2, p3, ..., pm then fractionalization is
EF = 1−
n∑
i=1
p2i .
Alesina et al. (2003)
ELF Average of ﬁve diﬀerent indices of ethno-linguistic fractionalization. The 5 compo-
nent indices are: an index of ethno-linguistic fractionalization in 1960; probability
of two randomly selected individuals speaking diﬀerent languages; the probability
of two randomly selected individuals do not speak the same language; percent of
of the population not speaking the oﬃcial language; and the percent of population
not speaking the most widely used language.
Desmet et al. (2012)
ELF(j) Derived using data on the size of ethno-linguistic groups, which is contained in the
Ethnologue (15th edition) database. This source allows the utilisation of `hierar-
chical language tress', which means that there are data on the diﬀering levels of
divisions between distinct groups. To the data on the size of these ethno-linguistic
groups, the following formula is applied. ELF (j) = 1−∑N(j)
i(j)=1
[si(j)]
2. The mea-
sures is most disaggregated at level 15 (ELF15) and most aggregated at 1 (ELF1).
A more illuminating explanation of the language trees and disaggregation is found
in Desmet et al. (2012).
Notes: Fractionalization, itself, is the probability that two individuals chosen at random in a given country are from the same ethno-
linguistic (ethnic) group. All measures take a value between 0 and 1, where 1 is certainty.
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Table 2.4: Summary statistics of main variables
No. of obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
FISC 78 1.035 1.515 0 5.924
BORRO 78 0.988 1.131 0 4.282
EF 67 0.342 0.210 0.004 0.766
ELF 77 0.349 0.219 0.002 0.740
ELF1 78 0.139 0.174 0 0.647
ELF4 78 0.249 0.226 0 0.797
ELF7 78 0.295 0.252 0 0.846
ELF10 78 0.307 0.259 0.0002 0.897
ELF13 78 0.307 0.260 0.0002 0.897
ELF15 78 0.307 0.260 0.0002 0.897
GDP per capita 78 9.358 1.193 6.395 11.50
Country size 78 7.080 2.132 1.163 12.01
Proportion of 65+ 78 11.23 5.096 3.275 21.32
Democracy 78 2.057 1.322 1 6.750
Natural resource rents 78 3.704 5.732 0 28.01
Pathogen prevalence 78 -0.139 0.558 -1.180 1.060
Trade 78 57.09 18.92 19.85 97.47
Arable land 76 17.43 13.32 0.0700 53.76
Tiers of government 78 1.551 0.658 1 3
Parliament 78 0.577 0.497 0 1
Gini 75 47.58 4.827 33.73 57.70
Origtime 78 0.259 0.209 0.012 0.750
Socio-cultural conﬂict 78 3.182 1.773 0 8.267
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Table 2.6: Cross-correlation table of fractionalization measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(1) EF 1.000
(2) ELF 0.890 1.000
(3) ELF1 0.406 0.425 1.000
(4) ELF4 0.550 0.582 0.717 1.000
(5) ELF7 0.440 0.505 0.620 0.900 1.000
(6) ELF10 0.452 0.511 0.619 0.873 0.977 1.000
(7) ELF13 0.453 0.511 0.614 0.873 0.977 1.000 1.000
(8) ELF15 0.453 0.511 0.614 0.873 0.977 1.000 1.000 1.000
Table 2.7: Replication of Panizza (1999)
FISC BORRO FISC BORRO FISC BORRO
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Country size 0.356*** 0.311*** 0.340*** 0.301*** 0.355*** 0.312***
(0.057) (0.039) (0.055) (0.039) (0.059) (0.040)
GDP per capita 0.485*** 0.327*** 0.511*** 0.319*** 0.515*** 0.322***
(0.118) (0.082) (0.119) (0.087) (0.112) (0.077)
ELF15 1.389*** 0.934*** 1.365*** 0.938***
(0.494) (0.308) (0.504) (0.310)
Democracy 0.087 0.020 0.047 -0.008
(0.103) (0.069) (0.092) (0.059)
Constant -6.450*** -4.560*** -6.333*** -4.169*** -6.815*** -4.501***
(1.295) (0.875) (1.266) (0.916) (1.227) (0.838)
R-squared 0.391 0.448 0.339 0.402 0.392 0.448
Observations 78 78 78 78 78 78
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
Table 2.8: The eﬀect of fractionalization on decentralization: baseline
cycling results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ELF1 -0.290
(0.677)
ELF4 1.016
(0.625)
ELF7 1.342**
(0.546)
ELF10 1.506***
(0.507)
ELF13 1.532***
(0.515)
ELF15 1.532***
(0.515)
GDP per capita 0.441** 0.434** 0.413** 0.416** 0.415** 0.415**
(0.175) (0.179) (0.179) (0.177) (0.177) (0.177)
Country size 0.351*** 0.370*** 0.373*** 0.374*** 0.374*** 0.374***
(0.064) (0.063) (0.063) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064)
Proportion of 65+ 0.047 0.063 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.062
(0.049) (0.051) (0.050) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
Democracy 0.200 0.200 0.182 0.178 0.177 0.177
(0.143) (0.135) (0.125) (0.124) (0.124) (0.124)
Natural resource rents -0.035 -0.043** -0.041** -0.039* -0.039* -0.039*
(0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Pathogen prevalence 0.114 0.162 0.103 0.082 0.083 0.083
(0.343) (0.333) (0.322) (0.310) (0.310) (0.310)
Constant -6.330*** -6.832*** -6.774*** -6.862*** -6.867*** -6.867***
(1.609) (1.602) (1.537) (1.530) (1.532) (1.532)
R-squared 0.377 0.396 0.423 0.439 0.442 0.442
Observations 78 78 78 78 78 78
Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is FISC. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; * p <
0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.12: First stage regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Origtime 0.469*** 0.546*** 0.515** 0.607*** 0.577***
(0.128) (0.142) (0.224) (0.166) (0.146)
GDP per capita -0.020 -0.000 -0.003 0.009 -0.025
(0.025) (0.034) (0.040) (0.042) (0.045)
Country size -0.012 0.002 -0.013 -0.011
(0.013) (0.021) (0.015) (0.014)
Proportion of 65+ -0.015* -0.014 -0.024** -0.006
(0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011)
Democracy -0.017 0.008 -0.032 -0.007
(0.026) (0.037) (0.024) (0.029)
Natural resource rents 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.003
(0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007)
Pathogen prevalence -0.053 -0.045 -0.019 -0.113
(0.067) (0.082) (0.081) (0.079)
Trade 0.004
(0.002)
Arable land -0.003
(0.002)
Tiers of government 0.043
(0.046)
Parliament 0.047
(0.080)
Gini 0.009
(0.006)
Constant 0.368 0.441 -0.346 0.522 0.429
(0.249) (0.335) (0.528) (0.385) (0.420)
Legal origin FEs? No No No No Yes
Colony FEs? No No No Yes No
R-squared 0.151 0.208 0.322 0.273 0.242
Observations 78 78 73 78 78
Notes: The table corresponds to the second-stage results in Table 2.11. The dependent variable
in columns is ELF15. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05;
*** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.13: The eﬀect of fractionalization on decentralization: baseline
cycling results: alternate dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ELF1 0.104
(0.504)
ELF4 0.709*
(0.381)
ELF7 1.105***
(0.340)
ELF10 1.078***
(0.316)
ELF13 1.076***
(0.312)
ELF15 1.077***
(0.312)
GDP per capita 0.221* 0.217* 0.199 0.204 0.203 0.203
(0.123) (0.123) (0.124) (0.122) (0.122) (0.122)
Country size 0.316*** 0.325*** 0.329*** 0.328*** 0.328*** 0.328***
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
Proportion of 65+ 0.038 0.045 0.046 0.044 0.044 0.044
(0.037) (0.037) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Democracy 0.116 0.114 0.098 0.098 0.098 0.098
(0.112) (0.104) (0.095) (0.095) (0.095) (0.095)
Natural resource rents -0.023 -0.028* -0.027* -0.025* -0.025* -0.025*
(0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Pathogen prevalence -0.133 -0.095 -0.137 -0.151 -0.151 -0.151
(0.219) (0.210) (0.190) (0.189) (0.189) (0.189)
Constant -3.922*** -4.166*** -4.169*** -4.195*** -4.193*** -4.193***
(1.130) (1.063) (1.034) (1.035) (1.035) (1.035)
R-squared 0.443 0.460 0.499 0.500 0.501 0.501
Observations 78 78 78 78 78 78
Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is BORRO. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; *
p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
Table 2.14: Robustness checks: 2SLS results
FISC BORRO FISC BORRO FISC BORRO FISC BORRO
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ELF15 2.408** 2.564** 3.021** 2.502** 2.448** 2.368*** 2.389** 2.587***
(1.183) (1.075) (1.367) (1.162) (1.002) (0.870) (1.170) (0.938)
AR Wald Chi2 0.049 0.005 0.032 0.015 0.021 0.001 0.061 0.002
F-stat 12.17 12.17 10.52 10.52 16.28 16.28 13.61 13.61
Observations 71 71 64 64 71 71 71 71
Notes: Origtime is used as an instrument for ELF15. In all columns GDP per capita, Country size, Proportion of 65+,
Democracy, Natural resource rents, Pathogen prevalence and a constant are omitted. Column (1) and (2) removes countries
that vary 2 points or more in the dependent variable and column (3) and (4) removes countries that vary by 1 point or more
in the dependent variable. Columns (5) and (6) remove the 7 largest countries by surface area. Columns (7) and (8) remove
the 7 smallest countries by surface area. The F-stat is F statistic for the explanatory power excluded instruments in ﬁrst
stage regressions. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.16: Robustness checks: alternate independent variable of interest
OLS 2SLS
FISC BORRO FISC BORRO
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(Number of languages) 0.361** 0.383*** 0.546* 0.652***
(0.143) (0.091) (0.300) (0.216)
R-squared 0.403 0.496
AR Wald Chi2 0.105 0.002
F-stat 11.92 11.92
Observations 65 65 65 65
Notes: Origtime is used as an instrument for Ln(Number of languages) in columns
(3) and (4). In all columns GDP per capita, Country size, Proportion of 65+, Democ-
racy, Natural resource rents, Pathogen prevalence and a constant are omitted. The
F-stat is F statistic for the explanatory power excluded instruments in ﬁrst stage re-
gressions. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05;
*** p < 0.01.
54
Chapter 3 A mailshot in the dark? The impact of
the UK government's leaﬂet on the 2016
EU referendum
The second empirical chapter continues the theme in this thesis of work inﬂuenced
by major political economy events. The previous chapter was only motivated by the
2014 Scottish independence referendum, however, in this chapter, I directly consider
the case of the 2016 EU referendum. Here, I use individual-level data to ask what
factors contributed to a populist outcome in the form of Brexit. In this context, I
explicitly focus on the role of the government's pro-remain leaﬂet that was sent to
UK households in the run-up to the referendum.
3.1 Introduction
There is an array of evidence that exposure to mass media can inﬂuence voting de-
cisions and therefore political outcomes. This is true across various outlets, for
instance, newspapers (Gerber et al., 2009, Gentzkow et al., 2011), biased news
programs and television (DellaVigna and Kaplan, 2007, Enikolopov et al., 2011,
Durante et al., 2017, Martin and Yurukoglu, 2017) and radio (DellaVigna et al.,
2014, Yanagizawa-Drott, 2014, Adena et al., 2015). In addition, there is evidence
that the eﬀects of exposure can vary across demographics (DellaVigna et al., 2014,
Yanagizawa-Drott, 2014, Kearney and Levine, 2015), which is attributed to certain
groups being more susceptible to persuasion bias (Gerber et al., 2011, Barone et al.,
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2015, Galasso and Nannicini, 2016).
In this chapter I show that government mass media regarding the 2016 EU ref-
erendum inﬂuenced voting behaviour. I exploit an individual's exposure to the
government's mailshot that was sent to UK households before the referendum and
I show that exposure, on average, led to a drop in the probability of voting leave
by 3 percentage points. Britain voting to leave the European Union was a seismic
event in European politics. A clear majority of economists and the UK government
had warned that leaving the EU would depress the economy and create a lengthy
period of uncertainty, and the government did not standby and let the referendum
pass without conveying their stance to voters. The mailshot, in the form of a leaﬂet,
contained information on the beneﬁts of EU membership and reasons why the gov-
ernment supported the Remain side. They were, of course, sent to households
before the referendum day and, either intentionally or by chance, not every person
was exposed to the mailshot. Hence, this oﬀers a unique opportunity to isolate the
impact of the leaﬂet on voting behaviour.
I employ both a matching and diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence approach, which allows this
chapter to address endogeneity concerns and selection issues, to estimate the causal
eﬀect of exposure to the leaﬂet on voting preference. In order to strengthen the infer-
ences of the results, I conduct numerous placebo and robustness checks throughout
the analysis. For the ﬁrst part of the main analysis, I use all available individuals
and ﬁnd that exposure to the leaﬂet led to individuals being about 3 percentage
points more likely to vote to remain in the EU. This eﬀect is economically and sta-
tistically signiﬁcant, and is robust to various speciﬁcations and placebo tests. In the
second part, to explore who is driving this eﬀect, I identify a group of respondents
that had a low degree of exposure to other sources of referendum information and
were exposed to the leaﬂet. Here, I allow for a heterogeneous treatment eﬀect across
diﬀerent ﬁxed demographic groups. I show that there is a much larger drop in the
probability of voting leave for females, low income, the risk averse and those who
expressed a preference to vote leave at a prior to treatment date after exposure to
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the leaﬂet. I argue that persuasion bias is plausible explanation for this evidence,
which allows certain groups to be more aﬀected than others. In fact, the evidence of
heterogenous eﬀects echoes, and is complementary to, the work of DellaVigna et al.
(2014), Barone et al. (2015) and Galasso and Nannicini (2016). Using the high ex-
posure sample of individuals who were exposed to multiple sources of information
and the leaﬂet, I show that Conservative partisans were also signiﬁcantly negatively
impacted, by about 6.2 percentage points. This occurs due to the visible splits in
the Conservative party, thus party supporters took the leaﬂet as a signal from the
Conservative government to back a remain vote.
To further support the ﬁndings, this chapter examines the persuasive mechanisms
at work by exploring how exposure to the leaﬂet aﬀected a individual's opinions
about information contained in the leaﬂet. I ﬁnd that individuals who were exposed
internalized the leaﬂets information on a possible leave scenario. For example, the
leaﬂet made the case that unemployment would be higher if the UK were to leave the
UK, and the results suggest that exposed individuals believe that this would indeed
be the case. Voters internalized the leaﬂet's persuasive information of likely vote
leave scenarios and became less likely to for Brexit because of this. I conﬁrm these
channels by conducting a number of falsiﬁcation tests of scenarios and information
not contained in the leaﬂet.
This research makes signiﬁcant contributions to the literature in three distinct ways.
First, it shows that clear, descriptive and realistic information from the government
can have a signiﬁcant impact on vote preference, and explore the possible explana-
tions for why this eﬀect exists. In this manner, the ﬁndings sit somewhere between
the previous contributions by Barone et al. (2015) on the negative impact of digital
TV on Berlusconi's vote share, and by Gerber et al. (2011) on the positive impact of
campaign mail on the Democratic candidate for the 2006 attorney general election
in Kansas  of which this chapter is most closely related. Uniquely, in this research I
diverge from the current mass media literature on the television and radio mediums
by showing that a government backed mailshot can also be a persuasive strategy for
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changing political preference in the context of a referendum. Moreover, my identiﬁ-
cation strategy allows me to identify the causal impact given that I can isolate the
speciﬁc eﬀect of the leaﬂet unlike in some of the previous media literature.
Second, the ﬁndings contribute to the work on inherent cognitive biases (Choi et al.,
2014, Dohmen et al., 2010, DellaVigna and Gentzkow, 2010, Barone et al., 2015,
Galasso and Nannicini, 2016). In particular, how certain demographics are hetero-
geneously aﬀected by exposure to the information due to the existence of persuasion
bias. The ﬁndings here shed new light on the existence of persuasion bias by isolat-
ing the eﬀect of government information on certain groups, and directly supported
by the ﬁndings of DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007), Barone et al. (2015) and Galasso
and Nannicini (2016).
Third and ﬁnally, this research contributes to the quickly expanding literature on
the determinants of Brexit and the support for populist policies (see, e.g., Goodwin
and Heath 2016b, Antonucci et al. 2017, Los et al. 2017, Colantone and Stanig
2017, Becker et al. 2017). All current work has focused on the characteristics of an
individual, or the population itself, in determining their vote preference, however,
to the best of my knowledge, this is the ﬁrst exploration into the impact of direct
government intervention in a quasi-natural experimental setup for the 2016 EU
referendum.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides some
background on the referendum and leaﬂet itself. Section 3.3 describes the data and
identiﬁcation strategy used in the empirical analysis. Section 3.4 presents the main
ﬁndings and various robustness tests. Section 3.5 presents results regarding the
mechanisms and section 3.6 concludes.
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3.2 Background
On June 23rd 2016, UK citizens were oﬀered the opportunity to vote in a referendum
as to whether the UK should Remain a member of the European Union or Leave
the European Union. The Leave side prevailed by 51.9% to 48.1%. Figure 3.1
and 3.2 present maps of vote shares by local authority district. Since this time,
there has been a vast amount of debate in the media and amongst academics as
to what drove the referendum result. Much of the empirical academic work has
focussed on drivers mostly at the regional-level and only a small portion at the
individual-level (see, e.g., Langella and Manning 2016 for an overview of vote leave
determinants). For instance, Goodwin and Heath (2016b) show that support for
leave closely mapped that of past support for UKIP, and Antonucci et al. (2017)
highlight the role of educational attainment. Los et al. (2017) provide evidence
that areas with a higher density of leave votes were areas that were relatively larger
beneﬁciaries of EU funds. Similarly, Colantone and Stanig (2017) show that areas
that were more exposed to globalisation had a greater tendency to vote to leave.
Becker et al. (2017) focus on the vote break down at the counting areas (by local
authority) and ﬁnd evidence that key fundamentals of the population were at the
heart of the leave vote, rather than exposure to immigration or their education
proﬁles. Liberini et al. (2017) suggest that it was in fact dissatisfaction with ones
own ﬁnancial situation rather than general unhappiness that contributed to Brexit.
Additionally, they show that it was only the young that were substantially pro-
remain. On the whole, the academic work conﬁrms much of the narratives in the
media about who voted for Brexit.
Despite the growing scholarly focus on individual and regional determinants, to the
best of my knowledge, no other research has been conducted into the impact of the
government's EU leaﬂet. It is of particular interest not only because of the impact
it may or may not have had on the ﬁnal result, but the leaﬂet came at signiﬁcant
cost to the UK taxpayer, ¿9.3 million. The leaﬂet, entitled Why the Government
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believes that voting to remain in the European Union is the best decision for the
UK, was sent to all UK households on Monday 11th to Wednesday 13th April 2016.
The 16-page document contained information on the beneﬁts on EU membership
and likely scenarios should Britian leave the EU with a particular focus on jobs, the
economy and security. Examples of the front and back page of the leaﬂet are shown
in Figure 3.3 and 3.4. Even at a glance, under no uncertain circumstances, the leaﬂet
ubiquitously makes the case for remaining a member of the EU. The back page in
particular makes clear the aforementioned three areas of focus, which the government
believed would be better oﬀ if the UK remained a member of the EU. The leaﬂet
was intended to make clear the government's position and therefore persuade voters
to back a remain vote by providing a fair assessment of EU membership and likely
scenarios should the UK vote to leave.1 This, however, is not the ﬁrst leaﬂet of
its kind. In the 1975 EU referendum, Harold Wilson's Labour government sent a
pamphlet to all UK households that made the case for remaining a member of the
European Community, see Figure 3.5.2 The pamphlet-backed remain side won with
67.2% of the vote, this apparent success may have acted as a catalyst in prompting
the government into action to repeat the past.
Figure 3.6 and 3.7 present the spatial distribution of the share of respondents that
received and read (exposed to) the leaﬂet by local authority district. Darker shades
represent local authorities that contain a greater proportion of exposed people. The
rationale for showing the geographic distribution of exposure is not to only set the
scene but to show that no systemic pattern in exposure exists. Exposure levels
appear randomly distributed in respect to a local authority's actual vote count,
except for Scotland where the exposure share is lower. As the leaﬂet was sent to
all households, there is no concern about the possible targeting of areas expected to
1 In a referendum characterised by contentious and a misuse of statistics, the leaﬂet was assessed to
contain largely factual and realistic content (Giles, 2016).
2 A full transcript of the leaﬂet can be found here: http://www.harvard-digital.co.uk/euro/
pamphlet.htm.
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be marginal or strong leave areas, which would cause a selection bias.3 The leaﬂet
reached a wide and diverse audience across the UK,4 the mean value of exposure
by local authority is 52%, the largest and smallest proportions are 74% and 24%,
respectively.
The exploration of this particular type of media is a distinct divergence from the
current mass media literature which analyses the eﬀects ideologically biased me-
dia consumption. However, in accordance with evidence in the related literature, I
would expect certain demographics that are more likely to be aﬀected by persua-
sion bias to change their voting behaviour to a greater extent, as in, for example,
Kearney and Levine (2015), Barone et al. (2015) and Durante et al. (2017). This is
expected as diﬀerent groups will suﬀer to various degrees of inherent cognitive biases
regarding decision making quality (Dohmen et al., 2010, Choi et al., 2014). There is
also evidence that supporters the idea that persuasion bias is larger for voters than
for, say, consumers (DellaVigna and Gentzkow, 2010).
3 In this instance, there was no targeted campaign because the referendum was decided by absolute
majority based on a national, rather than regional, vote. This is unlike a general election in the
UK, which is conducted under a majoritarian system, where marginal areas are targeted with
political party leaﬂets to win parliamentary seats.
4 The leaﬂet was sent to Northern Ireland households throughout the week commencing 9 May to
avoid disruption ahead of their local elections. All individuals in Northern Ireland are therefore
removed from the sample.
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3.3 Data and empirical strategy
3.3.1 Data
Individual-level data
The empirical analysis in this chapter draws on data from the British Election Study
(BES) internet panel survey. It is a nationally representative survey of individuals
that contains extensive information on personal political preferences, identity and
demographics. I focus on one particular wave, wave 8  á la Colantone and Stanig
(2017). This wave was conducted between 6th May and 22nd June 2016, prior to
the 23rd June referendum and contains a total of 33,502 individuals.5
The main advantage of these data, particularly for this chapter, is that wave 8
contains a variety of questions regarding the EU referendum. More speciﬁcally,
there are questions regarding voting intention, exposure to referendum information
and sets of questions created to elucidate opinions about the campaign and the
EU on the whole. Moreover, the respondents can be linked to their parliamentary
constituency and EU referendum counting area, which allows one to control for
regional and individual factors simultaneously.
In this wave, respondents are asked about their voting intention in the EU ref-
erendum. Respondents are asked If you do vote in the referendum on Britain's
membership of the European Union, how do you think you will vote? To create
the primary dependent variable of voting intention, I code a dummy variable 1 for
respondents who replied Leave the EU, and 0 for those who reply Remain in the
EU. Those who responded Don't know are removed from the sample.
5 Due to missing responses the number of analysed respondents is smaller than the full sample.
Formatively, results do not change when models are re-estimated with survey weighting.
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Another uniqueness of this wave is that respondents are asked about their exposure
to the government's EU leaﬂet, which made the case for the government backed
remain campaign. The relevant question reads as follows: Have you received and
read the UK Government's leaﬂet Why the Government believes that voting to
remain in the European Union is the best decision for the UK? Those replying
Yes, I received and read it are coded 1, whereas those who respond Yes, I received
it but I haven't read it and No, I haven't received it are coded as 0. This forms
the primary explanatory variable in this chapter.
I follow much of the previous literature on voting and partisanship in selecting the
set of individual-level control variables (Clarke et al., 2017, Colantone and Stanig,
2017, Aidt and Rauh, 2017, Liberini et al., 2017) and use the individual information
of some aggregate data used by Langella and Manning (2016) and Becker et al.
(2017). I also include some other potentially relevant variables such as a dummy for
whether the respondent has friends from the EU and whether they speak another
language other than English. To control for partisanship, I include a person's vote
from the 2015 general election, which follows from the intuition that people who
voted for Brexit typically voted for the right-leaning parties in the 2015 general
election.6 In order to capture this eﬀect, I rank parties based on their Euroscep-
ticism. More speciﬁcally, they are ranked by the percent of negative mentions of
the European Union in that party's 2015 general election manifesto, taken from the
Manifesto Project Database by Volkens et al. (2017).7 The variable is centered by
normalization (mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1). The non-normalized ranks
are reported in Table 3.2. I also include measures of the Big Five personality traits
for each individual, this helps to further unpick the black-box of factors that in-
ﬂuenced a individual's referendum vote. Given the importance for these traits in
6 This is arguably better than using a persons party aﬃliation due to the small number of UKIP
supporters.
7 Here, alternative rankings were tested, such as: negative mentions of multiculturalism and inter-
nationalism. The interpretation of a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect is unchanged regardless of the
information used to rank the parties.
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determining partisan support (Bakker et al., 2015, Aidt and Rauh, 2017), it is en-
tirely plausible that persons of particular ﬁxed personality traits favoured one side
more than the other in the referendum.8
Descriptive statistics
As a basic statistical point of motivation for this chapter, I split the summary statis-
tics by exposure status in Table 3.3. It shows that exposed individuals are less
likely to express a preference for a leave vote compared to non-treated people. More-
over, on average, people exposed to the leaﬂet are more likely to be male, older and
to hold a university degree than those non-exposed individuals; they are also less
likely to have children but more likely to be a home owner relative to individuals
who were not exposed to the leaﬂet; there is no diﬀerence across exposure status for
the income groups. These are in line with expectations as those with a degree are
expected to be more interested in information regarding the referendum, whereas
those with children and who are employed are typically busier. The leave-remain
vote split is only 0.3 percentage points away from the actual vote shares, which
highlights the representativeness of the sample is.
The eﬀect of the leaﬂet is plausibly reﬂected in the polls when examining the trends
around the time of exposure. As shown in Figure 3.8, there is a clear upward swing,
of those people who were polled, reporting that they would vote to remain in the
EU after the leaﬂets were sent out.9 Obviously, here it is not clear if this up-tick
for remain is due to the leaﬂet or a result of other referendum campaign rhetoric.
8 For a discussion of the extent to which the Big Five personality traits can be considered `ﬁxed',
and therefore exogenous, see Brown and Taylor (2014). If we are to assume they are indeed
ﬁxed throughout an individual's adult life, this coincides with their ability to participate in the
referendum, as voters must have been over the age of 18.
9 As similar trend is found in the FT's poll of polls, found here: https://ig.ft.com/sites/
brexit-polling/.
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For instance, on the 18th April, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne,
defended claims that Brexit would cost households an average of ¿4,300 per year.
And on the 22nd April, then President of the United States, Barack Obama, said
that the UK would be at the back of the queue to establish a trade deal with the
US. Robust econometric methods are required to disentangle this relationship and
to allow a causal reading.
3.3.2 Empirical strategy
Exposure to the government's EU leaﬂet should reduce an individuals probability
of voting leave by making the case for remaining in the European Union because
individuals will be persuaded by the information provided, therefore internalizing
the government's remain position. However, I do not expect this eﬀect to be un-
ambiguous. As the related literature has shown (DellaVigna and Kaplan, 2007,
Barone et al., 2015, Durante et al., 2017), certain demographics are more suscep-
tible to persuasion bias. This is entirely plausible in this scenario given that the
Brexit literature has established that there are `core' leave and remain supporters.
If this is indeed the case, one would expect a heterogeneous eﬀect across the diﬀerent
population groups.
I empirically investigate whether voting behaviour for the 2016 EU referendum
changed post-exposure. I formalize this relationship with the following reduced
form regression model:
V ote Leavei = α Exposedi + ψXi + i (3.1)
where V ote Leavei denotes the outcome variable, taking the value 1 if individual i
will vote to leave the EU, and 0 if they will vote remain. Exposedi is the indicator
variable for whether an individual has been exposed to the government's leaﬂet. Xi
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is vector of control variables which contains a rich set of controls for gender, age,
marital status, ethnicity, employment status, whether the individual has children,
home ownership, highest academic qualiﬁcation, whether individual has friends from
the EU or speaks a language other than English, their partisan status, a set of income
dummies and indicators of the Big Five personality traits. i is the error term.
To begin with, equation 3.1 is estimated by probit models. In doing so I cannot in-
fer causality given that I cannot rule out selection bias. That is, for instance, those
individuals who were more likely to vote to remain may be more likely to select
themselves into a pro-remain treatment. Given that exposure to the leaﬂet is quite
plausibly not truly exogenous, I make use of the quasi-natural experimental setup
and apply more appropriate techniques. Speciﬁcally, I primarily employ a propen-
sity score matching approach as the workhorse for estimation and conduct a battery
of robustness checks to ensure causal inference. Matching gains it legitimacy as a
technique for causal inference from the idea that there is no selection into treatment,
conditional on covariates, then diﬀerence in means across exposed and control groups
have a causal interepretation (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). This is similar to the
approach of Broockman and Green (2014) who use a diﬀerence-in-means approach
to assess the impact of exposure to online ads on political candidates. I also track a
reduced number of individuals to a previous wave and use a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence
approach to further strengthen my suppositions.
3.4 Results
This section presents the main results of my empirical analysis. I estimate the
eﬀect of the leaﬂet on voting intention for the 2016 EU referendum. I estimate this
eﬀect via multiple identiﬁcation strategies, across several samples and conduct some
placebo and robustness tests to support the ﬁndings.
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3.4.1 Who voted for Brexit?
First, I establish the characteristics, at the individual-level, that drove a person into
voting in favour of Brexit.10 This is a useful exercise for getting to grips with the
data in terms of quality and representativeness. Table 3.4 shows the results for
probit regressions testing the various determinants. Column (1) reports a relatively
parsimonious speciﬁcation, which includes only basic demographics, education and
partisanship. Column (2) and (3) then introduce household income and the Big
Five personality traits, respectively. Columns (4), (5) and (6) progressively include
an array of ﬁxed eﬀects to soak up various degrees of unobserved heterogeneity. In
column (4) I include local authority ﬁxed eﬀects to control for local authority char-
acteristics, this was also the aggregation at which the referendum votes were counted
at. 11 local authorities of the 379 are dropped as they contain no respondents in
this sample.11 Column (5) includes county ﬁxed eﬀects to soak up more regional
trends, for instance, Scotland's overwhelming preference for remain, 39 counties are
included. Column (6) introduced proximity to referendum date ﬁxed eﬀects, this
a dummy for the day the respondent completed the survey. The inclusion of these
dummies is in order to capture one-oﬀ day-to-day events that would inﬂuence ones
vote preference. For example, the murder of pro-remain MP, Jo Cox, on the June
16th caused referendum campaigning to be suspended.1213 Casting an eye across
these 6 columns it appears that regardless of the ﬁxed eﬀects included the point
estimates remain qualitatively the same. The elderly are more likely to vote leave,
although this is at a decreasing rate. The average turning point, across columns
(1)-(9) is estimated to be about 59 years old. This is in line with the ﬁndings of
10 In the spirit of the previous research, I also include local authority district controls as a replacement
for local area ﬁxed eﬀects and the main result remains unaﬀected, see Table 3.5.
11The referendum count was made for 382 local authority districts, I exclude Northern Ireland,
Gibraltar and the Isles of Scilly.
12Details on the murder in context of the referendum are provided here: https:/www.theguardian.
com/politics/2017/may/21/jo-cox-uk-general-election-campaign-pause.
13Results remain the same when removing individuals who responded after 16th June.
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Liberini et al. (2017), who argue that it was only the very young that were sub-
stantially pro-remain. More educated people are associated with a lower likelihood
of voting leave, relative to those with no formal academic qualiﬁcations, highlight-
ing the educational gap in voting preference. Those with a degree are, on average,
about 28 percentage points less likely to vote leave than those with no formal qual-
iﬁcations.14 Home owners are also less likely to report that they would vote leave.
For those individuals with a household income of over ¿70,000 per annum, they are
about 12 percentage points more likely to vote to remain than those with a yearly
income of 0-¿20,000, holding everything else constant. Conversely, those who voted
for relatively more eurosceptic parties in the previous general election are associated
with a higher probability of voting leave. Brieﬂy, in terms of the Big Five personal-
ity traits, the direction of the eﬀects are in accordance with the prior expectations.
Those individuals who are more conscientious or extroverted are, on average, more
likely to favour a leave vote. Whereas some weak evidence is found for those who
are more agreeable and more open are less likely to vote to leave. No signiﬁcant
eﬀect is found for neuroticism.
So far, the results presented here conﬁrm the media tropes about who voted for
Brexit and are consistent with what has been shown the existing literature. The
point estimates remain consistent across various models with assorted ﬁxed eﬀects.
However, I do not assign a causal inference to the ﬁndings at this stage. The role
of the government's pro-remain leaﬂet is explored in the proceeding sections.
14This is very close to the estimate by Goodwin and Heath (2016a), who estimate an eﬀect of 30
percentage points.
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3.4.2 The impact of the government's EU leaﬂet on voting
behaviour
This research question poses a diﬃcult puzzle in identifying a causal eﬀect of leaﬂet
exposure. As the leaﬂet was sent to all UK households there are no areas intention-
ally untreated nor a particular discontinuity to exploit. The variation in treatment
assignment comes from the selection into treatment i.e. a persons decision to read
the leaﬂet if they received it. Thus, in order to apply a causal reading to the impact
of exposure to the leaﬂet on voting behaviour, I implement a matching strategy.
I, in theory, should only need to control for the probability of treatment itself. In
the obvious absence of this, I control for the observed characteristics that select an
individual into treatment (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). Matching gains its legiti-
macy a technique for causal inference from the idea that there is no selection into
treatment, conditional on covariates, then diﬀerence in means across exposed and
control groups have a causal interpretation (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). This
strategy does not, however, deal with the possible measurement error that is a result
of self-reporting exposure status. This issue is not exclusive to this paper. It is likely
a potential issue in many studies that use self-reported data. In this context, it is
possible that individuals will report that they read the leaﬂet when they in fact did
not. This would bias the estimate of the eﬀect of exposure.
In order to match homogeneous individuals with one-another, I use the comprehen-
sive set of observed characteristics in Table 3.3 and I crucially include two extra
matching covariates: an individual's pre-existing Brexit preference, which is cap-
tured by their voting intention from a previous wave before treatment and an in-
dicator variable of referendum interest.15 Naturally, those who report themselves
15 I match, with replacement (each control observation can serve as the counter-factual for more than
one treated observation), on the following set of variables: male, age, age2 / 100, married, wid-
owed, non-white, employed, kids01, ln(household size), home owner, degree, a-level, gcse, friends
from the EU, speaks another language, partisan, 3 categories of household income, agreeableness,
conscientiousness, extraversion, neuroticism, openness, a dummy for pre-existing Brexit preference
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as interested in the referendum are more likely to select themselves into treatment.
The pre-existing Brexit preference is included as a restriction to ensure that indi-
viduals are matched to like-minded voters. This explicitly accounts for the fact that
voters who are more likely to vote remain are more likely to select into a remain
treatment. Both of these variables are powerful predictors of treatment status. I
employ 5 nearest-neighbour matching where the nearest neighbours are identiﬁed
from their propensity scores, conditional on the full set of control covariates. The
propensity scores are obtained from a probit regression of the form:
Pr(Exposedi = 1 | Zi) = Φ (ψXi+δ V oteLeaveit−1 +ζ ReferendumInteresti+i)
(3.2)
where Exposedi is the indicator of exposure status to the government's EU leaﬂet
for individual i; Zi is a function of all covariates that eﬀect treatment status; Φ
is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normally distributed random
variable; Xi is a vector of control variables from Table 3.4 column (3); V oteLeaveit−1
is whether the individual would vote leave from a wave prior to treatment;
ReferendumInteresti is a dummy for a respondents interest in the referendum; and
i is the error term. The corresponding propensity score estimations are shown in
Table 3.15.
In Table 3.6 I examine the eﬀect of leaﬂet exposure on voting for Brexit. In columns
(1) and (2), the coeﬃcient is negative and statistically signiﬁcant: being exposed to
the leaﬂet is associated with a 4.8 percentage point decrease in probability of voting
for Brexit.
As mentioned, without being careful about endogeneity concerns, this eﬀect cannot
and a dummy for referendum interest.
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be labelled as causal. In columns (3)-(6), I implement the propensity score match-
ing strategy. The coeﬃcients report the average treatment eﬀect on the treated
(ATT) for leaﬂet exposure. In column (3) individuals are matched on their individ-
ual characteristics. In columns (4), (5) and (6) I begin to impose restrictions that
the matched control observations must come from the same day of survey response,
county as the treated individual, and both simultaneously, respectively. The point
estimates are consistently estimated, remain negative and statistically signiﬁcant.
The coeﬃcients are now smaller in absolute magnitude, compared to the OLS esti-
mates, which indicates that the matching approach has been successful in reducing
the endogeneity bias. Exposure to the leaﬂet reduced the probability of voting for
Brexit by about 3 percentage points. Formal t-tests between treated and control
groups fail to reject the balancing hypothesis for all variables that enter the propen-
sity score equation, which conﬁrms that the matching procedure has been successful
in matching together homogeneous individuals and reducing the covariate bias (see
Table 3.7 and Figure 3.11).
Thus far, the results establish that individuals became around 3 percentage points
less likely to vote for Brexit after being exposed to the leaﬂet, which is in accordance
with the other campaign mailing literature by Gerber et al. (2011). I can now
proceed to focus on particular groups of the population which may be driving this
result.
Low degree of exposure to other information sources
To ensure a clean identiﬁcation of the leaﬂet's eﬀect, I restrict the sample to individ-
uals who had a low degree of exposure to other sources of referendum information.
To be speciﬁc, individuals are dropped from the sample who report themselves to
have watched any of the 5 major televised EU debates; have heard about the EU
from television, newspaper, radio, the internet or talking to other people; or have
been contacted by referendum campaigners. This leaves a sample of 513 individuals.
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The summary statistics and spatial distribution for this sample are shown in Table
3.8 and Figure 3.9 and 3.10, respectively.16
Table 3.9 shows the ATT of exposure to the government's EU leaﬂet on the likelihood
of voting leave. For the full low degree of exposure sample, column (1), the coeﬃcient
suggest that exposure is negatively related to voting leave, however, the eﬀect is
statistically insigniﬁcant. In order to test how the leaﬂet impacted demographics
that are more or less susceptible to persuasion bias, I split the sample across various
groups to allow for a heterogeneous treatment eﬀect.
In column (2), I ﬁnd that females are 8.8 percentage points less likely to vote leave
after exposure, whereas no signiﬁcant eﬀect is found for males. This is consistent
with the ﬁndings of Galasso and Nannicini (2016), that females respond better than
men to a campaign with positive rather than negative message. Low income and the
risk averse are also signiﬁcantly less likely to vote leave after exposure relative to the
control group, the eﬀects are 11.4 and 10.2 percentage points, respectively, and they
are precisely estimated. As voting in favour of leaving the EU was widely perceived
as a risky outcome, it is not suprising that risk averse individuals were less likely
to vote in favour of Brexit once they received information from the government
advising them not to. The estimates are precisely estimated and far larger than
the eﬀect for the whole sample in Table 3.6. The ﬁndings here match up nicely
with the priors that particular groups will be more aﬀected by exposure due to a
greater susceptibility to persuasion bias, which is also consistent with DellaVigna
and Kaplan (2007) and Barone et al. (2015).
In columns (8) and (9) I explore how diﬀerent partisan groups were aﬀected. At
this stage, I ﬁnd no diﬀerence in the way Conservative or Labour partisans reacted,
in terms of voting preference, to exposure.
16When comparing the summary statistics of the full and low exposure sample, the statistics show
that low exposure sample are made up of individuals of similar characteristics to the full sample
and are located across the UK.
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As a ﬁnal, but crucial, investigation, I test the eﬀectiveness of the leaﬂet of changing
voting intention. Here, I should observe that voters who reported in a prior treat-
ment wave that they would vote leave, should have a larger drop in the propensity
to vote leave after exposure. In column (11) I test this hypothesis by using only
individuals who said they would vote leave in wave 6, and ﬁnd that after exposure,
they are 9.3 percentage points less likely to vote to leave the EU than the control
group. This is an important distinction given the primary aim of the leaﬂet was to
garner support for the remain side.
In all columns covariate balancedness is achieved for all variables in the propen-
sity score equation, thus homogeneous individuals have been matched together and
covariate bias reduced  these diagnostic results are available on request.
Overall, the presented matching results conﬁrm that there is a larger drop in the
probability for voting for Brexit amongst certain groups of individuals that had a
low degree of exposure to other sources of referendum information and to the leaﬂet.
This is, again, consistent with the hypothesis put forward by Gerber et al. (2011),
that the eﬀects of the mailshot should be larger in a low information environment.
I also conﬁrm that the leaﬂet had an especially salient eﬀect on demographics that
are more susceptible to a persuasion bias, which is in accordance with the existing
literature.
Placebo analysis
As a robustness check and to complement the matching strategy, I conduct a number
of placebo tests. If the documented eﬀect on voting behaviour is due to the leaﬂet,
I should observe no eﬀect of exposure to the leaﬂet on earlier political outcomes
for the governing Conservative Party or other incumbent governments. In Table
3.10, columns (1), (2) and (4) re-estimate the matching procedure using whether a
respondent voted for the Conservative party in 2010, 2005 or the 2016 May local
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elections as the dependent variable, respectively. In (3), I check whether there is an
eﬀect for voting for Labour in 2005, then the incumbent party. All respondents were
not exposed to the leaﬂet at these dates. I ﬁnd no such evidence that there were any
prior treatment eﬀects driving the results, even in the local elections which allow for
examination of voting behaviour just a month before the referendum. Furthermore,
under the identifying assumption that exposure exclusively aﬀected referendum vot-
ing behaviour, I should also ﬁnd no eﬀect that exposed individuals were more likely
to take favourable views of David Cameron (leader of the Conservative Party and
Prime Minister at the time). I ﬁnd no evidence to support this hypothesis, which
suggests that the results are in fact due to the leaﬂet conveying its pro-remain in-
formation acutely.
Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence
To further support the matching strategy in applying a causal inference to the
results, I now employ a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence (DiD) approach. I identify a number
of individuals in the low degree of exposure sample who also completed wave 6
(pre-treatment) of the BES as well wave 8 (post-treatment), this however reduces
the total number of individuals (N = 430). I now estimate the following regression
model:
yit = αi + β1Postt + β2Exposedi + β3(Postt · Exposedi) + ψXit + it (3.3)
where t = 0, 1. yit denotes the outcome variable, whether individual i will vote to
leave at time t. The model includes individual ﬁxed eﬀects (αi), a vector of con-
trols (Xit) and an error term (it). Postt takes the value 1 for the post-treatment
period and Exposedi takes the value 1 for all individuals who were exposed, 0 oth-
erwise. The coeﬃcient of interest is β3 which is the DiD estimate of the eﬀect of
74
3.4. RESULTS
the leaﬂet on voting behaviour for the exposed. The models are estimated using a
ﬁxed eﬀects estimator to account for unobserved individual heterogeneity. I focus
on separating individuals by their inherent characteristics (risk aversion and gender)
rather than attempt to split the sample by characteristics that plausibly vary over
time (partisanship and income). Given the imbalance of certain variables between
the treated and untreated groups, I also balance the sample using each an individ-
ual's propensity score from a probit regression and re-estimate equation 3.3 in a
linear probability model. Again, I allow for heterogeneous eﬀects across the ﬁxed
demographics groups.
Table 3.11 reports estimates from the DiD analysis. The point estimates from the
ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcations are similar to those from the matching approach. They
show that females and the risk averse are 11.1 and 9.6 percentage points less likely
to vote to leave than the relevant control group. In the balanced sample the DiD
term again shows results qualitatively the same to those produced in the matching
approach.
On the whole, the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence results conﬁrm what has been shown pre-
viously. That is, a negative and signiﬁcant impact on the exposed group which is
a signiﬁcantly larger drop if an individual belongs to a demographic that is aﬀected
more by persuasion bias on their probability of voting leave.
High degree of exposure to other information sources
I can now take the analysis a step further and investigate whether individuals who
were exposed to other sources of information during the referendum campaign were
impacted by the leaﬂet. Given that there was an array of media sources discussing
the referendum during the campaign this is an interesting exercise. I use the set of
5,619 individuals who were excluded from the previous sections. These individuals
were treated with multiple sources of information as well as the leaﬂet. Explicitly, I
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keep individuals who have watched any of the televised debates, heard about the EU
from various sources or had been contacted by referendum campaigners, as well as
being exposed to the leaﬂet. I repeat the same propensity score matching as before
for this heavily treated sample.
The corresponding results are reported in Table 3.12. In column (1), insigniﬁcantly,
the coeﬃcient is now absolutely smaller in size than the low exposure sample. In
this sample, however, the results suggest some eﬀect for males. In the groups where
a large or signiﬁcant eﬀect is found in the low exposure sample, the coeﬃcients are
now severely demeaned or insigniﬁcant at the conventional levels, with the exception
of Conservative partisans. Why might this be? For at least two decades there has
been a rift between members of the Conservative party on the party's stance on the
EU and this split naturally translated into the referendum campaign.17 In this high
exposure sample, individuals will have seen various Conservative party members on
either side of the referendum debate. For instance, even in the 5 major debates,
there was a Conservative MP on both the remain and leave side in every debate.
Thus, exposed Conservative individuals will have interpreted the leaﬂet as a signal
from the Conservative Party, who were in government at the time and sanctioned
the leaﬂet, to vote to remain. They were, on average, 6.2 percentage points less
likely to vote to leave after exposure.
One area that warrants further investigation is the heterogeneous eﬀects within
partisan groups. The most interesting group to explore more deeply is the Conser-
vatives. One would expect a larger treatment eﬀect on those supporters who are
from the Cameron wing of the party. Conversely, there may be a negative, or no,
response to the leaﬂet from those Tory supporters from the right wing of the party.
17 In contrast, all other major political parties ran a united campaign about how their supporters
should vote. The Labour Party (only 10 members backed leave), the Liberal Democrats, the
Scottish National Party and the Green party all supported remain. UKIP and the Democratic
Unionist Party supported leave.
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On the whole, this suggests that the impact of the leaﬂet was far less pronounced
in respondents who were exposed to other sources of information regarding the
referendum. The null-result here goes some way to explain the outcome of the
referendum as many individuals were not uniquely exposed to the leaﬂet as a source
of referendum information.
3.4.3 Robustness checks
I now perform a series of checks to further assess the robustness of the main ﬁnd-
ings. First, in the full sample, I consider alternate matching strategies, including
Epanechnikov kernel matching and a fewer number of nearest neighbour matches.
Table 3.16 presents the results. The results obtained from these alternate strate-
gies support the results from the previous section: exposure leads to a signiﬁcant
reduction in the probability of voting to leave the EU.
Second, in the full sample, I alter the set of matching covariates. I systemically
exclude certain characteristics, such as income and personality traits, and allow
various ﬁxed eﬀects to enter the propensity score equation. The results remain the
same  the exposed group, on average, became signiﬁcantly more likely to vote to
remain than the control group. The results are shown in Table 3.17.
Similarly, third, I repeat the systematic exclusion and inclusion of matching variables
for the low exposure sample, whilst allowing for heterogeneous treatment eﬀects. I
also introduce government oﬃce region ﬁxed eﬀects in all estimations.18 The results
are presented in Table 3.18. The results here support that of the previous section:
for individuals who were only exposed to the leaﬂet, certain demographics who are
more susceptible to persuasion bias, were even more likely to vote to remain than
the control group.
18There is no distinction between party supporters due to the small sample size, therefore being
unable to locate suﬃcient matches.
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Fourth, I include calipers of varying sizes into the matching strategy in an attempt
to improve the quality of the matching. The corresponding results are shown in
Table 3.19. Here, the results remain qualitatively the same and a slightly larger
coeﬃcient is produced when the caliper is 0.005 and 0.001.
And ﬁfthly, I repeat the analysis whilst removing individuals from Wales and Scot-
land, where exposure is lower on average. I expect an unambiguous treatment eﬀect
regardless of the region an individual is located in. I drop individuals from Scotland,
then Wales and then both simultaneously. The results, presented in Table 3.20, re-
main the qualitatively the same.
3.5 Mechanisms
The results presented thus far establish that exposure to the government's EU leaﬂet
decreased an individual's propensity to vote leave in the 2016 EU referendum. The
leaﬂet presented information on key topics that were of concern to voters and this
section assess how informed voters became on these issues after exposure. I also
conduct some falsiﬁcation tests of these channels and consider some alternative
mechanisms.
3.5.1 The eﬀect of the government's EU leaﬂet on percep-
tions of leave vote outcomes
I now explore the mechanisms through which the leaﬂet should have inﬂuenced an
exposed individual's referendum vote. To do so, I return to the sample of 6,123
individuals used in Table 3.4. I use individuals where the answers to the relevant
question are non-missing. By being exposed to the leaﬂet it should have highlighted
particular areas of contention which would be typically worse oﬀ if a leave vote
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were to win. For instance, one area highlighted by the leaﬂet was job security, the
word job was used 8 times on 5 separate pages.19 The leaﬂet made the case that
jobs would be protected conditional on the remain side winning. By making minor
change the econometric strategy, I can establish these channels of impact. To test
the diﬀusion of the leaﬂets information on job security, I regress a person's opinion
on unemployment if the UK were to leave the EU on their exposure status. The
relevant question reads: Do you think the following [unemployment] will be higher,
lower, or about the same if the UK leaves the European Union? From this I create
a variable coded 1 for respondents who believe that unemployment will be higher
or much higher if the UK were to leave and 0 otherwise.20 This is repeated for
other key areas covered in the booklet: the general economic situation, security,
whether they believe the referendum to be ﬁnal, their personal ﬁnancial situation,
UK workers working conditions and world inﬂuence.
The results are reported in Table 3.13. The speciﬁcations used in all columns are
identical to that of Table 3.4 column (8) (i.e., controlling for individual character-
istics, local authority, and date ﬁxed eﬀects). Column (1) shows that those who
were exposed to the leaﬂet were, on average, 4.6 percentage points less likely to
believe that the UK economy would better oﬀ if the UK were to leave, relative to
the unexposed control group and is signiﬁcant at 1% level. Analogous results are
obtained that suggest exposure results in individuals being more likely to believe
that there would be higher unemployment, column (2); the risk of terror would be
higher, column (3); the referendum is the ﬁnal say on the EU, column (4); and UK
workers would not be better oﬀ, column (6). No eﬀect is found for personal ﬁnancial
situation and the UK's world inﬂuence. For the former, this is plausibly due to the
macro focus of the leaﬂet, with only minimal mentions of the cost of living impacts
of leaving the EU. And for the latter, it may be due to lack of clarity in the leaﬂet
19The words economy and economic were used a total of 12 times, and security was used 5
times.
20The responses: about the same/unchanged, lower and much lower, are coded as 0.
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about the UK's role in the EU's actions on the world stage. There is only a very
brief mention about the EU's role in the Iranian nuclear deal and tackling climate
change.
These results suggest that the leaﬂet was eﬀective at conveying its persuasive mes-
sage about contentious issues on the referendum trail. Voters idealized the govern-
ment's position on certain scenarios and therefore became less likely to vote to leave.
In essence, individuals believed the information the leaﬂet provided. This is perhaps
testament to the fair and realistic assessment of a possible leave outcome.
3.5.2 Placebo tests and alternate mechanisms
The results of the previous subsection suggest that by reading government's media
on particular areas of contention inﬂuenced a voter's perceptions of a likely scenario
should the leave side win the referendum. To further support these results as chan-
nels of impact, I now consider some placebo tests and alternate mechanisms. First,
as a placebo, I explore whether reader's views of speciﬁc outcomes that were not
addressed in the leaﬂet were aﬀected. Second, whether readers became more or less
receptive to prompts from the government after exposure. And third, after being
exposed, readers may take favourable views of prominent leave campaigners as an
act of rebellion against the government.
To investigate these hypotheses, I exploit additional questions in the BES. I estimate
the speciﬁcations as in Table 3.13 but similarly change the outcome measure. The
results are presented in Table 3.14. In columns (1)-(4) I show the falsiﬁcation tests
of the channels of impact. I regress whether a person believes that: there will be
more international trade if the UK leaves the EU; the EU would be better oﬀ if
Turkey were to join; the EU has undermined UK parliamentary sovereignty; and
immigration is increasing, on exposure status. All of which were extreme areas of
discussion in the televised debates and in the wider media during the campaign trail,
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however, critical to the placebo test assumption no information on these topics
was provided in the leaﬂet.21 As expected, the coeﬃcients are not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from 0. Now I attempt to rule out alternate mechanisms. In column (5) I
test whether exposed individuals became more trusting in general and no eﬀect from
exposure is found. In columns (6), (7) and (8) I also ﬁnd no evidence that individuals
take more favourable views of prominent leave campaigners, Boris Johnson, Michael
Gove or Nigel Farage, after exposure.
These ﬁndings suggest that the government's message was acutely conveyed to vot-
ers. The transmission mechanism was through the information provided rather than
altering voters sense of trust or pushing them toward the leave campaign as an act
of dissent. Importantly, I also show that exposure did not aﬀect voter's opinions of
scenarios not mentioned in the leaﬂet.
3.6 Conclusions
While much research has been undertaken on mass media's impact on political out-
comes, the impact on a single political event is largely unexplored. Moreover, much
of the work on Brexit has been focussed on individual or regional characteristics
that drove the leave vote, this work is a distinct aberration from this strand as I
oﬀer causal estimates from a quasi-natural experiment around the time of the 2016
EU referendum.
This chapter has addressed the role of the government's mailshot to UK households
on the 2016 EU referendum. I ﬁnd that those individuals who were exposed to
the leaﬂet displayed a higher probability of voting to remain in the EU than the
21 In the survey, respondents were asked what is the most important issue in the referendum. About
20% of individuals said the economy (in the leaﬂet) and another 20% said UK sovereignty (not in
the leaﬂet).
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untreated control group. The eﬀect is economically signiﬁcant, about 3 percentage
points, and statistically robust across diﬀerent speciﬁcations. In terms of the mag-
nitude, the eﬀect is comparable to that found in Gerber et al. (2011), who ﬁnd the
eﬀect of mailing to be between 1.5 and 3.5 percentage points. When exploring the
groups that are driving this result, I ﬁnd that the individuals who were exposed to
other referendum informtion to a low degree and exposed to the leaﬂet displayed a
much lower propensity to vote leave. It is those demographics who are more suscep-
tible to persuasion bias that were aﬀected to a larger extent, which is consistent with
the literature by DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007), DellaVigna et al. (2014), Barone
et al. (2015) and Galasso and Nannicini (2016). Speciﬁcally, I ﬁnd that the eﬀect
is larger in absolute terms for females, low income and the risk averse, I also show
that the leaﬂet was indeed eﬀective at changing individuals voting intention using
data from prior to exposure. I present evidence that shows in the midst of Conser-
vative party in-ﬁghting over the party's position, exposed Conservative supporters
were more likely to vote to remain as they took the leaﬂet as a signal from the
Conservative government.
In terms of the mechanisms at work, I show that the leaﬂet was eﬀective at conveying
the likely scenarios of a leave vote and highlighting the beneﬁts of EU membership,
which persuaded voters into voting to remain in the EU. This is because of the
realistic, concise nature of the information provided. Here, I also reject alternate
mechanisms and can hence be conﬁdent that the channel of impact was through
leaﬂet exposure.
My ﬁndings oﬀer the ﬁrst systematic evidence that exposure to the government's
leaﬂet inﬂuenced voting behaviour in the 2016 EU referendum. Whilst this research
is speciﬁc to the referendum, my analysis provides more general insights into the
economic allocation of scarce public resources and strategies for political campaign-
ing based on persuasion bias. A more targeted campaign, for example, based on
reaching speciﬁcally those demographics who were more likely to believe the infor-
mation and change their voting behaviour accordingly may have been more fruitful.
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As this chapter considers only a single source of referendum information, there are
several possible areas for future research. The sheer number of sources of informa-
tion on the referendum may prove to be an intersting area to explore. The televised
debates, the murder of Jo Cox MP or the role of a declining industrial sector all
warrant further exploration. Allcott and Gentzkow (2017) consider `fake news' in
the context of the 2016 US election. Here, there are obvious parallels to the EU
referendum where fake news was ingrained in the campaign trail.
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3.A Chapter 3 Figures
Figure 3.1: Spatial distribution of the Leave share (in %) across local
authority districts in the 2016 EU referendum. England, Wales and Scot-
land.
Notes: The map shows the vote leave share by each local authority district in England, Scotland and Wales.
Redder areas are more leave, and blacker areas are more remain. Data are obtained from the Electoral
Commission.
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Figure 3.2: Spatial distribution of the Leave share (in %) across local
authority districts in the 2016 EU referendum. London only.
Notes: The map shows the vote leave share by each local authority district in London only. Redder areas are more
leave, and blacker areas are more remain. Data are obtained from the Electoral Commission.
Figure 3.3: Example front cover of the government's
2016 EU leaﬂet.
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Figure 3.4: Example back page of the government's
2016 EU leaﬂet
Figure 3.5: Example front and back page of the
government's 1975 EU pamphlet
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Figure 3.6: Spatial distribution of the share of exposed to total respon-
dents per local authority district (as a %). England, Scotland and Wales.
Figure 3.7: Spatial distribution of the share of exposed to total respon-
dents per local authority district (as a %). London only.
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Figure 3.8: Average of polls through April 2016
Figure 3.9: Spatial distribution of the low exposure sample, the number
of respondents by local authority district. England, Scotland and Wales.
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Figure 3.10: Spatial distribution of the low exposure sample, the number
of respondents by local authority district. London only.
Figure 3.11: Bias before and after propensity score
matching  Table 3.6 column (3).
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Figure 3.12: Bias before and after propensity score
matching, with county and referendum proximity
ﬁxed eﬀects  Table 3.6 column (6).
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3.B Chapter 3 Tables
Table 3.1: 2016 Timeline
8th May 2015 • BES wave 6 begins
26th May 2015 • BES wave 6 ends
11-13th April • Government's EU leaﬂet is
sent out to all UK
households
14th April • BES wave 7 begins
4th May • BES wave 7 ends
5th May • Local elections
6th May • BES wave 8 begins
4th June • BES wave 9 begins
9th June • Postal vote registration
ends
22nd June • BES wave 8 ends
23rd June • Referendum day
4th July • BES wave 9 ends
Table 3.2: Partisan ranking
% of negative
Party name EU mentions Coding
United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) 16.53 8
Conservative Party 4.594 7
Liberal Democrats 0.782 6
Other  5
Green Party of England and Wales 0.403 4
Plaid Cymru (The Party of Wales) 0.387 3
Scottish Nationalist Party 0.112 2
Labour Party 0.099 1
Notes: The table shows the percent of the corresponding party's 2015 general election
manifesto dedicated to negative mentions of the European Union, taken from the vari-
able per110 as coded in the Manifesto Project Database by Volkens et al. (2017). Other,
refers to all other parties that were voted for in the 2015 general election by respondents.
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Table 3.3: Summary statistics for selected variables
Full sample Exposed = 1 Exposed = 0
mean sd mean sd mean sd
Vote leave 0.513 0.500 0.509 0.500 0.516 0.500
Male 0.506 0.500 0.525 0.499 0.485 0.500
Age 50.25 15.37 52.24 15.64 47.96 14.72
Age2 / 100 27.61 15.27 29.74 15.74 25.16 14.32
Married 0.510 0.500 0.527 0.499 0.490 0.500
Widowed 0.035 0.183 0.043 0.203 0.025 0.157
Non-white 0.092 0.288 0.082 0.274 0.103 0.304
Employed 0.592 0.491 0.545 0.498 0.646 0.478
Kids01 0.253 0.435 0.216 0.412 0.295 0.456
Ln(household size) 0.793 0.496 0.774 0.487 0.814 0.505
Home owner 0.656 0.475 0.685 0.465 0.622 0.485
Degree  education 0.397 0.489 0.404 0.491 0.389 0.488
A-level  education 0.218 0.413 0.222 0.416 0.214 0.410
GCSE  education 0.309 0.462 0.300 0.458 0.319 0.466
None  education 0.077 0.266 0.075 0.263 0.079 0.269
Friends from the EU 0.463 0.499 0.487 0.500 0.434 0.496
Speaks another language 0.200 0.400 0.228 0.420 0.169 0.375
Partisan -0.048 1.012 -0.009 1.005 -0.093 1.018
Household income (Over ¿70k) 0.070 0.255 0.072 0.259 0.066 0.249
Household income (¿40-70k) 0.219 0.413 0.218 0.413 0.220 0.414
Household income (¿20-40k) 0.393 0.488 0.387 0.487 0.400 0.464
Household income (¿0-20k) 0.319 0.466 0.323 0.468 0.314 0.464
Agreeableness 6.095 1.801 6.142 1.806 6.040 1.794
Conscientiousness 6.771 1.832 6.899 1.821 6.623 1.834
Extraversion 4.076 2.176 4.091 2.202 4.058 2.146
Neuroticism 3.730 2.196 3.590 2.192 3.891 2.190
Openness 5.449 1.665 5.488 1.658 5.405 1.672
Observations 5,921 3,208 2,713
Notes: Statistics are weighted by the BES core sample weight. Exposed refers to the Government
EU leaﬂet dummy, which is an indicator variable that is equal to one if a person has received and
read the governments leaﬂet backing a remain vote.
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Table 3.4: Who voted for Brexit?
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Male -0.021* -0.010 -0.009 -0.012 -0.009 -0.013 -0.012
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Age 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Age2 / 100 -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.012***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Married -0.010 0.002 -0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.001
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Widowed 0.031 0.035 0.034 0.033 0.035 0.030 0.030
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.032) (0.030) (0.032) (0.031)
Non-white 0.001 -0.004 -0.003 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Employed -0.034** -0.015 -0.015 -0.011 -0.014 -0.011 -0.014
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014)
Kids01 0.011 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Ln(household size) 0.033** 0.059*** 0.059*** 0.053*** 0.055*** 0.051*** 0.053***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017)
Home owner -0.061*** -0.038*** -0.040*** -0.051*** -0.043*** -0.050*** -0.042***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014)
Degree  education -0.291*** -0.261*** -0.257*** -0.248*** -0.253*** -0.248*** -0.252***
(0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023)
A-level  education -0.161*** -0.146*** -0.145*** -0.142*** -0.142*** -0.141*** -0.141***
(0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
GCSE  education -0.037* -0.029 -0.028 -0.031 -0.028 -0.028 -0.025
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Friends from the EU -0.055*** -0.046*** -0.045*** -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.038*** -0.039***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Speaks another language -0.033** -0.029** -0.029** -0.028* -0.029** -0.028* -0.028*
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014)
Partisan 0.174*** 0.176*** 0.175*** 0.175*** 0.174*** 0.175*** 0.174***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Household income (Over ¿70k) -0.153*** -0.160*** -0.140*** -0.142*** -0.143*** -0.144***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025)
Household income (¿40-70k) -0.108*** -0.111*** -0.098*** -0.101*** -0.099*** -0.101***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018)
Household income (¿20-40k) -0.051*** -0.053*** -0.049*** -0.048*** -0.050*** -0.049***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Agreeableness -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Conscientiousness 0.007** 0.007** 0.007** 0.008** 0.007**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Extraversion 0.005** 0.005* 0.005** 0.005* 0.005**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Neuroticism 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Openness -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Constant 0.301*** 0.287*** 0.259*** 0.178** 0.319*** 0.152 0.289***
(0.072) (0.072) (0.081) (0.089) (0.092) (0.108) (0.107)
Local authority FEs? No No No Yes No Yes No
County FEs? No No No No Yes No Yes
Ref. proximity FEs? No No No No No Yes Yes
R-squared 0.249 0.255 0.257 0.309 0.267 0.314 0.273
Observations 6,132 6,132 6,132 6,132 6,132 6,132 6,132
Notes: Coeﬃcients reported show the average marginal eﬀect from probit regressions. Local authority districts are govern-
ment areas at which the referendum count was reported. County areas are NUTS2 regions. Referendum proximity ﬁxed eﬀects
are time ﬁxed eﬀects for the day of survey completion. The omitted category for income is households that earn less than
¿20k per year. The education variables refer to the respondents highest level of qualiﬁcation, the omitted category is no formal
qualiﬁcations. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table 3.5: Individual-level analysis with local authority district controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Govt. EU leaﬂet (Exposed) -0.025* -0.023* -0.027** -0.026* -0.027* -0.026*
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
EU dependence
Primary Industries 0.006* 0.004 -0.003 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Manufacturing 0.005* 0.005* 0.009*** 0.008**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Construction -0.019* -0.026*** 0.005 -0.004
(0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012)
Services -0.005 0.004 -0.025 -0.014
(0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.018)
LAD migrant share
EU15 -1.396 -0.552 -1.047 -0.694 -1.348 -0.789
(0.964) (0.955) (1.106) (1.126) (0.974) (0.978)
EU12 -0.049 -0.272 0.311 -0.292 0.344 -0.034
(0.672) (0.670) (0.726) (0.752) (0.681) (0.691)
NON-EU 0.103 -0.068 -0.176 -0.279 -0.145 -0.272
(0.179) (0.184) (0.227) (0.230) (0.198) (0.202)
Other LAD controls
Ln (Local authority cuts per capita) 0.158*** 0.135*** 0.138***
(0.031) (0.040) (0.034)
Gross domestic household income (2015) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Individual controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ref. proximity FEs? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Local authority FEs? No No No No No No
County FEs? No No Yes Yes No No
GOR FEs? No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 5,957 5,957 5,957 5,957 5,957 5,957
Notes: Coeﬃcients reported show the average marginal eﬀect from probit regressions. Local authority districts are government
areas at which the referendum count was reported. County areas are NUTS2 regions. Referendum proximity ﬁxed eﬀects are time
ﬁxed eﬀects for the day of survey completion. GOR refers to the government oﬃce regions. The omitted category for income is
households that earn less than ¿20k per year. The education variables refer to the respondents highest level of qualiﬁcation, the
omitted category is no formal qualiﬁcations. Robust standard errors are clustered by local authority and reported in parentheses; *
p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
Table 3.6: The impact of the government's EU leaﬂet on voting behaviour
OLS Matching
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exposed -0.038*** -0.048*** -0.030*** -0.024** -0.029*** -0.039***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
County FEs? No Yes No Yes No Yes
Ref. proximity FEs? No Yes No No Yes Yes
Treated/control 3,408/2,724 3,408/2,724 3,408/2,724 3,408/2,724 3,408/2,724 3,408/2,724
Observations 6,132 6,132 6,132 6,132 6,132 6,132
Notes: Exposed is the Government EU leaﬂet dummy, which is an indicator variable that is equal to one if a person has received
and read the governments leaﬂet backing a remain vote. The dependent variable is a dummy for whether an individual will vote
to leave the EU. The set of matching variables, with replacement, in all columns includes male, age, age2 / 100, married, widowed,
non-white, employed, kids01, ln(household size), home owner, degree, a-level, gcse, friends from the EU, speaks another language,
partisan, 3 categories of household income, agreeableness, conscientiousness, extroversion, neuroticism, openness, pre-treatment vot-
ing intention and a dummy for interest in the referendum. Standard errors are Abadie-Imbens robust standard errors (Abadie and
Imbens, 2008, 2016). Columns (1) and (2) report estimates from OLS regressions, variables omitted are the full set of controls, as well
as country-level and proximity to referendum date ﬁxed eﬀects in column (2). Columns (3)-(6) report the average treatment eﬀect on
the treated using propensity score matching, with 5 nearest-neighbours. In column (3) there is no ﬁxed eﬀects. Column (4) and (5)
includes county-level and referendum proximity ﬁxed eﬀects, respectively. In column (6) the speciﬁcation includes both county-level
and proximity to referendum ﬁxed eﬀects. The propensity scores are obtained from a probit regression. Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table 3.7: Covariate balancedness
Before matching After matching
Treatment Control p-value Control p-value
group group diﬀerence group diﬀerence
mean mean in means means in means
Matching Covariates
Male 0.540 0.503 0.001 0.549 0.427
Age 58.12 53.26 0.000 58.10 0.940
Age2 / 100 35.71 30.58 0.000 35.70 0.975
Married 0.584 0.518 0.000 0.579 0.674
Widowed 0.049 0.038 0.019 0.047 0.638
Non-white 0.069 0.081 0.035 0.072 0.530
Employed 0.435 0.550 0.000 0.432 0.772
Kids01 0.167 0.218 0.000 0.171 0.644
Ln(household size) 0.723 0.753 0.004 0.725 0.858
Home owner 0.762 0.681 0.000 0.757 0.638
Degree  education 0.459 0.428 0.006 0.468 0.391
A-level  education 0.197 0.199 0.743 0.187 0.236
GCSE  education 0.260 0.272 0.243 0.259 0.934
Friends from the EU 0.524 0.480 0.000 0.530 0.554
Speaks another language 0.251 0.213 0.000 0.259 0.410
Partisan 0.008 -0.100 0.000 0.003 0.809
Household income (Over ¿70k) 0.066 0.058 0.131 0.066 0.966
Household income (¿40-70k) 0.171 0.167 0.577 0.165 0.447
Household income (¿20-40k) 0.290 0.301 0.271 0.282 0.418
Agreeableness 6.191 6.060 0.001 6.158 0.383
Conscientiousness 6.994 6.724 0.000 6.983 0.780
Extraversion 4.150 4.033 0.018 4.124 0.577
Neuroticism 3.467 3.816 0.000 3.455 0.798
Openness 5.535 5.488 0.231 5.542 0.851
Referendum interest 0.968 0.922 0.000 0.968 0.990
Vote leavet−1 0.434 0.451 0.126 0.439 0.644
Observations 3,408 2,724 2,724
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Table 3.8: Summary statistics for matching variables in the low exposure
sample
Full sample Exposed = 1 Exposed = 0
mean sd mean sd mean sd
Vote leave 0.526 0.500 0.509 0.501 0.535 0.499
Male 0.413 0.493 0.434 0.497 0.403 0.491
Age 50.897 14.682 52.728 14.385 49.965 14.765
Age2 / 100 28.056 14.812 29.860 15.034 27.138 14.635
Married 0.470 0.500 0.480 0.501 0.465 0.499
Widowed 0.043 0.203 0.052 0.223 0.038 0.192
Non-white 0.074 0.262 0.069 0.255 0.076 0.266
Employed 0.579 0.494 0.555 0.498 0.591 0.492
Kids01 0.275 0.447 0.266 0.443 0.279 0.449
Ln(household size) 0.745 0.500 0.742 0.488 0.747 0.508
Home owner 0.614 0.487 0.659 0.475 0.591 0.492
Degree  education 0.292 0.455 0.306 0.462 0.285 0.452
A-level  education 0.230 0.421 0.225 0.419 0.232 0.423
GCSE  education 0.339 0.474 0.329 0.471 0.344 0.476
None  education 0.138 0.346 0.139 0.347 0.138 0.346
Friends from the EU 0.349 0.477 0.422 0.495 0.312 0.464
Speaks another language 0.127 0.333 0.127 0.334 0.126 0.333
Partisan -0.118 1.033 -0.065 1.034 -0.145 1.032
Household income (Over ¿70k) 0.053 0.224 0.029 0.168 0.065 0.246
Household income (¿40-70k) 0.164 0.370 0.173 0.380 0.159 0.366
Household income (¿20-40k) 0.341 0.475 0.329 0.471 0.347 0.477
Household income (¿0-20k) 0.442 0.497 0.468 0.500 0.429 0.496
Agreeableness 6.150 1.812 6.064 1.709 6.194 1.863
Conscientiousness 6.741 1.819 6.832 1.795 6.694 1.832
Extraversion 4.117 2.129 4.121 2.189 4.115 2.101
Neuroticism 3.862 2.170 3.746 2.168 3.921 2.172
Openness 5.327 1.678 5.306 1.594 5.338 1.721
Referendum interest 0.823 0.382 0.879 0.328 0.794 0.405
Vote leavet−1 0.489 0.500 0.486 0.501 0.491 0.501
Observations 513 173 340
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Table 3.10: Placebo analysis
Like Cameron
Con 2010 Con 2005 Lab 2005 Con local [0-10]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Exposed -0.023 0.041 0.045 -0.005 0.278
(0.039) (0.039) (0.048) (0.052) (0.297)
Treated/control 168/326 157/291 157/291 75/115 164/316
Observations 494 448 448 190 480
Notes:Exposed is the Government EU leaﬂet dummy, which is an indicator variable that is equal
to one if a person has received and read the governments leaﬂet backing a remain vote. The set of
matching variables, with replacement, in all columns includes male, age, age2 / 100, married, wid-
owed, non-white, employed, kids01, ln(household size), home owner, degree, a-level, gcse, friends
from the EU, speaks another language, partisan, 3 categories of household income, agreeableness,
conscientiousness, extroversion, neuroticism, openness, pre-treatment voting intention and a dummy
for interest in the referendum. Standard errors are Abadie-Imbens robust standard errors (Abadie
and Imbens, 2008, 2016). Columns (1)-(5) report the average treatment eﬀect on the treated using
propensity score matching, with 5 nearest-neighbours. The propensity scores are obtained from a
probit regression. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; ***
p < 0.01.
Table 3.11: DiD estimates of the eﬀect of the government's EU leaﬂet on
voting behaviour
Fixed eﬀects Balanced sample LPM
Full isolated Female Risk avoider Full isolated Female Risk avoider
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post × Exposed -0.036 -0.111** -0.096* -0.071 -0.132** -0.148**
(0.040) (0.055) (0.051) (0.061) (0.064) (0.073)
R2 0.016 0.036 0.054 0.672 0.812 0.821
Observations 860 502 472 668 386 368
Notes: Exposed is the Government EU leaﬂet dummy, which is an indicator variable that is equal to one if a person has
received and read the governments leaﬂet backing a remain vote. All regressions include the full set of controls from Ta-
ble 3.4 column (3). As well as these controls, regional dummies are included in columns (4) - (6). The dependent variable
is a dummy for whether an individual will vote to leave the EU. Robust standard errors, clustered at the individual-level,
are reported in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table 3.15: Propensity score estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Male 0.078** 0.091*** 0.076** 0.089**
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036)
Age 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.010
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Age2 / 100 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Married 0.028 0.036 0.021 0.030
(0.043) (0.044) (0.043) (0.044)
Widowed 0.055 0.068 0.043 0.056
(0.088) (0.089) (0.089) (0.089)
Non-white -0.072 -0.059 -0.064 -0.052
(0.065) (0.066) (0.066) (0.067)
Employed -0.151*** -0.157*** -0.158*** -0.163***
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
Kids01 -0.062 -0.074 -0.053 -0.066
(0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.053)
Ln(household size) 0.086* 0.069 0.083* 0.066
(0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.051)
Home owner 0.080* 0.085** 0.092** 0.098**
(0.042) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
Degree  education 0.288*** 0.306*** 0.279*** 0.298***
(0.067) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068)
A-level  education 0.236*** 0.258*** 0.237*** 0.260***
(0.069) (0.070) (0.070) (0.071)
GCSE  education 0.171*** 0.172*** 0.172*** 0.175***
(0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.066)
Friends from the EU 0.086** 0.089** 0.089** 0.091**
(0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
Speaks another language 0.078* 0.077* 0.081* 0.079*
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.044)
Partisan 0.069*** 0.032* 0.075*** 0.037*
(0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019)
Household income (Over ¿70k) -0.031 -0.011 -0.035 -0.017
(0.074) (0.076) (0.075) (0.077)
Household income (¿40-70k) -0.032 -0.017 -0.032 -0.017
(0.054) (0.055) (0.055) (0.056)
Household income (¿20-40k) -0.072* -0.063 -0.079* -0.070
(0.043) (0.044) (0.043) (0.044)
Agreeableness 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.005
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Conscientiousness 0.031*** 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.027***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Extraversion 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Neuroticism -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
Openness 0.009 0.010 0.008 0.009
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Referendum interest 0.503*** 0.490*** 0.501*** 0.487***
(0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.077)
Vote Leavet−1 -0.144*** -0.157*** -0.155*** -0.170***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040)
County FEs? No Yes No Yes
Ref. proximity FEs? No No Yes Yes
Observations 6,132 6,132 6,132 6,132
Notes: Coeﬃcients reported show the average marginal eﬀect from a probit regression. Exposed
is the Government EU leaﬂet dummy, which is an indicator variable that is equal to one if a person
has received and read the governments leaﬂet backing a remain vote. Columns (1) - (4) correspond
to Table 3.6 columns (3) - (6).
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Table 3.16: Alternate matching strategies
Epanechnikov kernel Propensity score
50 reps 150 reps 4 neighbours 3 neighbours
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Exposed -0.029** -0.029** -0.031*** -0.025**
(0.014) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012)
Treated/control 3,408/2,724 3,408/2,724 3,408/2,724 3,408/2,724
Observations 6,132 6,132 6,132 6,132
Notes: Exposed is the Government EU leaﬂet dummy, which is an indicator variable that
is equal to one if a person has received and read the governments leaﬂet backing a remain
vote. The set of matching variables, with replacement, in all columns includes male, age,
age2 / 100, married, widowed, non-white, employed, kids01, ln(household size), home owner,
degree, a-level, gcse, friends from the EU, speaks another language, partisan, 3 categories of
household income, agreeableness, conscientiousness, extroversion, neuroticism, openness, pre-
treatment voting intention and a dummy for interest in the referendum. In column (1) and
(2) standard errors are bootstrapped using 50 and 150 replications, respectively. Columns (1)
and (2) report the average treatment eﬀect on the treated using Epanechnikov kernal match-
ing. In column (3) and (4) standard errors are Abadie-Imbens robust standard errors (Abadie
and Imbens, 2008, 2016). Columns (3) and (4) report the average treatment eﬀect on the
treated using propensity score matching, with 4 and 3 nearest neighbours, respectively. The
propensity scores are obtained from a probit regression. Robust standard errors are reported
in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
Table 3.17: Full sample matching with alternate matching covariates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A
Exposed -0.023** -0.027** -0.021* -0.031***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Panel B
Exposed -0.023** -0.034*** -0.027** -0.034***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Panel C
Exposed -0.022* -0.028** -0.021* -0.039***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
County FEs? No Yes No Yes
Ref. proximity FEs? No No Yes Yes
Treated/control 3,408/2,724 3,408/2,724 3,408/2,724 3,408/2,724
Observations 6,132 6,132 6,132 6,132
Notes: Exposed is the Government EU leaﬂet dummy, which is an indicator variable that is
equal to one if a person has received and read the governments leaﬂet backing a remain vote. The
dependent variable is a dummy for whether an individual will vote to leave the EU. Standard
errors are Abadie-Imbens robust standard errors (Abadie and Imbens, 2008, 2016). Columns
(1)-(4) report the average treatment eﬀect on the treated using propensity score matching, with
5 nearest-neighbours. The propensity scores are obtained from a probit regression. The set of
matching variables, with replacement, in Panel A is the same as those in Equation 3.2, but ex-
clude the big 5 personality traits. In Panel B, the matching covariates are the same as Panel A,
but exclude the big 5 personality traits and whether the respondents has friends from the EU
and whether they speak another language. In Panel C, the matching covariates are the same as
Panel A, but exclude income dummies. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; *
p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table 3.18: Low exposure sample matching with alternate matching covariates
Gender Income group Risk aversion
Full isolated Female Male ¿0-20k > ¿20k Avoider Taker Wave 6 Leavers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A
Exposed -0.051 -0.102** 0.032 -0.049 0.024 -0.160*** 0.051 -0.093**
(0.042) (0.042) (0.094) (0.102) (0.050) (0.038) (0.042) (0.043)
Panel B
Exposed -0.068 -0.069* 0.027 -0.081*** 0.017 -0.119*** 0.084 -0.093**
(0.042) (0.036) (0.051) (0.023) (0.050) (0.036) (0.084) (0.043)
Panel C
Exposed -0.020 -0.088** 0.008 -0.084*** 0.041 -0.109*** 0.043 -0.088**
(0.041) (0.043) (0.105) (0.029) (0.043) (0.037) (0.067) (0.039)
Panel D
Exposed -0.018 -0.063 -0.013 -0.128* 0.030 -0.087*** 0.030 -0.090**
(0.039) (0.045) (0.028) (0.078) (0.042) (0.020) (0.066) (0.046)
GOR
FEs?
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Treated/control173/340 98/203 75/137 81/146 92/194 94/183 79/157 84/167
Observations 513 301 212 227 286 277 236 251
Notes: Exposed is the Government EU leaﬂet dummy, which is an indicator variable that is equal to one if a person has received and
read the governments leaﬂet backing a remain vote. The dependent variable is a dummy for whether an individual will vote to leave
the EU. Standard errors are Abadie-Imbens robust standard errors (Abadie and Imbens, 2008, 2016). Columns (1)-(8) report the av-
erage treatment eﬀect on the treated using propensity score matching, with 5 nearest-neighbours. The propensity scores are obtained
from a probit regression. The set of matching variables, with replacement, in Panel A is the same as those in Equation 3.2 as well
as government oﬃce region ﬁxed eﬀects. In Panel B, the matching covariates are the same again, but exclude the big 5 personality
traits and includes government oﬃce region ﬁxed eﬀects. In Panel C, the matching covariates are the same as Panel A, but exclude
the big 5 personality traits and whether the respondents speaks another language or has friends the EU, and includes government of-
ﬁce region ﬁxed eﬀects. In Panel D, the matching covariates are the same as Panel A, but now exclude income dummies and include
government oﬃce region ﬁxed eﬀects. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
Table 3.19: Matching with calipers
(1) (2)
Panel A
Exposed -0.027* -0.041***
(0.015) (0.015)
Treated/control 3,393/2,724 3,401/2,724
Observations 6,117 6,125
Panel B
Exposed -0.026* -0.041***
(0.015) (0.015)
Treated/control 3,363/2,724 3,399/2,724
Observations 6,087 6,123
County FEs? No Yes
Ref. proximity FEs? No Yes
Notes: Exposed is the Government EU leaﬂet dummy, which
is an indicator variable that is equal to one if a person has re-
ceived and read the governments leaﬂet backing a remain vote.
The dependent variable is a dummy for whether an individ-
ual will vote to leave the EU. Columns (1) and (2) report the
average treatment eﬀect on the treated using propensity score
matching, with 5 nearest-neighbours. The propensity scores
are obtained from a probit regression. The set of matching
variables, with replacement, in all Panels, is the same as those
in Equation 3.2. Panel A ﬁnds matches using a caliper of
0.005 and Panel B ﬁnds matches using a caliper of 0.001. Ro-
bust standard errors are reported in parentheses; * p < 0.1;
** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table 3.20: Matching with countries excluded
(1) (2) (3)
Exposed -0.028** -0.026** -0.029**
(0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
Country dropped Scotland Wales Both
Treated/control 2,880/2,069 3,397/2,719 2,869/2,064
Observations 4,949 6,116 4,933
Notes: Exposed is the Government EU leaﬂet dummy, which is an indi-
cator variable that is equal to one if a person has received and read the
governments leaﬂet backing a remain vote. The dependent variable is a
dummy for whether an individual will vote to leave the EU. Standard er-
rors are Abadie-Imbens robust standard errors (Abadie and Imbens, 2008,
2016). Columns (1)-(3) report the average treatment eﬀect on the treated
using propensity score matching, with 5 nearest-neighbours. The propen-
sity scores are obtained from a probit regression. The set of matching vari-
ables, with replacement, in Panel A is the same as those in Equation 3.2.
Column (1) drops individuals from Scotland, (2) removes individuals from
Wales, and (3) removes individuals from both Scotland and Wales. Robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; ***
p < 0.01.
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Chapter 4 Partisan alignment, elections and experi-
enced politicians
This ﬁnal empirical chapter is prompted by the ﬁnal one of the three major political
economy events, speciﬁcally the November 2016 US presidential election. Previously,
I explored what factors aggravate or mitigate a populist outcome (in the form of
Brexit), this chapter however takes its cues from the election of a populist president.
This chapter therefore asks what a US president can do to consolidate his, and his
party's, political position. This chapter employs federal ﬁscal transfer data at the
state-level and the national and state electoral calendars to assess how a president
may favour his co-partisans.
4.1 Introduction
The allocation of funds for political gain has been studied to a wide extent in the
existing literature (Cox and McCubbins, 1986, Dixit and Londregan, 1996, An-
solabehere and Snyder, 2006). This strategic allocation causes distributive welfare
to be skewed toward co-partisans at lower tiers of government (see, e.g., Larcinese
et al. 2006, Baskaran and Hessami 2017). This naturally occurs as politicians seek
to favour their own party rather than support competing factions. The degree to
which this favouring occurs is deeply contextual, for instance, re-election incentives
causes further malapportionment (Veiga and Pinho, 2007, Veiga and Veiga, 2013,
Rumi, 2014, Fouirnaies and Mutlu-Eren, 2015).
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Favouring co-partisans has had a profound eﬀect upon policy decisions and has seen
political parties grow into brands. Before the establishment of formal left-right
parties during the French revolution, crude forms of partisanship date back at least
two thousand years. During the late Roman Republic, circa 133 - 27 B.C., two
political groups dominated  the Optimates and the Populares. Both were made
up of wealthy individuals that ran politics, although they took polar stances on
policy. The latter were the more left-wing grouping, which typically favoured the
cause of the plebeians and policies such as inequality reform. Conversely, the former
represented the more conservative arm of Roman politics at the time. They wished
to extended the power of the Senate  which they controlled, further the interest
of aristocrats and opposed generals rising through the course of oﬃce, the cursus
honorum. An example of this type of partisan politics comes from Julius Caesar, a
decorated general and Populare. Once a Consul, the highest elected oﬃce, Caesar
introduced a bill to the Senate to redistribute land to military veterans -eventual
Populares themselves- and the urban poor. However, this was essentially ﬁlibustered
and then abstained by the Optimates, which forced the bill to fail (Kuiper, 2010).
Naturally, comparisons are often drawn to modern day political theatre, in particular
US politics. The Optimates are akin to the Republicans and Democrats to the
Populares in regards to motivation, support and ideological leaning.
With respect to this notion of partisanship, this chapter looks at how a politician,
at a higher tier of government, can support another politician at a lower tier, who
is aﬃliated along party lines. Using evidence from the US, this chapter contributes
to this literature by providing empirical evidence on the allocation of the federal
budget -federal intergovernmental transfers- toward co-partisans of the president
around election times. The alignment eﬀect is identiﬁed by exploiting the quasi-
random nature of alignment in the US. Moreover, when interpreting the alignment
eﬀect, it is critical to ensure this acts separate to that of, and not through, the
eﬀect of merely favouring loyal supporting areas (Migueis, 2013), which most prior
empirical work has failed to do. In the existing literature, alignment and federal
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transfers have been considered to an extent, but they have not been analysed in
terms of a electoral cycle framework in the case of the US (Larcinese et al.; 2006;
Ansolabehere and Snyder; 2006). Additionally, I can further support an electorally
motivated channel by making a distinction between swing areas, which should be
favoured disproportionately more due to the paramount importance of winning these
state's electoral college votes on the way to presidency.
Moreover, a nascent area of the literature has begun to look at the impact of the
political ﬁgurehead's characteristics on economic outcomes. Some ﬁrst insights have
been provided for education (Besley et al., 2011); career (Dreher et al., 2009) and
gender (Brollo and Troiano, 2016). In this chapter, I contribute new understanding
on the impact of speciﬁc prior political experience to appropriate and lobby for a
larger share of federal money. I also allow for the transmission of this eﬀect to act
through co-partisan channels.
This chapter also has important contributions regarding ideology on the left-right
nexus. As I use the case of the US, I am able to distinguish between left (Democrat)
and right (Republican) alignment. By splitting alignment in this way I am able to
discern which party is driving the results and allows us to make inferences about
ideological aspects.
In short, my results can be summarised as follows. For my core analysis I ﬁnd
that presidents subvert federal revenue towards states that are governed by their co-
partisans  this eﬀect is robust to various speciﬁcations and controls, in particular
in the inclusion of state-speciﬁc time trends. Here I test for possible threats to
identiﬁcation, namely a violation of the common trends assumption between treated
and untreated states. I ﬁnd no such evidence of problematic pre- or post-treatment
trends when adding lead and lag variables. When I examine if this re-allocation is
being driven by the desire of the president to ensure re-election of his party at the
national level, I ﬁnd that this is indeed the case. Aligned governors in election years
receive more, there is also evidence that this occurs in pre-election years as well. The
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re-election of the president's party narrative is furthered by analysing the allocation
to co-partisans in swing states, in which I ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly larger eﬀect. I argue
that the underlying mechanism to redistribute funds downward to co-partisans is
due to performance spill-overs across the diﬀerent tiers of government, which the
president desires to beneﬁt from. I test whether the prior political career of governors
induces a larger inﬂux of funds to their states and ﬁnd that this happens irrespective
of alignment. This can be explained by the lobbying eﬀorts of governors with more
political nous rather than more experienced governors producing larger spill-over
eﬀects for the president's party. By splitting the alignment variable by the two
major parties I show that Republican presidents favour their co-partisans governors
more than Democrats. However, in election times both parties redistribute to their
political allies in similar magnitudes. I conduct some falsiﬁcation tests to conﬁrm
a non-spurious identiﬁcation of the relationship. As a ﬁnal element, I assess the
sensitivity to selection-on-unobservables, which would have to be 7 times as large as
the selection-on-observables to attenuate the relationship to 0 (Altonji et al., 2005).
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the relevant
literature and why co-partisans should be favoured. Section 4.3 presents the institu-
tional framework in the US, in particular the power of the president in allocating the
federal budget and the interactions with the state governors. Section 4.4 presents
the data and methodology. Section 4.5 presents the main results and the proceeding
section provides explanations of the driving force behind the results. Section 4.6
conducts some tests on the validity of my results and section 4.7 oﬀers some exten-
sions to the results. Finally, section 4.8 concludes.
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4.2 The literature
4.2.1 Related literature
The related literature on the tactical allocation of the federal budget oﬀers an alter-
native explanation to the role of the government  one that diﬀers from the typical
social welfare maximising role. Electorally and non-electorally motivated bias to
skew the allocation of intergovernmental grants in favour of co-partisans has been
demonstrated with varying degrees of success in a wide variety of institutional set-
tings and cultural contexts. The assorted literature is introduced below.
The manipulation of funds can be traced back to a central leader's desire to support
their sub-national co-partisans, this mechanism is discussed in detail in the next
section. A core piece of literature in relation to this work is by Larcinese et al. (2006),
who examines federal spending in US states from 1982 to 2000. They ﬁnd that
when the governors and president are of the same party politically aﬃliated those
aligned states are subject to more federal expenditure. As noted by Migueis (2013),
that paper does not control for the vote share, or margin of victory, awarded to the
parties, therefore it is not possible to distinguish between the partisan hypothesis
more votes means more transfers or a credible political alignment aﬀect. It is
also worth noting that Larcinese et al. (2006) does not consider intergovernmental
transfers, only total federal expenditure. In conjunction with the political alignment
impact, Ansolabehere and Snyder (2006) show that more grants are awarded from
state governments to counties with strong support. That is, uniﬁed democratic
states award more to democratic counties. Essentially this is an empirical test of
the theoretical loyal voter model of Cox and McCubbins (1986). That if politicians
are risk averse, loyal voting areas will be rewarded with more funds than marginal
areas and marginals will get more than opposition areas. A positive impact between
alignment and transfers is also found in Spain at multiple levels of governance by
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Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro (2008).
Within the sphere of the political economy of intergovernmental transfers looms
large the shadow of elections. Veiga and Pinho (2007) assess how transfers are
manipulated in municipal and legislative elections years in Portugal from 1979 to
2002  whilst Portugal was a developing democracy. They ﬁnd that the Portuguese
central government indiscriminately redistributes grants to areas with aligned and
non-aligned mayors in election years. However, no evidence is found for an individual
alignment eﬀect. The size of the manipulations are also decreasing as democracy
becomes more established. Migueis (2013) uses again the case of Portugal to show
that alignment does indeed matter, whereas an increase in the vote share for the
incumbent does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect transfers beyond the impact of alignment.
Thus conﬁrming that the bias is driven by alignment and not based on the vote
share. In an emerging democracy setting, Rumi (2014) assess electoral cycles for
federal grants in Argentina. Distinguishing between cash and in-kind transfers, they
ﬁnd that more total transfers are awarded to politically aligned provinces (run by a
mayor) in the pre-presidential election year.
In a similarly developing democracy setting, Brollo and Nannicini (2012) use data
from Brazilian intergovernmental transfers in a regression discontinuity design. They
present evidence that an aﬃliated mayor of a municipality receives more infrastruc-
ture grants in pre-election years. This eﬀect is driven by the fact that opposition
party mayors who won election by a narrow margin are severely penalised. More-
over, Brollo and Troiano (2016) use the same dataset to present evidence that a
disproportionate amount of transfers are awarded to female mayors irrespective of
alignment status. This highlights the gender diﬀerences in a politicians lobbying ef-
forts and response to political competition. An extension to the quasi-experimental
literature on political alignment, Baskaran and Hessami (2017) assess intergovern-
mental revenues in German local elections. They show that whilst being aﬃliated
to the state government is important, grant receipts vary with the degree of sup-
port at the ballot box. An aligned locality with strong support, receives a larger
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share of transfers. Whilst being aligned with low support makes little diﬀerence to
the amount received. Finally, Fouirnaies and Mutlu-Eren (2015) analyse the trans-
fer framework in England, an established democracy and a parliamentary regime.
Breaking away from the federalist literature, they argue that the co-partisan eﬀect
should be stronger in a centralised country where the local governments have little
autonomous power. They present results that show that the central government
allocates up to 17% more funds to aligned local councils, which ramps up the closer
the year to the next local election.
Whilst there is a wide exploration of partisan alignment in the political and eco-
nomics literature, very few studies consider the impact of alignment and transfers
around elections. One reason for a lack of literature may be the need for an suit-
able scenario to analyse, which the US case nicely provides.1 This break-out strand
of literature warrants further analysis given the relatively unexplored nature and
to provide robust support for the argument that transfers are manipulated as an
electorally charged decision, whilst addressing the oversights of the previous related
literature. The importance of building on the current work (Veiga and Pinho, 2007,
Rumi, 2014) but in the most developed democracy will oﬀer interesting new insights
and policy implications.
4.2.2 Hypotheses development
Given the broad consensus in the literature that political motivations bias the re-
allocation intergovernmental funds, one must ask why does political alignment, or
co-partisanship, have such a prevalent impact in redistributing said funds?
I argue that an incentive exists for the president to allocate more resources to their
own states. The rationale being that voter's assessment of party performance at
1 Cross-country studies would not be feasible due to the heterogeneous institutional arrangements
of national to sub-national transfers.
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the state level spills over and aﬀects the assessment of the party at the federal level
(Rodden, 2006). This has been documented at the English central-local level by
Fouirnaies and Mutlu-Eren (2015), and in the US state-local level by Ansolabehere
and Snyder (2006). It is in the interest of the president that his party performs well
at all levels of government as voters will therefore have a positive evaluation of the
incumbent president's party.
The implications of being aligned to the president, in terms of ﬁscal resources,
are expected to be positive. So called credit claiming is easier for the federal
government to do when the state is run by a co-partisan of the president (Levitt
and Snyder, 1997; see e.g. Fouirnaies and Mutlu-Eren (2015) for this argument in
terms of a Parliamentary regime). That is, good ﬁscal performance at the state level
will be claimed by the incumbent president, which will be rewarded by voters at the
next election. Conversely, when the president and governor are not aligned it is less
clear whom voters should reward or punish. Therefore, I hypothesize that
Hypothesis 1: Transfers should increase to a state when the president and governor
are politically aligned
With a political economy question, there is often electoral incentives. These are
clearly prevalent in this chapter. In terms of elections themselves, I consider two
levels of elections: federal (presidential) and state (gubernatorial). Firstly, I can
consider whether the president uses these grants to keep his party in oﬃce at the
next federal election. Given that election years are ﬁxed in the US, it is plausible that
the president engages in electoral cycle behaviour and allocates more to co-partisan
states in pre-election or election years. Secondly, in order to continue to enjoy
the beneﬁts of positive spill-over eﬀects, the president needs to ensure co-partisans
remain in oﬃce at the state level. Therefore one would expect the deliberate re-
allocation of resources towards co-partisan governors in pre-election and election
years. However, this is essentially a placebo test of the president's power given that
governors have no discretion over the allocation of grants and that president's use
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the transfers for their own gain. Therefore, one may alternatively expect no eﬀect
in gubernatorial years. Thus, I hypothesize that
Hypothesis 2a: When the president and governor are aligned transfers should be
higher in the presidential election year (conﬁrming the existence of an electoral cycle
in transfers)
Hypothesis 2b: When the president and governor are aligned transfers should not
be higher in the gubernatorial election year
Another element to this chapter examines the role of battleground states and align-
ment, which is complimentary to my election incentives argument. As the process
of being elected president is a winner-takes-all game in each state due to the elec-
toral college one would expect politically aligned governors located in swing states
to receive disproportionately more transfers. This would occur in order to deliver
that state's electoral college votes at the next election. Given the media attention
placed on governors to deliver their state's vote around election times, this a entirely
plausible scenario. The swing states are prime target given that these oﬀer the best
chance of increasing the probability of winning the electoral college. Thus, one ex-
pects that a larger amount of transfers are given to co-partisan governors located in
a swing state.
Hypothesis 3: When the president and governor are aligned electoral cycles in
transfers should be stronger in swing states
Finally, unlike in directly related studies, I consider the individual attributes of the
incumbent governor. After controlling for age, gender and term limits, one may ex-
pect the previous career of a governor to impact the amount of federal funds received.
This follows from Dreher et al. (2009) who assess the impact of political leaders pre-
vious careers on various economic outcomes. No evidence is found between being a
career politician and market-orientated reforms. However, as my case requires direct
interaction between two politicians it is plausible that a previous career in politics
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would have a signiﬁcant impact. Two arguments prevail here. First, it may be that
governors who have political experience prior to taking oﬃce as governor produce
larger spill-over eﬀects for the president than the inexperienced. Therefore, aligned
governors with political experience may receive more transfer from the president.
Alternatively, a relatively more experienced governor may be better placed to lobby
the president for more funds using deliberative and lobbying skills learnt in their po-
litical career. Hence, one would expect a governor with past political experience to
be associated with more intergovernmental revenue regardless of alignment status.
Hypothesis 4: When the president and governor are aligned and the governor has
prior political experience, transfers should be larger
Given these four core contributions to the literature, I am able to show that when
a governor is a co-partisan of the president they receive relatively more federal re-
sources. I present evidence that the president engages in electoral cycles of transfers
in order to keep his party re-elected at the presidential level. However, no such
support is found for the president favouring co-partisans at the gubernatorial level
when around their elections. In addition, I support the electorally driven argument
by examining alignment in swing states. I ﬁnd that aligned governors, who are
located in swing states, get relatively more federal transfers to their aligned coun-
terparts. In terms of the governor's speciﬁc role, I show that governors who have
been members of Congress before entering oﬃce as the state executive are favoured
by the president due to their superior lobbying skills. I ﬁnd no implications for
being a co-partisan and having past political experience simultaneously. My ﬁnal
contribution comes from analysing speciﬁcally Democratic or Republican alignment.
By doing so I provide diﬀerences in behaviour across parties. Interestingly, I show
that both parties redistribute to their co-partisans of the same magnitude in the
presidential election year.
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4.3 The US president, the federal budget and state governors
The degree of power enjoyed by the president over the federal budget is an important
consideration I need to make before diving into any analysis. A clear understanding
will elucidate the mechanism for the federal budget to be manipulated by the pres-
ident. Whilst the president is the head of the executive branch of government and
maintains signiﬁcant powers, the world's most mature democracy has checks and
balances in place in order to prevent an abuse of such power.
Following Congress' opposition to President Nixon's desire to reduce the budget
deﬁcit by not spending funds that Congress had allocated in 1972 the Budget and
Impoundment Act of 1974 was passed, which aimed to strengthen Congress' budget
authority and reduce the president's impoundment ability. In order to pass the
federal budget, it has to pass various committees and subcommittees in the House
of Representatives and the Senate. Once through these stages, the president is
required to sign the budget into law or veto it. If the president decides to veto, this
decision can be overturned by a two-thirds majority in each legislative chamber and
becomes law without presidential ratiﬁcation.2
Combined with the empirical evidence of the president manipulating the allocation
of the federal budget discussed in the literature review and now a clear channel
of impact, it is fair to say the president does in fact enjoy signiﬁcant amount of
inﬂuence over the federal budget.
Furthermore, this passage has so far done little to motivate the idea that the pres-
ident duly considers and interacts with the state governors and how the role of
partisanship can directly aﬀect a president's actions. First, I present some presiden-
tial quotes that give an insight into the interactions with the governors. For instance,
2 Legal scholars argue that the president maintains signiﬁcant control over federal funds primarily
because of the threat of veto (McCarty, 2000).
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Donald Trump, speaking at the 2017 Governor's Ball -a chance for the governors to
meet the president in an oﬃcial capacity- said the following: And tomorrow, we're
going to meet, and we're going to discuss things, like perhaps healthcare will come
up... Everybody is diﬀerent, every state is diﬀerent, and diﬀerent requirements,
but I think I have something that's going to really be excellent... But tomorrow
morning, we're going to meet and have some pretty big sessions on healthcare and
other things  whatever is on your mind.3 It appears, from this evidence alone,
that the president is indeed acutely aware of the capacity of each governor and their
ability to deliver their states support. And secondly, to motivate the idea that co-
partisanship favouring occurs from the federal-to-state level, consider the following
from Mitt Romney (speaking whilst the incumbent governor of Massachusetts) For
Republican governors, it means I have an ear in the White House, I have a number
I can call, I have access that I wouldn't have otherwise had, and that's of course
helpful.4 In essence, this is an explicit admission that co-partisans of the president
lobby for federal support and expect to be favoured in some capacity.
4.4 Data and methodology
4.4.1 Data
I use a novel panel dataset of the 48 contiguous US states.5 The sample spans a
period of 59 years from 1950 to 2008. This is a comparatively large dataset in the
literature, with each observation being identiﬁed on a state-year parallel. The data is
3 Quotes are taken from the White House's press oﬃce. Available from https://www.whitehouse.
gov/the-press-office/2017/02/26/remarks-president-trump-2017-governors-ball
4 Mitt Romney speaking after the re-election of George W. Bush in 2004.
5 As standard in the literature I focus on the 48 contiguous states, dropping Alaska and Hawaii from
my sample.
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a perfectly balanced panel with a total of 2,832 observations; the period in question
covers 15 presidential elections with 6 incumbency shifts between the Republican
and Democrat parties, and 839 gubernatorial elections with numerous changes in
incumbency.6
Variables of interest and controls
In order to integrate this study into the literature on political alignment I use the
natural log transformation of real per capita intergovernmental revenue from the
federal to state government as my dependent variable (ln Grantst). The values are
deﬂated by the consumer price index with a base year of 2000. These data are
obtained from the US Census of Governments and are available from 1950 onwards
for all 50 states. The total intergovernmental revenue can be disaggregated into a
variety of sub-categories.7 Given that diﬀerent states have diﬀerent needs, there
is considerable variation amongst the amount of grants awarded to the states in a
given year.
The main independent variable of interest is partisan alignment (Alignmentst). This
takes the value 1 when the state governor and president are of the same party and
0 otherwise. Naturally, the variation in alignment status comes from two sources: a
change in the president or a change in the governor.
In addition to these variables of interest, I include a rich vector of control variables.
The vector contains: the growth rate of real per capita income (∆ln Incomest−1)
and a states own tax revenue from their own sources (∆ln Revenuest−1), both
6 In the sample there are 4 cases of Independent governors.
7 The main categories are; air transportation; education; employment security administration; gen-
eral local government support; health and hospitals; highways; housing; and community develop-
ment; agriculture; other natural resources; public welfare; sewerage. Full for a complete breakdown
of what is included and excluded in each category see https://www.census.gov/govs/www/class_
ch7_ir.html
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from the previous year.8 I also include the growth rate of the states population
(∆ln Population) to control for the size of a state. The raw data are obtained from
the US Census of Governments and manually transformed into growth rates. The
political controls are the margin of victory for the incumbent president at the last
presidential election (Margin of victoryst), an important control to ensure that
an alignment eﬀect is separate to that of loyal support.9 This is obtained from
Leip (2008). As a proxy for state checks and balances, I include whether the state
government is split (Splitst), which is taken from Klarner (2013).
10 This occurs when
one party controls the executive branch of the state government and the other party
controls at least one of the state legislative chambers. Following Brollo and Troiano
(2016) I introduce governor speciﬁc traits, namely age (Agest), gender (Femalest)
and whether the governor is a lame duck (Lame duckst).
11 These are manually
gathered from the National Governors Association (NGA), which details each and
every state governor. An example of a governor's proﬁle is found in Figure 4.1. More
detail on all variables is provided in section 4.A.
Descriptives
The variation in alignment status comes from two sources: presidential and guber-
natorial elections. For instance, alignment can occur because a new Democratic
governor has been elected under an already Democrat president, causing Demo-
cratic alignment. Or, a new Republican president has been elected, causing all
current Republican governors to become aligned. Given that not all state's guber-
8 Single lags are used as it likely that this data will be used when determining the economic situation
to set grants for a state in time t.
9 Because this is measured as the two-party margin of victory, in the 1962 presidential election in
Alabama, the President Lyndon Johnson received 0 votes thus the margin of victory in that state
is -100. Results remain the same when removing outliers here.
10 I also cycled this for a uniﬁed (Unifiedst) government and the results remain unaﬀected. See
Table 4.13
11 I include age in levels but have tried various other speciﬁcations a quadratic and in natural logs
and the results remain unaﬀected, see Table 4.13.
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natorial electoral cycle follows the presidential pattern, changes in alignment status
occur in various years. There are 1,359 observations (approximately 48% of the sam-
ple) where president and governor are aligned, with ample variation within states.
Given the length of the period available and two sources of variation, there are no
states that have never been aligned nor any states that have always been aligned.12
Because of these two sources of variation, and the fact that voters vote according
to very diﬀerent narratives, alignment is not on the minds of voters when casting
their vote at either election (Atkeson and Partin, 1995).13 Therefore, the eﬀect of
partisan alignment is identiﬁed by exploiting the quasi-random nature of alignment
in the US. To further assess this assumption, I examine whether observable char-
acteristics that are correlated with transfers also determine whether certain states
become aligned. If the states and governors are similar across alignment status, then
diﬀerences in transfers can be attributed to partisan alignment. Table 4.2 presents
the summary statistics split by alignment status. Overall, the distributions of these
variables are very similar across aligned and non-aligned states.
Figures 4.2 and 4.3 presents the alignment status of states over time. Figure 4.2
shows Democratic alignment in blue, when there is a Democrat governor in place
creating partisan alignment with the incumbent Democrat president, Bill Clinton.
Figure 4.3 shows the Republican version in red, when the governors are co-partisans
of president Ronald Reagan in 1971. Changes of the executive party at the state
12The governor for each year is deﬁned as the governor who has served the majority of the year in
oﬃce.
13At this point it is prudent to attempt a brief answer to the question; why, for example, do `deep red'
states in presidential elections not always elect a governor from the GOP? Kansas has returned
electoral college support for the Republican party since 1968. In the same period of time the
state has had 7 diﬀerent governors, 4 of which were Democrats. In short, this is because federal
elections are more nationalised and voters take into account a range of national and international
issues. At the state level governors can break from the party line on issues, allowing pro-choice
Republicans to be elected into a blue state, for instance. Atkeson and Partin (1995) use survey
data to show that in gubernatorial elections, governors escape from national-level evaluation of
presidential performance but are judged on state economic conditions. Personal competence and
changing political sentiment are also important factors. A speciﬁc individual example of this is
from California where Arnold Schwarzenegger a Republican was elected as a two-term governor
of a deeply liberal state because of his socially moderate stances. The prevalence of alignment in
these `purple' states is demonstrated in Figure 4.5 and 4.6.
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level occur frequently given that not all states executive cycle follows the president's
cycle.
In terms of the federal transfers, the average growth rate is 4.12% per annum.
When federal-state executives are aligned the average growth rate is higher, 4.23%.
In contrast when there is no alignment the average growth rate is smaller, now 4%
per year. Alaska and Hawaii are typically very dependent on the transfers due to
their small revenue raising power. Richer states and those with a larger domestic
populous tend to receive less federal money. California, for example, has an average
transfer growth rate of 3.6% and the largest in-sample population. The transfers are
conventionally used to alleviate ﬁscal diﬃculty and to increase welfare of the state,
however, it is entirely plausible to ask how much political manipulation can explain
the diﬀerences across states.
4.4.2 Empirical strategy
To test the hypotheses developed in section 4.2.2, I employ a ﬁxed eﬀects model. I
start with the following econometric speciﬁcation to test hypothesis 1:
ln Grantsst = α0 ln Grantsst−1 + α1 Alignmentst + β Zst + ηt + µs + st (4.1)
where Grantsst is the intergovernmental transfer from the federal government to
state s at time t. Alignmentst is the dummy variable for partisan alignment,
Zst contains the sets of control variables detailed in the preceding section, namely;
∆ln Incomest−1; ∆ln Revenuest−1; ∆ln Populationst; Margin of victoryst; Splitst;
Agest; Femalest; and Lame duckst. ηt and µs are time and state ﬁxed eﬀects, respec-
tively and st is the i.i.d. error term. Following most previous literature, a lagged
dependent variable is included to capture the persistence of grants. Moreover, if Eq.
4.1 is estimated the lagged dependent variable approaches unity, indicating a unit
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root.14 Therefore I conduct Maddala and Wu (1999) and Choi (2001) stationarity
tests, which conﬁrm the null hypothesis of a unit root i.e. non-stationarity (see
Table 4.3). The ﬁrst diﬀerence of Grantsst allows us to reject the null of a unit
root indicating stationarity, thus I proceed with the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the dependent
variable, which is now the growth rate of the federal-state revenue.
I now specify a version of Eq. 4.1 to be estimated:
∆ln Grantsst = α0 ∆ln Grantsst−1 +α1 Alignmentst + β Zst + ηt +µs + st (4.2)
where s = 1, ..., 48 and t = 1950, ..., 2008. The preﬁx `∆' indicates the ﬁrst diﬀerence
has been taken. By employing a ﬁxed eﬀects estimator, the time-invariant state
speciﬁc eﬀects are `diﬀerenced' out, but not time speciﬁc eﬀects. Hence, δt is included
to control for speciﬁc year-ﬁxed eﬀects.
With regards to the econometric speciﬁcation, the inclusion of a lagged dependent
variable introduces a potential bias to my estimates by not satisfying the strict ex-
ogeneity assumption of the error term st. One possible solution would be to adopt
a GMM estimator (see, e.g., Arellano and Bond, 1991), however, this method only
yields consistent estimates in small T , large N panels. Given that the estimated
bias is 1/T , where T is the total time length of the panel, the bias becomes neg-
ligible in my long T sample (Nickell, 1981). Thus, I proceed to estimate Eq. 4.2
by employing the linear ﬁxed eﬀects estimator. To test the other 3 hypotheses, I
consider augmented versions of Eq. 4.2.
14See Table 4.5 column (1).
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4.5 Results
4.5.1 Transfer allocation and partisan alignment
Table 4.5 shows the test results for hypothesis 1. In columns (2) to (5) I report
parsimonious speciﬁcations that show partisan alignment is positively related to in-
tergovernmental transfers at the 5% level of signiﬁcance. The proceeding column
includes the economic controls and the margin of victory for the president in the last
presidential election, allowing us to control for the strength of support for the presi-
dent. Column (7) introduces the governor characteristics, which appear statistically
insigniﬁcant at the conventional levels. Column (8) includes a state-speciﬁc linear
time trend to soak up any unobserved heterogeneity speciﬁc to each state. Reassur-
ingly the results remain unaﬀected. In all columns Alignment remains positively
related to grants at the 5% level. Qualitatively, the ﬁndings imply that the growth
rate of transfers increases by about 0.8 percentage points when state governors are
aligned to the president. Tentatively, this eﬀect can be interpreted as causal due
to the quasi-random nature of alignment. Furthermore, Margin of victory, the
margin of victory for presidential support at the last election, exerts a positive and
signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the dependent variable, which suggests that there is some
reward for a governor delivering their states vote. Moving from 0 support to full
support increase the growth rate of federal-state transfers by an additional 1.6 - 1.7
percentage points. As Migueis (2013) argues, it is important to distinguish between
alignment and popular support to be sure the eﬀects are independent from one an-
other. Little evidence is found for the governor's characteristics at this stage, which
is not so dissimilar to the related literature (Dreher et al., 2009).15
The ﬁndings are so far consistent with hypothesis 1. That is, that after controlling
for the margin of victory, a state with a governor who is aligned to the president
15The results are subject to a set of further robustness checks, which are available in Table 4.13.
123
4.5. RESULTS
is rewarded with more intergovernmental revenue because the governor is a co-
partisan. This is also in accordance with Rodden (2006), who suggests that this
happens because of vertical spill-over eﬀects; the president will favour co-partisans
at lower tiers to ensure voters have a positive view of the government at all levels.
In this setting, a dichotomous variable of interest and year ﬁxed eﬀects, I can eval-
uate the common trend assumption that is necessary for a causal interpretation of
the coeﬃcient. While using a state-speciﬁc trend alleviates endogeneity concerns,
there still may exist some bias. I can test this assumption by examining whether
pretreatment or posttreatment (to use the language of causal inference) trends exist
for treated and untreated states that would indicate non-random selection. Given
that partisan alignment should only aﬀect transfers when the governor and presi-
dent are aligned simultaneously, signiﬁcant lead-variables would cast doubts on the
interpretation of the results thus far. Signiﬁcant lag-variables are not necessarily
a violation of the assumption as transfers may be contract based and take time to
reverse.
To test this assumption I follow Gehring and Schneider (2018). I create two lead
variables, taking the value 1 only in the year (t − 1) and two years (t − 2) before
alignment takes place, and 0 otherwise. I code four lag variables taking the value 1
for the year after alignment has been `switched oﬀ' in (t + 1) and up to four years
later (t+ 4), and 0 otherwise. The estimated speciﬁcation remains the same as that
in Table 4.5 column (8), which includes all controls, state-speciﬁc time trends and
year ﬁxed eﬀects.16 Table 4.6 depicts the results including diﬀerent leads and lags.
In column (1), both the lead variables are insigniﬁcant, whereas the coeﬃcient for
Alignment remains statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Column (2) replaces
leads for lags. Here all the lagged terms are insigniﬁcant and Alignment increases
16The estimating equation is: ∆ln yst = α0 + ∆ln yst−1 + α1Alignmentst +∑4
γ=−2(α1t+γAlignmentst+γ) + β Zst + ηt + µs + st
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to 0.012 and is now signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Finally, column (3) includes both
leads and lags. The coeﬃcient for Alignment becomes 0.015, again signiﬁcant at
the 1% level. All leads and lags are insigniﬁcant, giving no indication of any pre-
or posttreatment trends, whilst Alignment remains signiﬁcant throughout. This is
critical for a causal interpretation of the identiﬁed relationship. The coeﬃcients of
the leads and lags for Alignment is illustrated graphically in Figure 4.4.
4.5.2 Transfer allocation and partisan alignment around elec-
tions
As a next step in the analysis I consider what role elections play in the tactical allo-
cation of ﬁscal resources to co-partisans, hypotheses 2a and 2b.. Here, by exploiting
the exogenous variation in the electoral calendar, I can causally identify the eﬀect of
the electoral period in triggering more funds being allocated to co-partisans. This
follows from the notion that the president will attempt to re-allocate to co-partisans
around presidential election times in order to keep the presidents' party in oﬃce and
whether the president seeks to keep states aligned around gubernatorial elections.
By analysing whether the president seeks to keep states aligned, this is essentially a
placebo test of the president's power given that governor's have no direct discretion
over the allocation of transfers. In order to test this I interact my alignment indi-
cator with the (pre-) election variable, therefore I augment Eq. 4.2 in the following
manner:
∆ln Grantsst = α0 ∆ln Grantsst−1 + α1 Alignmentst + α2 Pres_elecst+
α3 Alignmentst ∗ Pres_elecst + β Zst + ηt + µs + st
(4.3)
The results from the estimates seeking to test these hypotheses are presented in Table
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4.7. Columns (1) - (4) present estimates for the president election cycle, here I cannot
use year ﬁxed eﬀects as the election occurs in each state at the same time. Columns
(1) - (3) includes the interaction term and a introduce progressively more controls.
The ﬁrst thing to note is that the interaction term, Alignment ∗ Pres_elecst, is
positive and signiﬁcant at the 5% level of signiﬁcance in all 3 columns. Qualitatively,
the results suggests that the growth rate of intergovernmental trsnfers in presidential
election years, when the governor is aligned to the president, increases by around
1.7 percentage points on average. In columns (4), I introduce a pre-election variable
to capture whether any pre-electoral manipulation takes place. This acts as an
improvement in the identiﬁcation of the eﬀect of the electoral cycle (Akhmedov and
Zhuravskaya, 2004, Shi and Svensson, 2006). Again, when the governor of the state
is aligned to the president and it is the year before a presidential election, there is
a positive manipulation of resources towards these states. This incremental eﬀect is
signiﬁcant at the 10% level and slightly smaller than in an election year. This is in
accordance with the results found in Fouirnaies and Mutlu-Eren (2015), that more
manipulation takes place around election times in order to increase the probability
of the national executives party's re-election. In particular, the impact is speciﬁc to
co-partisans because of the spill-over and credit claiming eﬀects associated with the
voters assessment of the state government.
In columns (5) - (8) I test whether the president seeks to keep states aligned by al-
locating more transfer in gubernatorial election times, which is an implicit placebo
test of presidential power. In these regressions I can include year ﬁxed eﬀects as
elections occur at diﬀerent times in diﬀerent states. Across all columns the coeﬃ-
cient for Gub_elect is positive and signiﬁcant at the 5% level indicating that the
president does indeed allocate more to all states in gubernatorial election years.
This may reﬂect the political ability of incumbent governors to strategically lobby
for federal resources to increase their re-election chances. This is political experience
argument is discussed in more detail later. No statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect is found
for the interaction with the alignment variable, however, the partisan alignment
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variable itself, Alignment, is highly signiﬁcant and positive. This is an acceptance
of hypothesis 2a and rejection of hypothesis 2b.
4.5.3 Partisan alignment and swing states
In order to further support the argument that partisan favouring occurs partly be-
cause of electoral incentives, I examine the role of swing states. This is testing
hypothesis 3. So called `swing' states are key battleground states for the US pres-
idential election, in so far as one party does not have overwhelming support. As
state's electoral college votes are nearly all a winner-takes-all game, therefore, it is
often vital that a potential president win these key states on their way to the presi-
dency. To construct my variable Swing I use information on state-level margins of
victory in presidential elections (Glaeser and Ward, 2006; McLaren and Ma, 2016;
Conconi et al., 2017). Therefore, I most closely follow Abramowitz and Saunders
(2008), Conconi et al. (2017) and McLaren and Ma (2016) and dichotomously deﬁne
a swing state if and only if the two-party vote share from the previous presidential
election was within 5 percentage points (151 states). As a robustness check I push
this out to 6 (187 states) and 10 percentage points (283). As in the previous section,
I now interact Swing with my alignment variable to analyse whether more resources
are awarded to aligned governors who are located in electorally critical swing states.
Hence, Eq. 4.2 is augmented in the following manner:
∆ln Grantsst = α0 ∆ln Grantsst−1 + α1 Alignmentst + α2 Swingst+
α3 Alignmentst ∗ Swingst + β Zst + ηt + µs + st
(4.4)
The results from these regressions are reported in Table 4.4. The ﬁrst 5 columns
report regressions using the 5 percentage point deﬁnition of the Swing variable.
The interaction term is positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The
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estimates show coeﬃcients of around 1.2 - 1.4 percentage points. Qualitatively,
this suggests that the growth rate of federal transfers to governors who are aligned
and located in swing states increases by around 1.3 percentage points. Column (5)
removes observations where the margin of victory was greater than 40 percentage
points; cases where the margin is larger than this value are clearly outliers. For in-
stance, in the 1948 election, the Democratic candidate did not appear on the ballot
paper in Alabama so the margin of victory was 100 points. Columns (6) and (7)
expand the deﬁnition of a swing state to 6 and 10 percentage points, respectively.
By doing so I include an extra 142 and 521 observations as swing states. The inter-
action term remains signiﬁcant level at the conventional level for the 6 percentage
point deﬁnition and is insigniﬁcant for the 10 point deﬁnition. However, this is not
unexpected given that 10 percentage point diﬀerence between the two parties in a
given state would not necessarily be thought of as a swing state per se.
When the Alignment ∗Swing coeﬃcients are compared to that of Alignment, (ob-
tained in Table 4.5) the aligned governors located in swing states are recipient to a
larger growth of federal resources, which is in line with hypothesis 3. This results
conﬁrm that the growth of federal resources to aligned governors is driven by elec-
toral incentives at the presidential level - which is consistent with the ﬁndings from
section 4.5.2.
4.5.4 Partisan alignment with experienced politicians
As another tranche to my analysis, I ask whether a more politically experienced
politician may also receive more intergovernmental resources as bridged in Section
4.2.2, this is to test hypothesis 4. The plausibly random assignment of experience
across governors is useful as it allows us to discern the impact of political ability of
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the governors who can lobby the president for more resources.17 A governor who has
more experience prior to taking oﬃce is likely to be better at lobbying the president
for him to award more funds to their state. In conjunction with this, it is possible
that the supposedly `better' politicians produce larger vertical spill-over eﬀects for
their party. Therefore, it may be that co-partisans with more experience receive
disproportionately more transfers to produce a better assessment of the president's
party. In order to test this hypothesis I include a dummy variable for whether a
given governor has ever served as a member of Congress prior to taking oﬃce as
state executive, denoted Congress member. This diﬀers from the Dreher et al.
(2009) deﬁnition of a `political career' in so far as I use a speciﬁc type of political
experience rather than simply any political career. The Congress member variable
is also interacted with Alignment to test the co-partisan spill-over argument. I
am able to fully discern the status for each governor using information from the
National Governors Association (NGA). There are 65 governors who are ex-members
of Congress, which equates to 319 state-year observations. The equation to estimate
now becomes:
∆ln Grantsst = α0 ∆ln Grantsst−1 + α1 Alignmentst + α2 Congress memberst+
α3 Alignmentst ∗ Congress memberst + β Zst + ηt + µs + st
(4.5)
The results from these regressions are presented in Table 4.9. Across columns (1)
to (6) both Alignment and Congress member appear positive and statistically
signiﬁcant. This supports the idea that governors, who have been ex-members of
Congress, receive more money from the president. The magnitude implies that
17Unforuntaley, I do not have data on whether the candidates runing in a gubernatorial election have
been Congress members. So I cannot detrmine whether a prior member of congress is more likely
to be elected into a governorship.
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prior members of Congress get 0.8 - 1 percentage points more on the growth rate
of federal transfers. The mechanism behind this eﬀect is that executives with more
political nous are more successful at lobbying for more funds. When the interaction
term is included in columns (4) to (6) it is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0. The
insigniﬁcance of the interaction terms signiﬁes that whilst all ex-members of congress
are allocated more, there is no disparity by being a co-partisan of the president.
Thus, I can reject the argument that more experienced politicians create larger
spill-over eﬀects (hypothesis 4) in favour of the notion that ex-politicians are more
eﬀective, and successful, at lobbying for federal resources. The eﬀect is likely driven
by the skills obtained whilst the governor was a member of Congress. That is,
cross-party co-operation on the legislative and ﬁscal agendas.
4.6 Falsiﬁcation and robustness tests
So far I have shown that the positive relationship between alignment and the growth
rate of federal-state transfers is robust to various speciﬁcations and shown the un-
derlying electorally driven mechanism. I now conduct some validation tests that
lend support to the identiﬁcation strategy and ensure the results are not due to
spurious inference. Given the variety of data available, I conduct a placebo test of
the eﬀect of alignment upon a state's own tax revenue. This is revenue that can only
be raised by the state government, therefore, independent of federal expenditure.
Thus, the impact of alignment of the state-federal executives should be unrelated.
I check whether Alignment is unrelated to state's own revenue by employing the
growth rate of per capita own state revenue as the dependent variable.
Table 4.10 panel A reports the results from the set of placebo tests. Column (3)
introduces year ﬁxed eﬀects, (4) and (5) include extra controls and the state-speciﬁc
time trend, respectively. The estimate of Alignment is insigniﬁcant across all spec-
iﬁcations. The strong signiﬁcance of the margin of victory variable is interesting
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and furthers support for my identiﬁcation strategy. That is, states that voted for
the winning party are rewarded with lower state taxes. Hence, I can be conﬁdent
in my identiﬁcation of an alignment eﬀect and that my results are not driven by a
systematic error.
I apply the method developed by Altonji et al. (2005) to assess how much larger the
selection bias based on unobserved factors relative to observed factors would have
to be to fully explain away the result. I compare the coeﬃcient of Alignment from
two kinds of OLS regression models: one which contains only state and year ﬁxed
eﬀects to one which contains a full set of controls in addition to the ﬁxed eﬀects,
βL and βF , respectively. Panel B of Table 4.10 depicts the selection ratio (SR) the
ratio of selection-of-unobservables to obseravbles necessary to fully explain away the
Alignment eﬀect. The SR indicates that the selection-on-unobservables would have
to be 7 times as large as the selection-on-observables to fully wash out the positive
relationship.18 In the same set-up, Altonji et al. (2005) estimate a SR of 3.55, a
much smaller SR which they interpret as evidence that unobservables are unlikely
to explain away their entire eﬀect.
4.7 Extensions
4.7.1 Democrats versus Republicans
Given the dominance of the two parties in the US, I am able to disentangle the
behaviour of each party in order to elucidate further diﬀerences in their actions.
By using the US case, it not only highlights cross party heterogeneity, but dif-
ferences across the ideological spectrum. Some regressions from the previous sec-
18When including a linear state-speciﬁc time trend into the full model, the SR remains at 7.
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tion are now re-estimated except now the alignment variable is split between the
Democrats and Republicans, or the left and right-wing parties. I create two new
variables D_Alignment and R_Alignment to separate the alignment and replace
Alignment. The former, D_Alignment, represents Democratic alignment of the
state-federal executives and takes the value 0 otherwise, i.e. when Republicans are
aligned, or there is no alignment. R_Alignment reﬂects the same situation but for
Republican alignment. There are 524 and 835 cases of Democratic and Republican
alignment, respectively. This disparity is expected given the dominance of the Re-
publican party at the national level over the period  holding oﬃce for 36 of the 59
years in the sample. By creating these two variables it allows us to separate out
which party is driving the alignment eﬀect and to distinguish which party engages
more often in rent seeking behaviour i.e. the manipulation of federal transfers. I
modify Eq. 4.2 in following manner:
∆ln Grantsst = α0 ∆ln Grantsst−1 + α1 D_Alignmentst + α2 R_Alignmentst
+β Zst + ηt + µs + st
(4.6)
The results from these split alignment regressions are presented in Table 4.11. In
columns (1) - (3) I include the two alignment variables with progressively more
controls. The results show that the eﬀect of alignment on transfers is stronger, and
statistically signiﬁcant, when the Republican executives are aligned. In contrast,
there is no eﬀect, at this stage, for Democratic alignment. Hence, what emphasises
the combined alignment eﬀect is driven by the right-wing party. This is not to say
that right-wing parties prefer larger governments as the federal transfer system is
not necessarily an indicator of government size, but rather that right-wing parties
actively target their co-partisans with extra funds.
In addition, I can examine how the distribution of funds is aﬀected around election
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times. Once again, I interact my alignment variables with the (pre) election years
and re-estimate my speciﬁcations. These models are presented in columns (4) - (6).
First, what is intriguing, is that both parties favour their co-partisans in presidential
election years by similar magnitudes. Qualitatively, this means that when the state
executive is aligned to the president, and in a presidential election year, the growth
rate of federal transfers increases by approximately 2.3 percentage points. There
is also some evidence that if not aﬃliated, the opposing parties `ties-the-hands'
of the unaﬃliated governors. On the whole, this suggests that both Democrats
and Republicans engage in electoral cycle behaviour with federal transfers toward
their co-partisan governors, in order to increase the probability of re-election of
the president's party at the national level. This happens by supporting their co-
partisans to create a positive vertical assessment of the presidents' party by voters.
Moreover, by taking into account the pre-electoral manipulation the results are also
interesting. In the pre-election years, states receive less, however, when the president
and governor are Republicans there is a comparably large net gain. When these
eﬀects are considered together, it appears that the in pre-election years less funds
are awarded, however, when there is Republican alignment, there is a signiﬁcant net
gain.
In the ﬁnal columns, (7) - (9), I report the whether either party seeks to keep states
aligned and the implicit placebo test. Again, R_Alignment appears positively and
highly signiﬁcant, and as in Table 4.7 the gubernatorial election year variable is
signiﬁcant. However, no heterogeneous eﬀect is found between the two parties,
which suggests that neither party seeks to keep their co-partisans in oﬃce during
gubernatorial elections via the manipulation of transfers.
4.7.2 Variation across diﬀerent time periods
The long time period for which data is available prompts a brief exploration into
the period of time where the alignment eﬀect may be being driven from. Over the
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period, there have been few major reforms to budgetary power, the exception being
the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act, which was enacted in
July 1974. The focus of this Act was to prevent the president impounding federal
funds thus shifting the balance of power toward Congress. In light of this, one may
expect the alignment eﬀect to be more pronounced in the years prior to the reform
as the president has more power to allocate resources to co-partisans. However, it
may be that the alignment eﬀect is driven by the years after the reform. The reform
shifted the balance of budgetary power back toward Congress, which constrained
the president's ability to allocate funds, this therefore increases the incentives to
reward co-partisans. Moreover, the president is seen to maintain power over the
budget after the reform due to the threat of veto. This is in line with the argument
put forward by Abramowitz and Saunders (2008), that ideological polarization in
the US has been increasing since the 1970's for both voters and political elites. In
order to show some initial evidence of this reform on co-partisan biases, I split the
sample either side of this reform date and re-estimate Eq. 4.2 on each time period.
The results of this exercise are presented in Table 4.12. The table shows that
Alignment is only statistically signiﬁcant in the years after the reform in 1974.
Here, in column (2), the coeﬃcient shows that the growth rate of transfers to a
state increases by 0.7 percentage points when the president and governor are of the
same party, ceteris paribus. This ﬁts with the argument that the president began to
favour his partisans only, once he felt that his budgetary setting power was threat-
ened by Congress.
4.8 Conclusions
In this chapter, I have used a novel data set of federal grants to states, elections
and political careers from 1950 - 2008 to investigate the role of partisan alignment
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in allocating a portion of the federal budget. My analysis depicts a causal rela-
tionship between alignment and the allocation of federal money by exploiting the
quasi-randomness of alignment status. More speciﬁcally, I show that federal grants
are targeted towards states whose governor is aligned to the president, in order to
increase the re-election probability of the president's party at the national level.
I also ﬁnd evidence in favour of a bi-partisan eﬀect when accounting for political
experience.
The results are consistent with prior work on the US that show a positive alignment
bias in federal expenditure (Larcinese et al., 2006; Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2006).
Moreover, when getting into the mechanism that is driving this eﬀect, my analysis
suggests that co-partisans are favoured because of electoral incentives. This is ﬁrst
shown by following the PBC literature and introducing (pre) election year indica-
tors. And secondly, I show that co-partisans, that are located in electorally critical
swing states, are favoured to a greater extent. I am also able to present evidence
that governors who have previously been members of Congress receive more federal
money, which occurs on a cross-party basis. That is, that more politically expe-
rienced governors are recipient of more funds due to their political know-how and
lobbying eﬀorts, which have been honed in their prior political incumbency.
Moreover, I can split my sample by Democratic and Republican alignment in order
to shine light on the party which is potentially driving my results. I show that
the pure alignment eﬀect is driven primarily by the Republican party. However, by
splitting my alignment variable into two, I am able to show that in election times,
presidents of both parties favour their aligned governors to a similar extent.
The implications of this chapter are multifaceted, although, the primary focus is on
the role of partisanship. Whilst there are signiﬁcant checks and balances in place to
limit an abuse of presidential power, the results show an implicit contradiction to the
founding principles of the US. Whereby George Washington abhorred partisanship
and thought it detrimental to the US on the whole. Whilst I show that co-partisans
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are favoured, one may ask whether this favouring actually produces a worse outcome
for society.
One other potential avenue for future research could be to further disaggregate polit-
ical experience into speciﬁc job types. For instance, in this setup, one could examine
the impact of governors who have progressed through the state government oﬃces.
This is also not necessarily constrained to the study of experience and transfers,
there is signiﬁcant scope to develop the literature and analyse spending or revenue
patterns amongst governors  along a similar line of enquiry to Alesina et al. (2016)
and Beland and Oloomi (2017).
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Chapter Appendices
4.A Chapter 4 variable deﬁnitions
Dependent variables
ln Grants  The natural logarithm of total per capita grants to state governments,
deﬂated by the consumer price index, $2000 prices.
∆ ln Grants  The growth rate of total per capita grants to state governments,
deﬂated by the consumer price index, $2000 prices.
Key independent variables
Alignment  Political alignment. Takes the value 1 when the president and gov-
ernor are of the same party, 0 otherwise. When there is a mid-year switch in the
party of the governor, the party of the governor for the majority of the year is used.
D_Alignment  Democratic alignment. Takes the value 1 when the president is
a Democrat and the governor of a given state is a Democrat, 0 otherwise.
R_Alignment  Republican alignment. Takes the value 1 when the president is
a Republican and the governor of a given state is a Republican, 0 otherwise.
Pres_elec  Takes the value 1 in a presidential election year.
Gub_elec  Takes the value 1 in a gubernatorial election year.
Swing  Takes the value 1 if the two-party state presidential vote margin of victory
was less than 5 percent at the last presidential election.
Governor characteristics
Congress member  Takes the value 1 when the governor has previously served
as a member of the House of Representatives or the Senate, 0 otherwise.
Age  The age of the governor in oﬃce.
Female  Takes the value 1 when the governor is a female, 0 when male.
Lame duck  Lame duck last year. Takes the value 1 when a governor is in their
last year before a binding term limit, 0 otherwise.
Other control variables
∆ ln Income  The growth rate of real per capita income, deﬂated by the consumer
price index, $2000 prices.
∆ ln Revenue  The growth rate of the total amount of per capita state revenue
from a state's own sources, deﬂated by the consumer price index, $2000 prices.
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∆ ln Population  The growth rate of state population. pop = Ln(Population/1000).
Margin of victory  The two-party margin of victory for the incumbent president
at the last presidential election.
Split  Takes the value 1 when one party controls the executive and the other party
controls at least 1 of the two state legislatives chambers.
Trend  Linear trend term for each state.
4.B Chapter 4 Figures
Figure 4.1: Example of a governor's proﬁle on the National Governors
Association website
Figure 4.2: Democrat alignment in 1994
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Figure 4.3: Republican alignment in 1971
Figure 4.4: Leads and lags. Regression coeﬃcients and conﬁdence inter-
vals correspond with Table 4.6 column (3).
Figure 4.5: `Purple' aligned states in 1993: Rep. voting states in the
1992 presidential election, with a Dem. governor and a president who is
a Dem.
139
4.B. CHAPTER 4 FIGURES
Figure 4.6: Democratically aligned states in 1993.
Figure 4.7: Governors who are ex-members of Congress in 1993
Figure 4.8: Swing states from the 2000 presidential election
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4.C Chapter 4 Tables
Table 4.1: Summary statistics 1950 - 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
No. of obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Source
∆ln Grant 2,784 0.0413 0.104 -0.431 0.574 US Census of Govts.
(per capita)
Alignment 2,832 0.480 0.500 0 1 Author's elaboration
D_Alignment 2,832 0.185 0.388 0 1 Author's elaboration
R_Alignment 2,832 0.295 0.456 0 1 Author's elaboration
∆ln Income 2,784 0.0220 0.0291 -0.152 0.331 BEA
(per capita)
∆ln Revenue 2,784 0.0319 0.0993 -0.985 0.743 US Census of Govts.
(per capita)
∆ln Population 2,784 0.0120 0.0291 -0.0586 0.331 BLS
Margin of victory 2,832 9.236 18.34 -100 100 Leip (2008)
Split 2,832 0.487 0.500 0 1 Klarner (2013)
Age 2,832 52.312 8.040 33 78 Author's elaboration from the NGA
Female 2,832 0.0364 0.187 0 1 Author's elaboration from the NGA
Lame duck 2,832 0.0703 0.256 0 1 Klarner (2013)
Congress member 2,832 0.113 0.316 0 1 Author's elaboration from the NGA
Pres_elec 2,832 0.254 0.436 0 1 Author's elaboration
Gub_elec 2,832 0.296 0.457 0 1 Author's elaboration
Swing 2,832 0.207 0.405 0 1 Author's elaboration from Leip (2008)
Trend 2,832 30 17.03 1 59 Author's elaboration
Notes: BEA: Bureau of Economic Analysis. BLS: Bureau of Labor Statistics. NGA: National Governors Association.
Table 4.2: Summary statistics by alignment status
Alignment = 1 Alignment = 0
N mean min. max. N mean min. max.
∆ln Income 1,340 0.022 -0.152 0.331 1,444 0.022 -0.121 0.271
∆ln Revenue 1,340 0.029 -0.985 0.612 1,444 0.034 -0.789 0.743
∆ln Population 1,340 0.013 -0.033 0.120 1,444 0.011 -0.059 0.099
Margin of victory 1,359 9.849 -100 50.24 1,473 8.671 -72.94 100
Split 1,359 0.504 0 1 1,473 0.47 0 1
Age 1,359 52.54 33 74 1,473 52.12 33 78
Female 1,359 0.027 0 1 1,473 0.046 0 1
Lame duck 1,359 0.077 0 1 1,473 0.064 0 1
Congress member 1,359 0.119 0 1 1,473 0.107 0 1
Swing 1,359 0.204 0 1 1,473 0.210 0 1
Table 4.3: Panel unit root tests
(1) (2)
ADF - Fisher χ2 ADF - Choi Z-stat
ln Grants 49.051 3.013
(1.000) (0.989)
∆ln Grants 544.768*** -18.111***
(0.000) (0.000)
Notes: H0: unit root. The preﬁx `∆' indicates the ﬁrst diﬀerence
has been taken. Unit root tests are carried out with a constant, a
maximum of 3 lags and a trend term. Figures without parentheses
are test statistics and ﬁgures in parentheses are p-values where *
p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table 4.5: Transfer allocation and partisan alignment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ln Grants ∆ln Grants ∆ln Grants ∆lln Grants ∆ln Grants ∆ln Grants ∆ln Grants ∆ln Grants
yt−1 0.957*** -0.253*** -0.264*** -0.266*** -0.266*** -0.266***
(0.007) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Alignment 0.005* 0.006** 0.007** 0.007** 0.008** 0.008** 0.008** 0.008**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
∆ln Incomet−1 -0.150** -0.148** -0.148**
(0.061) (0.062) (0.062)
∆ln Revenuet−1 0.029 0.030 0.030
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
∆ln Population -0.476** -0.480** -0.480**
(0.221) (0.220) (0.220)
Margin of victory 0.016* 0.017* 0.017*
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Split -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Age 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Female -0.002 -0.002
(0.009) (0.009)
Lame duck 0.008 0.008
(0.005) (0.005)
No. of states 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48
Year FEs? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-speciﬁc trend No No No No No No No Yes
R-squared 0.989 0.351 0.390 0.353 0.396 0.400 0.401 0.401
Observations 2,784 2,784 2,736 2,784 2,736 2,736 2,736 2,736
Notes: Fixed eﬀect regressions (except for columns (1), (2) and (3), which are pooled OLS) using annual data for US states between 1950 and 2008. yt−1 is grantst−1
in column (1) and ∆grantst−1 in all other columns. Variables are at time t unless stated otherwise. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, in parentheses;
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
Table 4.6: Pretreatment and posttreatment trends
(1) (2) (3)
Alignment (t− 2) 0.008 0.008
(0.008) (0.008)
Alignment (t− 1) 0.002 0.003
(0.007) (0.007)
Alignment 0.010** 0.012*** 0.015***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Alignment (t+ 1) 0.000 0.002
(0.007) (0.007)
Alignment (t+ 2) 0.009 0.009
(0.007) (0.007)
Alignment (t+ 3) 0.011 0.012
(0.008) (0.008)
Alignment (t+ 4) 0.011 0.012
(0.010) (0.010)
No. of states 48 48 48
All controls? Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs? Yes Yes Yes
State-speciﬁc trend? Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.401 0.402 0.402
Observations 2,736 2,736 2,736
Notes: The dependent variable, in all columns, is ∆ln Grantst.
Fixed eﬀect regressions using annual data for US states between
1950 and 2008. Variables are at time t unless stated otherwise. Ro-
bust standard errors, clustered at the state level, in parentheses; *
p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table 4.7: Partisan alignment around elections
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
yt−1 -0.022 -0.021 -0.041 -0.040 -0.263*** -0.265*** -0.265*** -0.265***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024)
Alignment -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.008 0.010** 0.010** 0.010** 0.014***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Pres_elect−1 -0.012**
(0.005)
Alignment ∗ pres_elect−1 0.015*
(0.009)
Pres_elect -0.003 -0.005 -0.004 -0.008
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Alignment ∗ pres_elect 0.017** 0.017** 0.016** 0.021**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Gub_elect−1 0.003
(0.005)
Alignment ∗Gub_elect−1 -0.010
(0.008)
Gub_elect 0.015** 0.015* 0.015* 0.016**
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
Alignment ∗Gub_elect -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.010
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
No. of states 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48
No. of electionsα 720 720 720 720 839 839 839 839
All controls? No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs? No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-speciﬁc trend? No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
R-squared 0.002 0.013 0.043 0.044 0.398 0.402 0.402 0.402
Observations 2,736 2,736 2,736 2,736 2,736 2,736 2,736 2,736
Notes: The dependent variable, in all columns, is ∆ln Grantst. Fixed eﬀect regressions using annual data for US states between 1950 and
2008. Variables are at time t unless stated otherwise. All controls includes ∆ln incomet−1, ∆ln revenuet−1, ∆ln pop, margin of victory,
split, age, female and lame duck. α number of total presidential elections = 48 states * 15 elections, gubernatorial elections are speciﬁc
individual elections. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
Table 4.8: Partisan alignment and swing states
Swing=5pp margin Swing=6pp Swing=10pp
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Alignment 0.008** 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.005
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Swing -0.000 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.003 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Alignment ∗ Swing 0.014** 0.013** 0.013** 0.012* 0.011* 0.008
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
No. of states 48 48 48 48 48 48 48
No. of swing states 151 151 151 151 151 187 283
All controls? No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-speciﬁc trend? No No No Yes No Yes Yes
Year FEs? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.396 0.397 0.401 0.401 0.397 0.397 0.401
Observations 2,736 2,736 2,736 2,736 2,602 2,736 2,736
Notes: The dependent variable, in all columns, is ∆ln Grantst. Columns (6) and (7) deﬁne swing states as states whose mar-
gin of victory was 6 and 10 percentage points, respectively. Fixed eﬀect regressions using annual data for US states between
1950 and 2008. All controls includes ∆ln incomet−1, ∆ln revenuet−1, ∆ln pop, margin of victory, split, age, female
and lame duck. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table 4.9: Partisan alignment with experienced politicians
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
yt−1 -0.264*** -0.266*** -0.266*** -0.264*** -0.266*** -0.266***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Alignment 0.008** 0.008** 0.008** 0.009** 0.008** 0.008**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Congress member 0.008** 0.008* 0.008* 0.010** 0.009* 0.009*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Alignment ∗ Congress member -0.004 -0.003 -0.003
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
∆ln Incomet−1 -0.146** -0.146** -0.146** -0.146**
(0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062)
∆ln Revenuet−1 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
∆ln Population -0.477** -0.477** -0.475** -0.475**
(0.218) (0.218) (0.218) (0.218)
Margin of victory 0.016* 0.016* 0.016* 0.016*
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Split -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Lame duck 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
No. of states 48 48 48 48 48 48
State-speciﬁc trend? No No Yes No No Yes
Year FEs? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.397 0.401 0.401 0.397 0.401 0.401
Observations 2,736 2,736 2,736 2,736 2,736 2,736
Notes: The dependent variable, in all columns, is ∆ln Grantst. Fixed eﬀect regressions using annual data for US states be-
tween 1950 and 2008. Variables are at time t unless stated otherwise. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, in
parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
145
4.C. CHAPTER 4 TABLES
Table 4.10: Falsifaction tests and selection-on-observables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A
yt−1 -0.168*** -0.300*** -0.306*** -0.306***
(0.019) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021)
Alignment -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
∆ln Incomet−1 0.300*** 0.300***
(0.066) (0.066)
∆ln Population -0.072 -0.072
(0.232) (0.232)
Margin of vitory -0.024*** -0.024***
(0.008) (0.008)
Split -0.003 -0.003
(0.003) (0.003)
Age 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Female -0.004 -0.004
(0.007) (0.007)
Lame duck -0.003 -0.003
(0.005) (0.005)
No. of states 48 48 48 48 48
Year FEs? No No Yes Yes Yes
State-speciﬁc trend? No No No No Yes
R-squared 0.001 0.021 0.556 0.563 0.563
Observations 2,784 2,736 2,736 2,736 2,736
Panel B
Controls in the State FE βL = 0.007
limited set Year FE
SR = |βF /(βL − βF )| = 7
Controls in the State FE βF = 0.008
full set Year FE
Control variables
Notes: In Panel A the dependent variable, in all columns, is ∆ln Revenuest. Fixed eﬀect regressions using annual data
for US states between 1950 and 2008. Variables are at time t unless stated otherwise. Panel B reports OLS regression co-
eﬃcients for Alignment and SR (selection ratio) based on the depicted formula. βL refers to the coeﬃcient of Alignment
from a model that contains only state and year ﬁxed eﬀects, βF refers to the coeﬃcients of Alignment from a model that
contains all control variables in addition to these ﬁxed eﬀects. The selection ratio indicates the extent of remaining selec-
tion bias due to unobservables relative to the observable variables in the model that would be necessary to drive treatment
eﬀect down to 0. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table 4.12: Sub-sample analysis
<=1974 >1974
(1) (2)
Alignment 0.008 0.007**
(0.007) (0.003)
No. of states 48 48
All controls? Yes Yes
Year FEs? Yes Yes
State-speciﬁc trend? Yes Yes
R-squared 0.398 0.372
Observations 1,104 1,632
Notes: The dependent variable, in all columns, is
∆ln Grantst. Fixed eﬀect regressions using annual
data for US states between 1950 and 2008. Variables
are at time t unless stated otherwise. Robust stan-
dard errors, clustered at the state level, in parenthe-
ses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
Table 4.13: Other robustness checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
yt−1 -0.266*** -0.266*** -0.266*** -0.266*** -0.266*** -0.266*** -0.266***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Alignment 0.008** 0.008** 0.008** 0.008** 0.008** 0.008** 0.007**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
∆ln Incomet−1 -0.148** -0.148** -0.148** -0.149** -0.148** -0.149** -0.148**
(0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.061) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062)
∆ln Revenuet−1 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
∆ln Population -0.479** -0.480** -0.481** -0.487** -0.479** -0.470** -0.482**
(0.220) (0.218) (0.220) (0.221) (0.220) (0.230) (0.221)
Margin of victory 0.016* 0.017* 0.017* 0.017* 0.017* 0.017* 0.016*
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Split -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Lame duck 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Pres birth state 0.003
(0.006)
Age2 0.000
(0.000)
ln Age 0.008
(0.012)
Military -0.004
(0.003)
Unified 0.001
(0.003)
Senators -0.002
(0.002)
Southern Democrat -0.009*
(0.005)
No. of states 48 48 48 48 48 48 48
All controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-speciﬁc trend? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.401 0.401 0.401 0.401 0.401 0.401 0.401
Observations 2,736 2,736 2,736 2,736 2,736 2,736 2,736
Notes: The dependent variable, in all columns, is ∆ln Grantsst. Fixed eﬀect regressions using annual data for US states between
1950 and 2008. Variables are at time t unless stated otherwise. Column (1) controls for the president's birth state. Columns (2)
and (3) alternatively model the impact of governor's age, ﬁrst by including a square term and then by using the natural log transfor-
mation. Column (4) controls for military experience of the governor, Military. Column (5) replaces the state checks and balances
variable to Unified, (6) controls for over representation of small states in the Senate by including the number of senators per capita
and (7) accounts for Democratic governors located in the South. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, in parentheses;
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Chapter 5 Conclusions
This thesis analyses three distinct scenarios that are motivated by three major po-
litical economy events in the recent past, namely the 2014 Scottish independence
referendum, the 2016 EU referendum and the 2016 US presidential election. By
taking cues from these events it allows this thesis to contribute to the existing lit-
erature in the most meaningful way possible. The ﬁrst empirical chapter examines
why countries tend to be more decentralized than others, which has implications in
explaining what drives the decentralization of ﬁscal powers, like in Scotland. The fol-
lowing empirical chapter is prompted by the Brexit vote. By examining the impact
of the government's pro-remain impact leaﬂet across assorted demographic groups,
the evidence shows results in line with expectations. This includes a distinction
across partisan groups i.e. separate analysis on Conservative and Labour support-
ers. The subsequent chapter, chapter 4, looks at whether a centralized policy maker
can exploit a decentralized system of governance for partisan gain at elections. By
using evidence from the US, this chapter provides insights into how the president
may seek to consolidate power for his party.
5.1 Summary of ﬁndings
Chapter 2 presents analysis on the drivers of ﬁscal decentralization with a focus on
the role of ethno-linguistic diversity. Using a new dataset of decentralization mea-
sures, that better capture the true degree of sub-national decision making authority
within a given country, I show that increasing the level of diversity leads to a increase
in more ﬁscal decentralization. When accounting for the depth of cleavages between
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ethno-linguistic groups I ﬁnd that is the more superﬁcial cleavages that are behind
this relationship. Whereas the perennial cleavages bear no impact on the degree
of decentralization. In order to overcome endogeneity concerns, mainly because of
reverse causality and possible omitted variables, I employ an instrumental variable
methodology. I use the origin of anatomically modern human life in a given country
as an instrument for long-run diversity.
In chapter 3 I investigate how the government's leaﬂet impacted voting behaviour
in the 2016 EU referendum. The leaﬂet was sent to all UK households, however,
not every individual was exposed to this source of information. Using individual-
level data from the British Election Study, this chapter implements matching and
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence identiﬁcation strategies to identify a causal eﬀect of leaﬂet
exposure. I ﬁnd that exposure caused an individual to become 3 percentage points
more likely to vote remain. I split the sample between those with high and low
exposure to other sources of referendum information. Here, I distinguish between
several demographic groups that diﬀer in their susceptibility to persuasion bias. I
ﬁnd that the result is driven by groups more susceptible to persuasion bias who
had a low level of exposure to other information. Also, this chapter shows that
Conservative partisans who were exposed with a high amount of other referendum
information are even more likely to vote remain, which is because they observed
splits in their party and interpreted the leaﬂet as a signal to vote remain from
the Conservative government. There is also evidence that shows the leaﬂet was a
persuasive tool changing leave votes into remain ones, rather than increasing the
remain vote turnout. The mechanism behind this persuasion argument is based on
exposed individuals becoming more informed about likely scenarios in the event of
a leave vote.
The ﬁnal empirical chapter, chapter 4, explores partisan alignment in the US over
the period 1950  2008. In particular, partisan alignment is when the president
and state governor are simultaneously in oﬃce and of the same party. I exploit the
quasi-randomness of alignment in the US to identify the alignment eﬀect. I show
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that when aligned, the president increases the growth rate of grants to a co-partisan
state by 0.8 percentage points. When examining why this occurs, I focus on an
electoral incentives argument. By interacting the alignment variable with the elec-
toral calendar, I ﬁnd that funds are disproportionately increased in election years.
To further this argument, the paper examines the role of swing states. There are
electorally critical states in presidential elections. Here, funds are again increased
to a greater extent when a co-partisan governor is in place. As another facet to this
chapter, and contribution to the literature, I analyse the role of governor's personal
traits in determining the amount of grants received and ﬁnd that those governors
with prior political experience in congress receive more, irrespective of their parti-
sanship. This is a result of their superior lobbying skills. All in all, the results are
in accordance with the president increasing funds to co-partisans in order to beneﬁt
electorally from positive vertical spill-overs in the performance of government.
5.2 Policy implications, limitations and future research
The results of chapter 2 indicate that a more ethno-linguistically diverse population
positively impacts the level of ﬁscal decentralization in a given country. The ﬁndings
are not only of interest to social scientists, but to the general population because they
oﬀer a reasoned projection of how the world will develop. As the world continues
to become a more globalised place, where groups of people are able to migrate with
increased ﬂuidity, there should be a continued push toward more regional autonomy.
This reaction to increasing diversity is necessary for local authorities to integrate
those out-groups into a modern society (Alesina and Ferrara, 2005). In this sense, the
work is limited by looking only at the cross-country level. More information on the
impacts of diversity may be revealed by using a more disaggregated within country
approach. For instance, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2017) use the case of Africa
to reveal that city-level diversity has a positive eﬀect on economic growth, whereas
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no relationship is found when using a country as the unit of analysis. Moreover,
more work can be done to disentangle the channels of impact that diversity aﬀects
decentralization.
The following chapter ﬁnds that exposure to the UK government's leaﬂet caused
individuals to become more likely to vote remain in the 2016 EU referendum. All
previous work focuses on correlations and associations of why people voted leave or
projections of the impact of leaving the EU. This chapter, however, oﬀers the ﬁrst
evidence from a quasi-natural experiment in context of the referendum. The impli-
cations of this research are particularly pertinent due to the novel setting studied.
Future political, or referendum, campaigns may be more focused on those demo-
graphics that are more liable to persuasion bias in order to elicit their votes. The
drawbacks of this research are that it considers only a single source of referendum
information. Throughout the campaign there was a wealth of sources arguing dif-
ferent things about what leaving the EU may mean for the UK. Portions of the
news were considered to be inaccurate and would therefore warrarnt further work
to examine the impact of this. New research in this area about who believes `fake
news' (deﬁned as news stories that are intentionally and veriﬁably false) in context
of the 2016 US election has been explored by Allcott and Gentzkow (2017). In terms
of other areas of future research, given that the literature is in the very early stages
there is ample scope for future work. Other interventions such as the televised de-
bates or the murder of Jo Cox MP may prove to be fruitful avenues in contributing
to the understanding of how a leave vote prevailed.
The third empirical chapter reveals that, in the US, the president shows a bias
towards co-partisan governors in order to beneﬁt from vertical spillovers of perfor-
mance and increase his party's chances of re-election. Naturally in this case, the
connotations of this scenario are a malapportionment of federal monies, which cre-
ates an ineﬃcient allocation of resources. As a remedy to this, policy should focus
on a re-structuring of presidential power. Perhaps a blind system that continues to
allow governors to lobby for federal transfers but through a channel which hides all
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information that may reveal who is applying for the funds. The blind system should
allow funding to reach projects based on merit alone. However, as this research
focuses solely on the case of the US, the implications may not be applicable to other
countries. Not only may this work not apply to other mature democracies, but it
is unlikely to be correct for autocracies or even less mature democracies due to the
lower level of constraints placed on the executive branch. It would also be inter-
esting to assess the welfare implications of a misallocation of resources because of
alignment. Are funds diverted from one states welfare budget into an aligned states
welfare budget? Or, are the extra funds channelled to the states in one particular
classiﬁcation of transfer? Furthermore, one may ask whether the alignment aﬀect is
still present at lower tiers of governance. To use the US case again, it would be inter-
esting to investigate whether state governors award more funds towards co-partisan
city mayors to beneﬁt their party in gubernatorial elections.
In summary, each chapter within this thesis separately contributes to the various
relevant strands of literature in topics such as state development, electoral cycles and
political preferences. There are also implications for behavioural economics and the
mass media literature. In its entirety, this thesis builds upon and develops existing
scholarly research on the political and public economics literatures. Whilst there
are limitations to the research presented in this thesis, several future avenues have
been discussed for the literature to develop understanding further. The implications
are of this research are important for policy makers and social scientists alike, due
to the motivation and framing of each chapter.
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